

At to ER 10-326
for Rangin Kluck
1958

R E P O R T
of the
ZELLERBACH COMMISSION
on the
EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

(Including Resume of Findings and Recommendations)

Sponsored by the

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

35

Copies of this Report
may be obtained through

THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

255 Fourth Avenue

New York 10, N. Y.

Price: \$2.00 per copy

"Refugee" is more than a word. A refugee is a man who needs an identity - a passport, a paper that says he may work, a place to settle again, a chance to educate his children, a need to feel, above all, that he is wanted by the human race. He cannot have these behind cement walls, or in filthy barracks, forgotten by the free world for which he once fought."

Gertrude Samuels

"People In Search Of Identity"

N. Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 23, 1956

THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION
on
THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

Chairman:

MR. HAROLD ZELLERBACH
President
Crown-Zellerbach Corporation

Co-Chairman:

HON. ANGIER BIDDLE DUKE
President
International Rescue Committee

HON. EUGENIE ANDERSON
Former U. S. Ambassador
to Denmark

MR. IRVING BROWN
European Representative
AF of L -- CIO

MRS. DAVID LEVY
Member
New York State Youth Commission

MR. EUGENE LYONS
Senior Editor
The Reader's Digest

THE VERY REV. JAMES A. PIKE
Dean
Cathedral of St. John the Divine

THE IRON CURTAIN



C O N T E N T S

o f

The Zellerbach Report

- I. The Zellerbach Commission on the European Refugee Situation
- II. Foreword
 - Glossary
- III. Resume of Findings and Recommendations
- IV. Report of the Zellerbach Commission
 - 1. The Refugee Situation in Europe
 - 2. The Hungarian Refugees One Year Later
 - 3. The "Hard Core" Refugees
 - 4. The New Influx of Yugoslav Refugees
 - 5. Berlin
 - 6. Present Status of the Communist Redefection Campaign
 - 7. The Reception and Treatment of the Refugees -- a Challenge
to the West
 - 8. U. S. Immigration Policy
- V. Annexes
 - i. Recommendations of the Geneva Conference, May 30-31, 1957
 - ii. On the Need for an Initial Grant for Refugees
 - iii. Refugee Intake Compared to Population of Receiving Countries
 - iv. Statute of the Office of the U. N. High Commissioner
 - v. The USEP Employment Project
 - vi. Resolution on Closure of Camps
 - vii. Resolution on Sardinia Project
 - viii. The Geneva Convention on Refugees
 - ix. Excerpts -- UNHCR Statistical Report
(Based on Preliminary Surveys)
 - x. Resolution Adopted by NATO Parliamentary Conference

The Zellerbach Commission on the European refugee situation was established on the initiative of the International Rescue Committee. The decision to set up the Commission sprang from these considerations:

1. The unprecedented response of the free world to the Hungarian refugee emergency had, ironically, accentuated the misery of the 170,000 iron curtain refugees who had accumulated in Western Europe since the end of the war and were still waiting for an opportunity to rebuild their lives.

2. On the other hand, the success in resettling almost 170,000 Hungarian refugees in less than one year had established a pattern of emergency action, which, with suitable modification, might provide a solution for the residual problem of the anti-communist refugees in Europe.

3. The American people have always responded generously to situations such as this when the facts have been squarely presented. The apparent public indifference to the problem is due to a simple lack of knowledge.

After much thought, it was decided that the most effective way of bringing the facts to the attention of the American public would be to have a survey made by a representative group of prominent citizens, who could, so to speak, submit a citizens' report to the people.

The decision to establish the commission was also inspired by the hope that such a group of people, looking at the problem with a fresh viewpoint, might be able, through their recommendations, to make a modest contribution to the solution of the problem.

It was decided in advance that the Commission should limit its survey to the problem of the "non-ethnic" refugees in Western Europe. The problems of the East German refugees in the Bonn Republic and the Venezia

Giulia refugees in Italy are of the greatest importance, but they are properly the subject for a separate--though related--study. For the ethnic refugees, arriving in a country whose language and culture he shares, integration on the spot is, more frequently than not, the ideal solution. But for the non-ethnic refugee--e.g., A Pole arriving in Germany--barriers of language, culture and history (plus economic limitations in the case of Italy and Austria) make integration much more difficult and sometimes impossible. For this category, emigration rather than integration is the solution indicated in the majority of the cases. That is why their problem is of special concern to the United Nations and to the free world.

In the case of West Berlin, the Commission decided in favor of a brief deviation from its over-all pattern because the situation there is historically unique as well as of the greatest significance politically.

The Commission was constrained to place one further limitation on the scope of its report. There are some scores of thousands of European refugees whose original uprooting fell somewhere between World War I and World War II. Many of these are in very great need. Particularly desperate is the plight of more than 20,000 Europeans in mainland China and Hong Kong, most of them refugees from the Russian Revolution, or their descendants. (ICEM and UNHCR, which maintain offices in Hong Kong, have evacuated more than 10,000 of these refugees to various parts of the free world, but the movement has now stopped due to the lack of funds.) Again, it was felt that, while the problem of the pre-World War II refugees is distinctly related to the subject of this survey, there is a qualitative difference which suggests the need for separate study. (It should be noted that many pre-World War II refugees--e.g., Russians in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and East Germany--became refugees for a second time during or after World War II.)

Finally, limited time and staff facilities made it necessary for the

Commission to confine its study basically to the European countries which have the greatest refugee concentrations--Germany, Austria, Italy and France. Perhaps at some later date it will be possible to bring out a supplement dealing with the situation of the refugees in Greece, Turkey, the Scandinavian countries, etc.

The Commission arrived in Europe on October 15 and returned to New York on November 1. Two weeks is a brief time to view a problem of such magnitude and complexity. To compensate in part for this, the Commission subjected itself to an unbroken itinerary--early morning until late evening, seven days a week--of visits to camps and installations, and discussions with representatives of governments, intergovernmental agencies, and private organizations concerned with refugees. But even with so concentrated a schedule, this report obviously would not have been possible without several months of preliminary research by a very competent staff--to whom the Commission is indebted, in addition, for their labors as editorial assistants over the past month.

So many impressions were crowded into so short a period of time, that when the trip was over the Commission members had the feeling that they had been moving around Europe studying the refugee problem for two months rather than two weeks.

In Switzerland, the Commission met with representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner's office and of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration; it also visited the I.R.C. home for Hungarian refugee minors at Adelboden.

In Italy it had discussions in Rome with the representatives of UNHCR

Approved For Release 2003/07/10 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000900040001-7

gratitude to the Hon. Henry J. Taylor, American Ambassador to Switzerland; the Hon. James Zellerbach, American Ambassador to Italy; the Hon. Freeman Matthews, American Ambassador to Austria; the Hon. Amory Houghton, American Ambassador to France; Gen. and Mrs. Lauris Norstadt; the Hon. Edward Paige, American Consul General in Munich; Mr. James Read, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees; the Hon. Harold H. Tittmann, Director of ICEM; Herr Oskar Helmer, Austrian Minister of the Interior; Herr Werner Middleman, Deputy to the Minister for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims in Germany; Colonel Marsallo, Director of the AAI in Italy; M. Philippe Monod, Plenipotentiary Minister, Director of Administrative and Social Affairs at the French Foreign Office; Mr. Richard R. Brown, European Director for USEP and Mr. Eric Hughes, Deputy European Director.

The Commission also wishes to express its gratitude to the representatives of the American voluntary agencies for their courtesy, for the information they provided, and for their helpful suggestions. In particular, the Commission wishes to mention Mr. James Norris, NCWC Director for Europe; Dr. Edgar Chandler, Director of Refugee Services in Europe for the World Council of Churches; Msgr. Andrew P. Landi, Italian Director for NCWC; Mrs. Margaret Angelo, Welfare Officer of the NCWC office in Trieste; Mme. Tatiana Schaufuss, Overseas Director for the Tolstoy Foundation; and Prince Nicolas Engalicev, former Italian Director for the World Council of Churches, who placed himself entirely at the Commission's disposal during its visit to Italy.

The Commission owes a great debt to all of the members of the IRC staff in Europe for their help in arranging their tour and in gathering the factual information contained in this report. Special thanks are due to Mr. John Alexander-Sinclair, European Director of the International Rescue Committee, who was at the same time an authority, a guide, and a general manager; to Miss Alida de Jager, of IRC Switzerland, who prepared a most useful preliminary survey; and to Mr. David Martin, who served as rapporteur for the Commission.

It is the hope of the Commission that this report will make some small contribution in promoting an understanding of the refugee problem, and of the special responsibilities of the free world community and, in particular, of our own country.

The opinions and recommendations presented in this report represent the private views of the Commission.

HAROLD ZELLERBACH

CHAIRMAN

ANGIER BIDDLE DUKE

CO-CHAIRMAN

EUGENIE ANDERSON

IRVING BROWN

ADELE LEVY

EUGENE LYONS

JAMES A. PIKE

ERRATA AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

FOREWORD

Page 2, para 3: It is incorrect that the movement of refugees from the Far East has already been stopped. It may stop entirely by the end of this year unless further funds are forthcoming -- but it is still continuing, although at a much reduced level.

RESUME

Page 2, para 1,
line 5: The figure of 170,000 refugees remaining to be resettled refers to non-Hungarian refugees.

THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES ONE YEAR LATER

Page 7, para 3,
line 3: "more than 6,000" ... should read "more than 7,000".

Page 8, para 5,
line 1 "2,000 unaccompanied Hungarian minors" ... should read "1,200 unaccompanied Hungarian minors".

Page 10: STATISTICAL TABLE: The figure of 2,800 refugees remaining in Yugoslavia includes, as the footnote points out, some 600 who can be considered locally integrated. The 600 who are integrated are not living in camps or centers.

Page 11, lines
22-23: "the refugees were accommodated in resort hotels." This was true for about half of the refugees; the rest were accommodated in camps from the outset.

Pages 13 and 14: The Hungarian Refugees in Other Countries. The figure given for Germany is 14,500; for France, 8,500; for Switzerland, 10,700. These figures actually reflect the number of Hungarian refugees present in these countries as of September 30, 1957. The number of Hungarians originally admitted was somewhat higher in each case -- for Germany, 15,300; for France, 12,400; for Switzerland 12,600.

Special mention should also have been made in this section of the United Kingdom and Canada, each of whom received more than 20,000 refugees. These countries were not included in the area of the Commission's survey. An effort was made to obtain information relating to the Hungarian resettlement programs in Canada and the United Kingdom, but unfortunately the information did not arrive in time for inclusion in the Report.

Final Page: The photograph on the final page, identified as Camp Bela Crkva, was really taken in Camp Ecka.

G L O S S A R Y

of

FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

A. Governmental and Inter-Governmental Organizations. *

ICEM -- Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration
UNHCR -- U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNREF --- U. N. Refugee Fund
USEP --- U. S. Escapee Program

B. American and International Voluntary Agencies Concerned With Refugees. **

AFSC -- American Friends Service Committee
AJDC -- American Joint Distribution Committee
CWS -- Church World Service
HIAS -- Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
IRC -- International Rescue Committee
ISS -- International Social Service
LWF -- Lutheran World Federation
NCWC -- National Catholic Welfare Conference
TF -- Tolstoy Foundation
WCC -- World Council of Churches

* The functions of these organizations are described fully in the section entitled "The Refugee Situation in Europe", beginning on page 14.

** This list of abbreviations covers only those agencies of whom mention is made several times in the text. For a full list of agencies, see pages 19 and 20 of section entitled "The Refugee Situation in Europe".

III. RESUME OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

RESUME OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"It is a base lie to say that the refugee problem is insoluble. Every single one of the problems involved - many of them admittedly complicated ones - can be solved, provided only that the will to do so is there."

-- Dr. Odd Hansen

The Situation:

There are in Europe today some 200,000 non-resettled refugees from the Communist sphere. This figure includes:

- Approximately 23,000 Hungarians in Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy - the remainder of the 200,000 who escaped after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution
- Approximately 14,000 recent Yugoslav escapees in Austria and Italy - the balance of some 20,000-25,000 who have come out since the beginning of the year
- Refugees who escaped from the satellite countries at various times since the communist clampdown of 1946-47
- Refugees who were classified as Displaced Persons at the end of the war (Having come to Germany and Austria as prisoners or slave-laborers, they refused to return to their communist-dominated homelands)

These figures do not include the expellees or ethnic refugees (East German refugees in Germany, Venezia Giulia refugees in Italy, etc.)

Of the 200,000 refugees, over 50,000 are living in 180 official refugee camps. The remainder are living in numerous unofficial camps, hutments and sub-marginal dwellings.

Yugoslavs have been coming out at the rate of several thousand a month. This has been possible because there are no barbed wire entanglements and watch towers on the Yugoslav frontiers. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian frontiers in contradistinction are virtually impassable. However, over recent months some hundreds of Poles, Czechs and Hungarians have managed to defect while travelling on legal passports.

Findings and Recommendations:

1. The refugee problem can be solved: The handling of the Hungarian refugee emergency demonstrates how much can be done when the will and the unity are there. It is noteworthy that the number of unresettled refugees remaining in Europe is roughly comparable to the number of Hungarians resettled over the past year. While the 170,000 remaining include many difficult-to-resettle cases, there is every reason to believe that, given a concerted effort by the Western nations, the problem can be solved humanely and expeditiously.
2. There must be no more palliatives: We have, in effect, thrown life-belts to the drowning, but left them in the sea. We now have to pull them to land. We must put an end to the flow of unproductive millions that have gone into camp upkeep, small subsidies, parcels, etc. - without helping the refugee to re-establish himself. The refugee must be given constructive aid that will enable him to become self-supporting and self-respecting, instead of being compelled to exist on alms.
3. The refugees from communist rule are a collective Western responsibility. As things stand today, those countries which, by virtue of political accident, have common frontiers with the Iron Curtain, must bear the brunt of the burden. This is unfair to the refugees and unfair to the receiving countries. It is a source of unnecessary friction within the Western community of nations; and, since it impedes the expeditious processing of escapees, it also plays into the hands of the Communist defection agents and the Communist radio.
4. The need--a crash program to be planned by a Western Nations Conference: To liquidate the residual refugee problem in Europe on a crash basis, the Commission proposes the convening of an international conference involving UNHCR, ICEM and the Free Nations most concerned with the refugee problem, either as countries of first asylum or countries of

immigration. Conceivably, this conference should be initiated by an existing Western Nations organization, such as NATO. Whatever the instrumentality, the Commission hopes that the United States will fully back such an initiative.

5. U. S. Immigration Policy must be liberalized: To provide the leadership which the Western World expects of us and to live up to our own tradition of asylum for the oppressed, the U.S. must enact legislation permitting a substantially greater number of Iron Curtain refugees to enter our country. Specifically, the Commission recommends:

A. The enactment of a new law admitting 75,000 Iron Curtain refugees as non-quota immigrants, with special provision for the admission of a fair share of hard-core cases, on the pattern established by the Scandinavian countries. A program of this scope would encourage the other Western Nations to join in a crash program designed to liquidate the residual refugee problem in Europe, as well as the unfinished business of the Hungarian emergency.

B. The pooling of unused quotas, as proposed by President Eisenhower. The Commission, however, believes that, in addition to persons qualifying for preference status under existing law, all bona fide refugees from communist countries should benefit from the pool.

C. The enactment of legislation regularizing the status of the 30,000 Hungarian parolees so that, in President Eisenhower's words, "they might in the future acquire permanent residence, looking forward towards citizenship."

D. The extension of the parole program to make possible the admission of Hungarian refugees for whom affidavits of relationship are filed by relatives in the United States, no matter whether the affiant relatives are citizens, legal residents, or parolees.

6. Greater Support for UNHCR: The U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees has embarked on a "Close the Camps" campaign, designed to shut down.

6. Greater Support for UNHCR and ICEM: UNHCR, in addition to providing international protection for refugees, has been one of two inter-governmental agencies actively concerned with their resettlement. (For an account of the activities of the UNHCR see page 14, "The Refugee Situation in Europe".)

UNHCR has embarked on a "Close the Camps" campaign, designed to shut down all the camps with the exception of the reception and processing centers, by the end of 1960. This is one of the most imaginative proposals that has yet been put forward, and it merits the unstinting support of the community of free nations. If, however, this crash program is to be expanded to include the liquidation of the "out-of-camp" refugee problem simultaneously with the "in-camp" refugee problem, the Office of the High Commissioner will require far greater support from the contributory nations.

ICEM is the other intergovernmental agency concerned with the resettlement of refugees. Although it was set up for the primary purpose of organizing the transport of European migrants, it provides an entire range of supplementary resettlement services — documentation and processing, transportation, vocational training, etc. (For a more detailed account of ICEM's operations see page 15, "The Refugee Situation in Europe".)

Since ICEM is the only organization with the machinery and know-how for moving large numbers of migrants, any crash program to liquidate the refugee problem would require a proportionate increase in government contributions to ICEM.

7. Greater Support for USEP: The United States Escapee Program since its inception has made a wide range of assistance possible for almost 150,000 refugees. With the exception of the Hungarian emergency, it has operated on an annual budget of approximately five and one-half to six million dollars per annum. The Commission was greatly impressed by the

scope and effectiveness of the USEP program. By channeling its aid through the voluntary agencies, it has given it the "people to people" quality which direct government aid cannot give. From the standpoint of the concrete benefits and the happiness it has brought to those who have escaped, as well as from the standpoint of the ideological conflict with communism, the program is worth many times its cost in dollars. If the USEP budget were doubled, as the Commission believes it should be, it would still be a very minor item of our total governmental budget — for that matter a minor item compared with the many millions that are being spent for cold war purposes.

8. The escapee problem must be dealt with on a current basis:

Because of the accumulated refugee backlog and because of complicated screening and immigration procedures, the refugees escaping to the West since the end of the war have, in most cases, had to wait several years for resettlement. (The Hungarian refugees were, of course, an exception. This long waiting period is wasteful financially, imposes unnecessary suffering

Soviet redefection agents. It would be in the interest of the receiving countries to develop programs and procedures that would make it possible to resettle escapees within 6 months to one year of their arrival in the West -- and once the slate has been wiped clean of the residual refugee problem which exists today, there is no reason why this goal cannot be achieved.

9. The treatment accorded escapees should be made uniformly humane:

A. The escapee's first real experience of the free world is apt to be a camp like Valka, the reception center for all non-German refugees arriving in Germany. Valka looks more like a concentration camp than a refugee reception center. It is a blot on Germany's generally good reputation in the treatment of refugees. The Commission was assured that Valka would be closed by the end of 1958. It wonders, however, whether means might not be found of moving up the target date.

Reception centers need not have a concentration camp atmosphere. Camp Zirndorf, near Valka, which was set up with USEP assistance, provides an environment and conditions which might well serve as a model.

B. Screening procedures should be carefully re-examined with a view to providing the refugee with the same degree of protection as is accorded an accused person.

C. Eligibility criteria should, insofar as possible, be made uniform for the countries of reception.

D. Legal counselors should be available to all escapees during the period of their eligibility screening and afterwards.

E. The process of resettlement must be expedited.

10. The Hungarian refugees one year later: In the space of five months commencing November, 1956, almost 200,000 Hungarian refugees escaped into Austria and Yugoslavia. The fact that this number has now been reduced

Because of the moral and political significance of the Hungarian Revolution, it is essential that the remainder of this problem be tackled on a priority basis (recommendations relating to U. S. immigration are covered in the section entitled "U. S. Immigration Policy").

11. The New Yugoslav Refugees: Since the beginning of the year some 20,000 to 25,000 Yugoslav refugees have escaped into Austria and Italy. The rate of escape into Austria has been as high as 2200 per month and that into Italy as high as 1600.

There has been a tendency in the West to regard these escapees as "economic migrants" rather than as "political refugees". The Commission believes that this definition is meaningless and that the Yugoslav refugees, like the refugees from other communist-dominated countries, escape for a complex of political, economic and personal motivations. The Commission urges that they be accorded the same consideration and treatment as escapees of other nationalities.

The Commission was greatly impressed by the youth of the escapees, almost 80% of whom are under 25. They are not delinquents, but for the most part workers and students. They have made their decision to flee apparently for the reason that they are part of the generation that is in ferment throughout the communist world.

The Commission was disturbed by the fact that, both in Italy and Austria, escapees under the age of 18, with very rare exceptions, were being repatriated. While some argument may be made for turning back youngsters in their early teens, the Commission feels that the majority of the 16 and 17 year old escapees have much the same motivations as the 18, 19, or 20 year old escapees. It recommends that the most serious consideration be given to a solution resembling that applied in the case of the Hungarian minors.

12. The Hard-Core Cases: The residual refugee population in Europe includes somewhat more than 31,000 so-called hard-core cases. Included in this category are the aged, the physically incapacitated, and the institutional cases. But also included in it are many thousands of people in their 50's and late 40's, men and women whose only disability is a TB scar on their lungs, or some other minor handicap - all of whom can, with special effort, be made economically self-sustaining.

The hard-core problem cannot be solved by leaving these difficult-to-resettle cases in Germany, Austria, and Italy.

The hard-core program, as much as any other aspect of the refugee problem, must be considered a joint responsibility of the Western world. It is unfair to leave the bulk of this burden to the several nations -- Germany, Austria, and Italy primarily -- who have thus far provided asylum for the hard-core refugees.

The great majority of the hard-core cases can be resettled with special effort. This is borne out by the experiences of Norway and other small countries; by the Trieste program; by Father Pire's European Villages, the Galvania project, and other undertakings. Indeed, the Scandinavian countries discovered that TB refugees, after being cured, make particularly desirable citizens.

If smaller countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Switzerland could, between them, take several thousand hard-core cases, then other Western countries, including the United States, could take proportionately more.

There is every reason to believe that the problem could be liquidated in short order by a Western Nations conference such as has already been proposed.

1. THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION TODAY

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

I. THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN EUROPE

The Post War Period:

The end of hostilities in 1945 found 11,000,000 displaced persons of non-German origin in Europe. 8,000,000 of these were repatriated by UNRRA, in the immediate post-war years. But as the pattern of Communist domination in the Central European countries emerged more clearly, the rate of repatriation -- despite the enticements of the Communist regime -- slowed to a trickle.

The International Refugee Organization, which was established in 1947, took over 1,620,000 refugees, of whom 795,000 were distributed in more than 1,000 camps -- the majority of them in West Germany, Austria and Italy. Of this number, only 73,000 agreed to repatriation. The vast majority, who had already spent two years in the camps and knew that they might have to wait several years more for an opportunity to migrate, made it clear that they preferred this dismal prospect to life in their Communist-dominated homelands.

IRO succeeded in resettling 1,039,000 refugees overseas. A further 97,000 died or disappeared. An unknown number, possibly several hundred thousands, succeeded in achieving a more or less satisfactory integration in their countries of asylum. On the other hand, a steady influx from the Communist dominated countries increased the number of refugees, in some years almost off-setting the rate of resettlement.

The Present Situation

The refugee problem in Europe today has been spawned by the spread of Communist despotism. The Hungarian revolution demonstrated the passionate and universal hatred with which the subject peoples regard their Communist masters. To escape from this regime of terror to the freedom of the West hundreds of thousands of people have sacrificed everything they possess and

Present Situation

risked their lives. So long as Communism exists and so long as men cherish freedom, it can be anticipated that every year will see a new influx of refugees from the Communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe.

* * *

There are in Europe today some 200,000 non-resettled refugees of whom about 50,000^{*} are living in camps. (These figures do not, however, include the so-called ethnic refugees, such as the Volksdeutsche in Germany). Included in these figures are:

- (1) Refugees (called "Displaced Persons") who refused to return to their Communist-dominated homelands when the war was over;
- (2) Refugees from the satellite countries who came out after the Communist seizure of power of 1946-47, but before the Iron Curtain had become a reality of barbed wire and watchtowers;
- (3) Refugees who, despite the Iron Curtain, made their way to Western Europe during the difficult period of 1950-56;
- (4) Some 23,000 Hungarian refugees who escaped from their country last winter after the Soviets had crushed the Hungarian revolution;
- (5) More than 13,000 Yugoslavs who have escaped since the beginning of this year;
- (6) Several thousand "passport" refugees of various satellite nationalities who have made their bid for freedom while traveling with legitimate passports to East Germany or to Western

* These figures are approximations (a) because the High Commissioner's statistical survey has not yet been completed for out-of-camp population, and (b) because the in-camp population fluctuates from month to month -- e.g. some thousands of Hungarians have gone out in the past month but several thousand Yugoslavs have come in.

European countries, in most cases for business, professional or scholastic reasons.

Compared to the millions of refugees and displaced persons who have already been moved, the number of 200,000 non-resettled refugees remaining in Europe seems small. With the exception of recent escapees, however, resettlement for the European refugees, both in-camp and out-of-camp, is bound to be more difficult than it was in the past. In the first place, selection for immigration has generally been carried out on narrow preferential grounds rather than humanitarian. The selection missions of the receiving countries, quite understandably, accorded priority to the young and the able-bodied and the highly skilled.

The receiving countries, with notable exceptions, accepted refugees not in terms of solving the problem or helping human beings in distress but rather in terms of their own narrowly viewed economic requirements. As a result, the countries bordering on the Iron Curtain have had a double burden to bear -- the general burden of serving as a first haven for all displaced persons and refugees, and the special burden of accommodating the residual hard core -- those who were suffering from disease and physical disability or who were past the prime of life.

The Refugees in Western Germany

	<u>In Camp</u>	<u>Total</u>	*
Foreign Refugees (not including Hungarians)	22,400	220,000	
German expellees from Eastern countries	400,000	9,004,000	
East German refugees	180,000	2,867,000	
* Approximate estimates as of September, 1957.			

Because of her geographic position and her formidable economic development, Western Germany has not only received the greatest number of refugees, but on the whole it has done the most for them. Certainly it is the country where integration sur place has been easiest.

Since the end of World War II, Western Germany has received and sheltered more than 220,000 refugees from Soviet terror. This, in addition to the almost 9 million German ethnic expellees and some 3 million German ethnic refugees. For foreign refugees only, the German government has been spending on an average \$10 million per year since 1950. In addition, approximately \$21 million have been spent on the construction of houses for foreign refugees.

Under a law of April 25, 1951, foreign refugees in Germany were granted legal equality with German citizens, so far as their right to work, their protection under the law, and their eligibility under the law for social benefits, were concerned. At the present time, less than 20% of the foreign refugees in Germany are still unemployed and/or living on public assistance. Approximately 5,000 are temporarily employed while living in camp. About 30% of the refugees can be considered integrated. The remaining 50%, however, have inadequate or unsatisfactory jobs, not in the trades or professions for which they were trained.

The present economic situation in Germany has made it possible to find employment (sometimes satisfactory, sometimes acceptable only as a stopgap) for refugees. However, many of the camps and settlements built for the refugees after the war are far removed from industrial centers. Since no housing for refugees is available in these centers the refugees living in these camps are for practical purposes doomed to unemployment. The German Government is now attempting to implement a plan for transferring the unemployed refugees to areas where the employment opportunities are greater. This has meant concentration on the construction of new

houses, especially for refugee workers in the industrial areas.

The greatest foreign refugee concentrations are to be found in Nord Rhein, Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Bavaria.

The reception camp for all foreign refugees entering Germany is Camp Valka near Nurnberg. (For a full description of Valka see chapter entitled "Reception and Treatment of the Refugees".) Here the refugee has to pass screening and examination procedures that require on an average 8 to 9 months. If he is granted refugee status, he has precisely the same right to work as a German citizen. If he is denied status - which now happens to more than 40% of the new arrivals - he requires a special permit to accept employment. An appeal - which may take months - can be made against a negative decision. Most refugees are handicapped, however, because they do not know German, and do not have first-hand information about their rights, and do not have access to legal counsel. As a result, only one-third of the appeals are successful.

Refugees whose status has been recognized and who have been declared eligible for USEP assistance are, as places are available, eventually transferred from Valka to Camp Zirndorf, a camp with a capacity of some 330, recently established with USEP support. Zirndorf, so far as this can be said of any camp, is a model one.

However terrible Camp Valka may be, morale is still much lower in ordinary camps like Landshut. In Valka, at least, people come and go. There is some life and movement. In Landshut all is dead. Landshut's 424 inmates have lived there for years. Those who had emigration possibilities have already left. The voluntary agencies have for the most part withdrawn their social workers because the cases that remain possess next to no possibility of migration. These are truly the "forgotten men". In the entrance, on the blackboard, are the rules of RRA, long since extinct.

People cook in their own rooms. The old stone barracks is dark, damp and dirty. The one common room is generally kept locked by the camp leader. Most of the 86 children in the camp know no other life than this. It is not strange, therefore, that so many of them have shadows on their lungs, which bar their entire family from emigration.

In the section on the "hard core" refugees we detail some of the effective steps that have been taken to make even difficult "hard core" cases economically self-supporting. It is amazing that after so many years in Landshut there are still so many refugees who manifest both the will to live and the desire to work - like the Russian refugee of 50 who, after 13 years in camps, asked the Commission's staff not to give him charity but to provide him with a possibility of retraining in any profession or trade so that he could again have the satisfaction of earning his own bread.

Certainly those who wish to work should be encouraged in every way to do so. Unfortunately, as things are now, they are penalized in certain respects. Unemployed refugees leaving camp to live on their own receive a supply of furniture through German Sozial-fürsorge (Social Welfare). Those who leave the camps to accept employment have to pay for their furniture - and in order to do so they must mortgage themselves for years to come.

For very many of the refugees, the easiest and most sensible solution is integration into the German economy. This is something that frequently requires a special effort.

In many cases the problem of integration boils down to the problem of housing. In both Germany and Austria the High Commissioner, for this reason, has placed primary emphasis on this aspect of the program. Through contributions to the German Social Housing Program, low cost fixed rental dwelling units are being made available to some thousands of refugees.

After housing, job placement ranks as the next most acute problem. A model project in this field, which lends itself to reproduction in other parts of Germany and other countries, is the employment service run jointly by the American Friends Service Committee and the International Rescue Committee under USEP auspices. Thanks to this service, almost 800 refugees were placed in employment during 1956.

Austria

Refugees in Austria

	<u>In Camp</u>	<u>Out of Camp</u>	<u>Total</u>
Foreign Refugees (not including new Hungarians)	6,500	18,500	25,000 *
German-speaking & South Tyroleans	8,700	79,600	88,300
Number of Government camps:	55		
* Approximate figures as of September, 1957			

Next to Germany, Austria has been called upon to shoulder the heaviest burden of refugees. Whereas the burgeoning German industrial economy has made it possible for her to absorb not only millions of German expellees and refugees but also the majority of the foreign refugees, the Austrian government has had to cope with its own refugee problem within the framework of a much poorer and more restricted national economy. There are unquestionably a number of weak spots in the treatment accorded to Iron Curtain refugees in Austria. But against the background of her own very great difficulties, Austria deserves the praise of the world for all she has done to receive and shelter the thousands who flee from Communist persecution. Indeed, her courageous respect of the right of asylum is all the more noteworthy because of her delicate political position as signatory of a peace treaty that compels her neutrality and leaves her virtually unarmed.

Austria now has a total of about 25,000 foreign refugees, not including the recent Hungarian escapees. Of this number 6,500 are in camps and approximately 18,500 out of camps. Approximately 6,000 of the refugees

are USEP eligible. Most of the camps with pre-Hungarian revolution refugees are in Upper Austria and near Salzburg. Camps Kufstein, Klagenfurt and Villach are reputedly among the worst of them. Beside the official camps, there is a large number of smaller, unofficial ones throughout the country, where living conditions are at least as bad as the worst of the official camps.

Though many refugees have succeeded in integrating themselves into the Austrian economy, this has not been an easy task. Refugees who arrived in Austria before January 1, 1953 are placed on the same footing as Austrian nationals so far as their right to work is concerned. Those who arrived after this date, however, require a special permit before they can accept a job. In most cases this permit is granted only for work in agriculture, in the building trades and in the metal working industry.

Housing, which is desperately short for the Austrians, is difficult to the point of being unobtainable for the refugees. In Vienna as much as AS 1000 (U. S. \$40.00) has to be paid for a furnished room with kitchen use. (What this means relatively may be gauged from the fact that monthly earnings in Austria frequently do not exceed \$60.00) Fortunately the High Commissioner's program in Austria provides for the building of 1200 dwelling units for refugees.

The Czechoslovak border with Austria is so heavily guarded and fortified that virtually no one now succeeds in crossing illegally. The border with Hungary has become almost equally difficult. During the last months, however, about 700 Poles and Hungarians have come to Austria, traveling with legal passports, and have asked for asylum.

The most serious of Austria's current problems is the large influx of refugees from Yugoslavia, which has run more than 13,000 since the beginning of the year. (See Section, "The New Influx of Yugoslav Refugees".)

Italy

Foreign Refugees	15,000
Ethnic Italian Refugees (from territories now incorporated into Yugoslavia)	400,000
Number of camps	9
Population of camps	11,000

Over the past six months in particular there has been a very heavy influx of Yugoslav refugees into Italy. (See Section, "The New Influx of Yugoslav Refugees".) In addition, there are several hundred refugees from Poland and other satellite countries who have arrived in Italy with legal passports and asked for asylum after arrival. The new influx has made it necessary for the Italian authorities to reopen some of the camps which had been closed down or which were about to be closed down.

While Germany, Austria and France are in a position to provide opportunities for integration to a substantial number of refugees, Italy's economic condition makes it virtually impossible for her to absorb refugees into her own economy. Nevertheless, the Italian government, by a decree passed in June 1957, has granted the right to work to all those refugees who have been in Italy for three years or more. Refugees who have been in Italy less than three years may, if they find a job, apply for working permits - but these permits are granted only in exceptional instances. Under these circumstances, there are only two choices open to the refugees: either they must migrate or else they must vegetate in idleness and at a bare subsistence level.

As is the case in Austria and Germany, the camp conditions in Italy range from extremely bad to acceptable. The reception camp of San Sabba in Trieste is not quite as bad as Camp Valka in Germany, but it

belongs generally to the same category. Other camps visited by the Commission and its staff were relatively clean and well organized. No more than one family or two single people were lodged in one room. At Camp Capua near Naples the World Council of Churches has established a farm which it operates as an agricultural training center. Since there is no possibility at all of finding work outside the camps, this farm, for many of the refugees, has been the one thing which stood between them and total inactivity.

The standard allowance for food and lodging in the camps is 10,000 Lire (approximately \$19.00 per person per month. Refugees living outside the camps can be divided into three categories: (1) Those who are aided by AAI (Amministrazione Aiuti Internazionali) - approximately 1,500 - who receive a monthly check of about 4,000 Lire (approximately \$7.00); (2) Those aided by USEP - approximately 1,000 - who receive monthly food packages valued at \$10.00; (3) Those without official refugee status who are not aided by any government agency and must keep themselves alive on occasional assistance from the Italian Red Cross, the American voluntary agencies and other charities. This last category is in the most serious situation.

For the refugees in Italy, there is, except in rare cases, no solution other than overseas emigration. At present, schemes for mass emigration of refugees from Italy are limited to Australia, which plans to take 500 - 1,000, and Canada, which may take as many as 1,500. But the Canadian and Australian immigration policies are exceedingly selective, so that only the young and the skilled refugees will be taken into consideration.

What is needed, in the case of Italy particularly, is a liberalization of immigration policy on the part of the countries of overseas reception.

France

There are in France a total of approximately 360,000 foreign refugees, of whom some 37,000 must be considered non-resettled. Despite her very large refugee population, France has recently announced that she is accepting a group of 50 blind refugees for resettlement.

The situation of the refugees in France is different fundamentally from that in Germany, Austria and Italy because there are no camps.

The French government has made a generous effort to assist the recognized refugees by granting them the basic economic and social rights enjoyed by French citizens - the right to work, to unemployment relief, to free medical treatment, to old age pensions, etc.

Because of the labor shortage, refugees who are physically fit can generally find employment. But as a rule the jobs available to them are of the most menial variety that pay very low salaries. Very few of the refugees with jobs such as this can be considered satisfactorily resettled. Their existence is constantly threatened. The slightest accident or illness, an extra expenditure for a child, the replacement of an expensive item of clothing or household equipment, can completely unbalance the highly vulnerable budget of the foreign refugee in France.

For all of the refugees, housing is the major problem - especially in Paris and other urban centers where work is available. Paris suffers from one of the most acute housing shortages in Europe, and the refugees feel the effects of this shortage even more than the ordinary French citizen. Fourth class rooms may cost as much as \$30 - \$40 per month -- this out of a salary approximating \$60 per month. This confronts the refugee with the choice of eating and sleeping in the open - or spending most of his salary on a room and going on half rations.

Another problem is that of the refugee professionals, for whom it is understandably difficult to find employment in their own fields.

A project designed to cope with this problem was recently initiated under the name of "Chantiers des Travailleurs Intellectuels", with government, UNHCR, and voluntary agency support. Libraries, laboratories, offices and institutions, who have work available for intellectuals but lack the budget for salaries, provide employment for selected refugee professionals whose salaries are then paid by the project sponsors. For a sum no greater, or very little greater, than what would be spent to maintain them on a charity basis, the refugee intellectuals are in this way provided with an opportunity to earn their livelihood, apply their skills, and retain their self-respect.

The aged refugees constitute still another problem, especially those who, for one reason or another, refuse to enter a home for the aged. It is impossible for them to live on their pension of Fr. fr. 4920 (U. S. \$12.) per month in summer, and Fr. fr. 6420 (U.S. \$15.70) in winter.

The generous reception which France has accorded the Iron Curtain refugees is all the more noteworthy in view of the fact that she was already burdened with a refugee population of 115,000 Spaniards who had crossed the Pyrenees after the downfall of the Republic. The lot of these Spanish refugees is still a desperate one. Some 60,000 Spanish refugees volunteered for service in the Allied armies during the war and almost half of them paid with their lives. Among those who remain in France there are 5,000 who were disabled in World War II, 3,500 survivors of German concentration camps, 3,000 chronically ill, and 4,000 over 65 years of age. To date only 8,000 of the Spanish refugees have been granted French citizenship.

For many of the refugees in France today satisfactory resettlement could be arranged if they could be provided with a small capital (a) to pay "key money" for a room or flat with low rent, or to buy a room or a flat in a cooperative building, which would provide them with an even

greater degree of security; (b) to buy tools and equipment with which to re-establish themselves in a trade; (c) to buy dental prostheses which are needed by an estimated 500 refugees.

While excessive charity can admittedly have a demoralizing effect, if the refugee had to borrow the funds required for these purposes, even on the most favorable terms, he would be placing an almost impossible burden on his meager earnings. (See Annex No. II, "On The Need for an Initial Grant for the Resettlement of Refugees".)

The ideal solution, as the Commission sees it, would be to make an outright grant to the refugees to cover a basic portion of their requirements - e.g. "key money" and clothing - and make available to them from a revolving fund non-interest loans for the purchase of tools, equipment, trading supplies, etc. In countries of reception, funds for such purposes have been made available by UNHCR and USEP to the voluntary agencies. It would be ideal if these funds could be increased so that the same assistance would be generally available to non-resettled refugees in countries of second asylum.

THE APPARATUS OF ASSISTANCE

The tremendous work that has already been accomplished in arranging resettlement or local integration for the refugees and the unprecedented success of the Hungarian refugee program is due to a partnership of governmental, inter-governmental and private agencies. Involved in this partnership are the governments of the countries of reception and of immigration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), the U. S. Escapee Program (USEP), and the international voluntary agencies working for refugees.

An account of the individual functions of these agencies is essential as background, because the history of what has already been accomplished is significant for the future, and also because it is this cooperative apparatus which must implement any plans directed towards a solution of the refugee problem.

UNHCR

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations to take over the protection of the refugees from IRO (International Refugee Organization) on its termination. Its original mandate ran from January 1, 1951 to December 31, 1953. This mandate was subsequently renewed until the end of 1958, and, at the present session of the UN, it has been renewed once more to the end of 1963.

UNHCR has two main functions: (1) to provide international protection for refugees; (2) to promote the resettlement of the refugees in other national communities, or to facilitate their repatriation if this is their clearly expressed desire.

A four-year plan for solving the problem of the refugees was drawn up by the first High Commissioner, Dr. D. G. van Heuven Goedhart, and was approved by the General Assembly at the end of 1954. At the same time the UN General Assembly set up the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF). The target that was set for the four-year UNREF program was \$16,000,000, from the UN governments - to which, it was expected, the voluntary agencies and the major countries of asylum would add approximately \$40,000,000.

When the UNHCR-UNREF effort was first launched, there were many who wondered whether the targets that had been set were not overly ambitious. In terms of his expectations of income from government sources, the High Commissioner is still some \$7,500,000 short of his goal. But with the funds already available to him, he has been able to accomplish truly

Approved For Release 2003/07/10 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000900040001-7
prodigious results. Camp population has been reduced from 85,000 to 40,000 (ignoring the Hungarian statistics). Ambitious housing projects are under way in Austria and Germany to hasten the integration of those refugees for whom local resettlement is the best solution. Scholarships have been granted to students in many countries. Loan funds have been set up to establish refugees in professions, trades or business. The governments of those countries with refugee concentrations have been stimulated and assisted to set up programs designed to promote local integration - e.g., the Bonn Government this year initiated an internal resettlement program for some 5,500 foreign refugees who were to be transferred from their camps in unemployment areas to regions with a labor shortage. These projects through 1956 had brought effective assistance to more than 10,000 refugees.

Perhaps the most dramatic of all the programs thus far elaborated by UNECR is the "close the camps drive" which was initiated this year by High Commissioner Auguste Lindt. It is the goal of this drive to close down all of the 180 camps in Europe (with the exception of the reception centers) by means of emigration, local integration and institutional arrangements for the old and chronic invalids. The target date set for the completion of this drive is the end of 1960.

ICEM

The Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration was established at a Conference on Migration which took place in Brussels in December 1951. It is ICEM's primary task to organize the transport of European migrants, both non-refugees and refugees, to overseas destinations and to obtain the financial means required. ICEM also provides services directly related to movements - assistance in pre-selection to immigration missions, documentation and processing, transport to port of

embarkation, reception at port of destination, vocational training, language courses, etc.

Since its establishment, ICEM has moved a grand total of more than 700,000 migrants, of whom approximately one of three was a refugee. ICEM's refugee activities have been carried on in the closest cooperation with UNHCR, USEP and the voluntary agencies.

There have been three outstanding operations in ICEM's record of service to the refugees:

- (1) the movement and resettlement with UNHCR and voluntary agency participation, of over 9,000 refugees of European origin from mainland China
- (2) the expedited movement and resettlement, again in partnership with UNHCR and the voluntary agencies, of more than 6,000 refugees from the Trieste area during the political crisis of 1953-54. (See section on the Trieste Operation in Chapter entitled "The Hard Core Refugees".)
- (3) the movement of nearly 165,000 Hungarians from Austria and Yugoslavia to 43 countries within the space of one year — 100,000 within the first six weeks.*

USEP

The United States Escapee Program was established on March 22, 1952 with the two-fold function of supplementing the assistance then given to escapees by the countries of first asylum and of expediting their reestablishment within Europe and overseas. At the present time the escapee program operates under State Department direction. Mr. Robert S. McCollum, the Director of the United States Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, has overall responsibility for USEP, as he has for the other refugee activities within the State Department. He is also coordinator of the Special Immigration Program. Mr. Laurence A. Dawson is the Chief of USEP and Mr. Richard R. Brown is its European Director.

* ICEM was asked by the Austrian government to undertake all coordination for resettlement which they proceeded to do the day after the revolt was crushed. 90,000 of the Hungarian refugees were moved overseas and 74,000 to other European countries. Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) shared in the movement of refugees to the United States, but ICEM provided all documentation and played a general coordinating role.

USEP is not an operational organization. Its assistance has been channelled through some 25 voluntary agencies, both American and European, on a contractual basis. Under these contracts the agencies are reimbursed for specifically approved projects that have to do with reception, care and maintenance, emigration, and local resettlement.

According to its records, USEP over the first five years of its existence gave aid in one form or another to 141,761 refugees in Europe and the Near East. Of this number, approximately 70,000 were resettled in more than 30 countries. The actual transportation of these refugees was handled by ICEM but a substantial part of the cost was borne by USEP. In addition, USEP has subsidized the integration of 9,415 refugees in the countries of their asylum; it has contributed to the establishment of homes for the aged and chronically ill refugees in Austria, Belgium, France and Italy; it gave urgently needed support to the Trieste operation, which in 1953-54 moved more than 7,000 refugees out of this critical area; and it has given support to special projects such as homes for youths and the establishment of refugee enterprises.

USEP responded to the Hungarian refugee emergency by making more than \$3,000,000 in special funds available. It provided beds, stoves, food, medicine and clothing, it renovated and furnished several resettlement processing centers, it distributed over 120,000 amenity kits to new arrivals and it gave generous support to the activities of the voluntary agencies.

Under its present criteria, USEP gives assistance to refugees who escaped from behind the Iron Curtain since 1948. In the case of refugees from the Soviet Union, all of those who left their homeland subsequent to the outbreak of World War II are eligible for assistance. It is USEP's general intention, however, to concentrate its assistance on those who have recently escaped. It is expected that by 1960 the case load will consist of refugees who had escaped over the previous three year period.

Among the projects and installations the Commission visited which were financed in whole or in part by USEP funds, were the model camp of Glasenbach, Austria; the Galvania factory near Salzburg where some 30 hard core refugees are employed (this project is sponsored by the World Council of Churches); the special camp for Soviet refugees maintained by the Tolstoy Foundation near Munich; the model reception center at Zirndorf, near Nurnberg; and the International Rescue Committee home for refugee students in Munich.

The Commission cannot speak too highly of the USEP program. It is amazing and gratifying that \$5.5 - \$6 million dollars per annum can accomplish so much in human terms. From the standpoint of the ideological conflict with communism, it is worth many times its cost in dollars.

The Voluntary Agencies

UNHCR, ICEM and USEP have provided funds and/or machinery for many of the refugee programs. It is the voluntary agencies, both American and European, who have done most of the work at the personal level. They have provided counsellors and case workers. They have maintained offices to which the refugees could come for advice or assistance. They have helped the refugees surmount their personal crises. They have guided them through the intricacies of applications for emigration. They have given them - more than anything else - the feeling that they are wanted and that the Western world is genuinely concerned over their fate.

To coordinate their activities, the voluntary agencies have formed two conference bodies: The Standing Conference on Voluntary Agencies Working For Refugees, and the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations Interested in Migration.

On May 27 - 28, 1957 in Geneva a conference was convened under the joint auspices of these two bodies. The purpose of the conference

was to

- "1. emphasize the persistence of a world-wide refugee problem and again urge peoples and governments to provide for the re-establishment in normal life of the millions of refugees still uprooted in many parts of the world;
2. call for continued support of those agencies, governmental and intergovernmental, that are dealing with segments of the refugee problem;
3. seek ways and make recommendations to assure resettlement opportunities now to Hungarian Refugees still in camps in Austria and Yugoslavia;
4. study the lessons to be drawn from the Hungarian Refugee crisis and formulate some plan or plans which could be put into immediate operation in the unhappy event of another refugee crisis."

The recommendations of this conference on the subjects of RECEPTION, EMIGRATION, and INTEGRATION are reproduced as annexes to this report.

The international agencies who are members of the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees include:

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees
American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC)
American Polish War Relief
Brethren Service Commission
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC)
International Conference of Catholic Charities
International Labor Assistance
International Relief Committee for Intellectual Workers
International Rescue Committee
International Social Service
Jewish Agency for Palestine
Lutheran World Federation
National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC)
Tolstoy Foundation
World OSE Union
Unitarian Service Committee
United HIAS Service
United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America
United Ukrainian American Relief Committee
World Council of Churches (WCC)
World ORT Union
World University Service
World Alliance of YMCA's
World's YWCA

National agencies who are members of the Standing Conference include:

Aide aux Israelites victimes de la guerre (Belgium)
Secours International de Caritas Catholica (Belgium)
Comite de Coordination des oeuvres benevoles (France)
C.I.M.A.D.E. (Comite Inter-Mouvements aupres des Evacues) (France)
Comite Juif d'Action sociale et de Reconstruction (C.O.J.A.S.O.R.)
(France)
Centre d'Orientation sociale des Etrangers (France)
Centre de Reclassement professionnel (France)
Oeuvre de Protection des Enfants Juifs (France)
Service Social d'Aide aux Emigrants (France)
Refugee Service Committee for Greece
Suisse a l'Etranger (Switzerland)
Swiss Central Office for Aid to Refugees
British Council for Aid to Refugees.

2. THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES --

ONE YEAR LATER

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

II. THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES ONE YEAR LATER

<u>Statistics of the Hungarian Refugee Emergency</u> <u>(as of October 31, 1957)</u>	
Total arrivals in Austria and Yugoslavia	198,700
Total emigrations from Austria and Yugoslavia	166,400
Repatriations	9,400 (1)
Presumed to be left in Austria and Yugoslavia	23,000 (2)
(1) Including unrecorded repatriations.	
(2) Of whom some 7,600 can be considered resettled.	

In the opinion of the Commission the story of the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956-57 should be viewed as a background to the refugee problem that exists in Europe today -- because it illustrates how much can be accomplished in a very short period of time if the will and the unity of purpose are there.

* * * *

Just over one year ago on October 23rd, 1956, the Hungarian people rose up against their Communist oppressors. For eight glorious days Hungary was free. In the early morning of November 4th, while negotiations were going on for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Red Army attacked again with massive reinforcements drawn from the surrounding countries. When the major centers of resistance had fallen and it was obvious that the Soviet terror would be reimposed on their country, scores of thousands of Hungarians -- men, women, and children -- left their homes and their belongings and fled to the West.

1. Hungarian Refugees

Austria opened its frontiers and prepared to receive an estimated 20,000 refugees. An uninterrupted flow of men, women and children crossed the border, exhausted, half-frozen, drenched and wounded -- with empty hands but with hearts full of the meaning of freedom. By December 31st, 158,000 refugees had arrived in Austria.

The response of the Western world to this emergency was exemplary. Switzerland, France, and Germany sent trains to the frontier to pick up the refugees as they arrived from Hungary -- without any pre-selection. The United States waived its immigration regulations to admit a total of 37,000 Hungarian refugees, the great majority of them as parolees. To move them out of Europe as rapidly as possible, Military Air Transport Service of the United States Air Force mobilized all of its resources; indeed "Operation Safe Haven", as it was called, ranks next only to the Berlin Airlift as an air operation in the service of humanity. But even with all this assistance, the influx of refugees was so great that it was impossible to provide shelter for all of them. Because no accommodation could be found, "ghost trains" with as many as 10,000 refugees circulated through Austria and parked in railway sidings for nights on end before they could discharge their human cargo into buildings that were hastily conscripted as shelters.

Looking back on what has been accomplished over the past year, the Free World can legitimately take pride in the record of its effort. Of the total of 200,000 Hungarians who escaped to Austria and Yugoslavia, 158,000 have thus far received asylum in 36 countries of the Free World. Nothing illustrates more dramatically how much can be accomplished when the will and the unity are there.

But the task is not finished. There are still some 24,000 Hungarian refugees who remain to be resettled. (20,200 in Austria, 2,900 in Yugoslavia, and approximately 1,000 in Italy). Nor can we overlook the 15,000 Hungarian refugees, many of whom have relatives in the

United States and Canada, who moved on to other European countries in the anticipation that in the not too distant future they would be able to emigrate to the Western hemisphere.

Because of the moral and political significance of the Hungarian Revolution it is essential that the remainder of the problem be tackled on a priority basis. Despite everything that has been done, the West can derive no solace from the fact that some 10,000 Hungarian refugees, tired of waiting, returned to the regime from which they had fled. Even today, despite the many confirmations of the terror that prevails in Hungary, some 20 to 30 Hungarian refugees, broken in spirit, return to Hungary each week from Austria.

In general, the Hungarian refugees were young and vigorous and their integration in the countries of their permanent asylum has developed satisfactorily. An exception exists, however, in the case of the intellectuals and professionals, for whom it is frequently extremely difficult to find positions in the professions for which they have been trained.

Another serious problem is presented by the several thousands of Hungarian minors who escaped without their parents. The Communist Government in Budapest has left no stone unturned in attempting to repatriate the teen-age refugees. Their representations to the Western governments and to the U. N. have had little effect. Thus far the Western countries have refused to return Hungarian minors unless it was their clearly expressed desire.

Much more serious are the letters which the youthful refugees frequently receive from their parents imploring them to come home and assuring them that they will not be punished for their defection. The one trouble with this letter stratagem is that, more frequently than not, the first letter is followed by a second letter in which, either openly or

in coded language, the parents let their children know that Letter No. 1 was written under pressure and that they really wish them to remain in the West.

But having accorded the Hungarian minors de facto refugee status, the Western countries find themselves confronted with a complex of social problems. Since these young people do not have occupations, they must either be sent to school or provided with vocational training. Not surprisingly, a fairly large number of them are emotionally upset as a result of their experiences and their training must therefore be coupled with costly psycho-therapeutic care.

It was almost unavoidable that the spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm with which the West greeted the Hungarian refugees should be followed by an emotional let-down in most of the countries of reception. The Hungarian refugee was idealized by the Western world as a Freedom Fighter and a hero. The West expected perfection. Instead, they found that the Hungarian refugee was an ordinary human being with the customary human failings. The Hungarians on their side had idealized the Western world - and now they discover that it is not a paradise, but a world with many imperfections.

In addition to the misconceptions which existed on both sides, there were the difficulties of language and culture. The Displaced Persons who migrated to America and to other countries in the post-war period had access to language courses and reorientation courses that helped to prepare them, at least in some small measure, for life in their new homelands. But the Hungarian refugees moved quite literally overnight from life under Communism to life under democratic rule -- without any reorientation on the differences, and without even the vocabulary of basic words that enables an immigrant to make his way on arrival in a new country. In retrospect, it is not surprising that there has been some

disappointment on both sides. What is amazing is that the integration in all countries has, on the whole, proceeded smoothly and without grave difficulties.

For the refugees remaining in the camps, material conditions have improved, but their morale has deteriorated distressingly. It was deeply moving to hear grim-faced refugees in Camp Kaiser-Ebersdorf near Vienna, in Ecka in Yugoslavia and in other camps, pleading for an opportunity to be able to work again, and asking how much longer they would have to wait. The 6,000 refugees who were crowded into Camp Traiskirchen, Austria, last November, sleeping on straw and without sanitary installations, were a far happier lot than the 1,000 refugees who are left in Traiskirchen today -- although the camp has been so greatly improved that it is virtually unrecognizable. Last November, those who came to the camp were hopeful; today those who are in the camp feel that there is no longer hope. "Are we forgotten? Shall we remain here for years like the other refugees?" they asked.

Even more bitter were some of the Hungarian refugees who had escaped before the revolution, or who had managed to escape in recent months via East Germany. For them there were no wide open doors and accelerated processing, as there had been for their compatriots who came out immediately after November 4th. They felt that they were being penalized either because they had been compelled to flee before a certain date or because they had stayed behind a bit longer in the hope that all was not lost.

The Hungarian Refugees in Austria

Total arrivals of Hungarian refugees in Austria as of October 31, 1957	178,900
Total emigration of Hungarian refugees from Austria	152,000
Repatriations	6,700 (1)
Presumed to be left in Austria	20,200 (2)
(1) Including an estimated 1,300 unrecorded repatriations.	
(2) Of whom some 7,000 can be considered resettled.	

In Austria, the Commission visited the Hungarian refugee camp at Kaiserbrunn, and members of the staff visited the camp at Traiskirchen. Commission members also spoke to Hungarian refugees in Camp Hellbrunn and the ICEM processing center near Salzburg. The Commission had lengthy discussions with the Austrian Government officials concerned with the refugees, and with representatives of the U. N. High Commissioner's Office, ICEM and USEP.

* * * * *

According to Austrian statistics, approximately half of the 20,200 Hungarian refugees were living in some 20 camps; while the other half were living in private lodgings or in homes and institutions operated by voluntary agencies.

Until September 30th, most of the camps were administered by the League of Red Cross Societies. On that date they were taken over by the Austrian Ministry of the Interior.

Some months ago the Ministry of the Interior organized with UNREF funds a special Social Service for Hungarian refugees. This service has provided teams consisting of one social worker and one Hungarian

interpreter to each of 11 camps. Though entirely insufficient to cope with the caseload, the establishment of these counselling teams has brought about a marked improvement.

Emigration opportunities are, at the moment, limited. Australia has accepted an additional 1,500 Hungarian refugees to be moved by the end of the year. A few parolees are still leaving for the United States. Canada, at present, takes only close relatives, but may initiate a new program next year. Latin American countries take individual cases. Germany takes minors. Most other European countries accept only close relatives.

Estimates as to the number of refugees who will still be in Austria at the end of 1957 differ. It seems probable that the figure will be somewhere around 17,000. Of this number, more than 6,000 can be considered satisfactorily integrated in the Austrian economy, and there is reason to believe that others will also succeed in integrating themselves locally.

ICEM is now making a survey establishing individual case files for every Hungarian refugee still in Austria. This survey, which will be ready by the end of the year, should greatly facilitate the task of finding new emigration outlets by giving a clear picture of professions, age groups, etc., of the refugees remaining in Austria. This will enable ICEM to submit to selection missions, without delay, a list of those refugees meeting their requirements.

Preliminary results of this survey have shown that among the Hungarian refugees remaining in Austria 4% are tubercular.

The refugees still in camp are undergoing an obvious erosion of morale and stamina -- despite the considerable improvement in camp conditions since last year.

Children are either going to nearby Austrian schools as in Traiskirchen, or good schools have been organized in the camps, as in Kaiserebersdorf.

One of the most nefarious aspects of camp life is that families with small children and single men and women are in many instances still lodged together in large halls. The lack of privacy and crowded conditions has inevitably resulted in a certain amount of promiscuity, the tragic consequence of which has been the birth of many illegitimate children.

There have been many evidences of increasing frustration and even open dissatisfaction on the part of the refugees who remain. In Camp Roeder, morale is especially low. It was originally established as a transit center. Refugees sent there had hoped to leave for overseas within a couple of weeks. Now most of them have been there for eight months. Mass hunger strikes took place in Roeder against the closing down of migration opportunities. In Vienna during September a major protest demonstration of Hungarian refugees was averted only with difficulty by the Austrian authorities.

Requests to be repatriated to Hungary are frequent occurrences in camps and there have been many instances of suicide.

Approximately 2,000 unaccompanied Hungarian minors are still in Austria. To help cope with this specific aspect of the problem, UNHCR has allocated \$745,000, and USEP has also given substantial support to various projects designed to improve the lot of the young Hungarian refugees. The Austrian Ministry of the Interior, Caritas, and the World Council of Churches have opened vocational training schools. Special homes for emotionally disturbed Hungarian children have been established by Caritas and the International Rescue Committee.

The majority of the young Hungarians are in recently established refugee high schools and in other institutions. Conditions in some of these centers are good; in others, they leave much to be desired. Case workers of the International Social Service, entrusted by the High Commissioner with dealing with the unattached Hungarian youth, are not admitted to some of the schools.

There is much on the credit side, however. For example, there has been a most dramatic improvement of the school at Hirtenberg, which formerly was one of the most unsatisfactory. Under a new director, vocational training shops have been established, in which the boys are taught to be carpenters, mechanics and shoemakers. The 120 boys, who indulged in rioting and other misbehavior so long as they were idle, are now working and happy.

The International Social Service states that 80% of the unaccompanied youth in Austria want to emigrate and it urgently recommends the creation of new emigration opportunities for them. At present, the United States is the only country that has a special program for young refugees who have close relatives there. Other countries thus far have no provision allowing children to follow close relatives.

The number of students in Austria is estimated at approximately 1,400. Of this number, 600 are studying with Rockefeller grants and another 300 have scholarships from UNHCR.

To help cope with the special problems of the refugee intellectuals, a working committee has been established by the voluntary agencies, which gives emergency grants, arranges scholarships, helps find employment and housing, and prepares requests for loans for professional establishment.

The Hungarian Refugees in Yugoslavia

Total arrivals of Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia, as of November 21, 1957	19,800
Recorded emigrations of Hungarian refugees	14,400
Official repatriations to Hungary	2,700 (1)
Remaining in Yugoslavia, in camps or centers	2,800 (2)
(1) This figure does <u>not</u> include unrecorded repatriations.	
(2) Of whom 600 can be considered locally integrated.	

In Yugoslavia the Commission visited two camps -- Ecka, which will be the last camp in Yugoslavia to be closed down, and Bela Crkva, which is reserved for unaccompanied children. Bela Crkva now contains some 200 unaccompanied minors ranging in age from 3 years to 18 years. (It also contains about 100 Greek children who were taken from Greece by the Communists during the Guerilla warfare of 1945-1948. They have been in Yugoslavia for eight to ten years now and many of them have forgotten their own language.) The Commission also had extensive discussions with representatives of the U. N. High Commissioner's office, ICEM, the American voluntary agencies, the Yugoslav Red Cross and Yugoslav Government.

* * * * *

During January, 1957, the Hungarian-Austrian border had been hermetically sealed by the Soviet authorities by means of minefields, electrified barbed-wire and other standard devices of the Iron Curtain. As soon as it became generally known in Hungary that there was no way out to Austria, thousands of people who had made up their minds to leave the country set out for the Yugoslav frontier, where minefields and barbed wire still did not exist. During January alone almost 14,000 Hungarian

refugees entered Yugoslavia. The rate of flow fell off as the Soviet authorities and the Hungarian Secret Police tightened their control over the frontier area. In the next several months, however, some 5,000 additional refugees succeeded in escaping to Yugoslavia, bringing the total of recorded arrivals in that country to 19,800.

On the other hand, those who have been close to the problem are convinced that among the Hungarians who escaped to Yugoslavia there was a very large percentage who had played an active part in the Revolution and had serious reason to fear persecution if they remained in their country longer. In many cases the fact that they escaped to Yugoslavia in January or February rather than to Austria in November and December can be explained very simply by a disposition to stay behind and fight so long as the faintest spark of resistance was possible.

In several respects the situation in Yugoslavia was an anomalous one. Here were refugees from Communism in a Communist country. The Yugoslav Government had recognized the Kadar regime, and in general had approved of Soviet intervention to crush the Revolution. But it nevertheless granted asylum to the refugees escaping from Hungary, provided them with shelter, and cooperated with U. N. High Commissioner in arranging for their resettlement in other countries. On their arrival, the refugees were accommodated in resort hotels which were empty because of the Winter season. To make way for the tourists, they were evacuated during the Spring and early Summer and moved to various camps and centers. In some of these conditions were tolerably good; in others they were, admittedly, very bad.

The U. N. High Commissioner and the voluntary agencies promptly offered their assistance to the Yugoslav government. The UNHCR was given permission to open an office in Belgrade, staffed with personnel from the voluntary agencies. ICEM was permitted to come in at the end of April under the UNHCR umbrella and to establish offices and processing teams to expedite the resettlement operation. This cooperative effort, involving UNHCR, ICEM and the voluntary agencies, was generously supported by USEP. Through this effort, a total of 14,600 Hungarian refugees were moved from Yugoslavia to countries of resettlement between February and the end of November this year.

During November, selection missions of Canada, France, and Belgium were still at work in Yugoslavia and it was expected that by the year's end the total number of refugees remaining in camps would be reduced to approximately 1,000.

It seems likely that within the next few months, the slate will have been wiped clean in Yugoslavia at least.

The Hungarian Refugees in Italy

Italy is not in the position to integrate large numbers of refugees into its own economy. It nevertheless offered to take 3,800 Hungarian refugees from Austria on a transient basis. The refugees were accommodated in Italian Red Cross hostels and camps, where the conditions generally were good. Most of the Red Cross centers, however, have now been closed down and the refugees have been transferred to the existing AAI camps, which contain refugee accumulations dating back as far as World War II. Having to live together with these old refugees who have been waiting in vain for emigration for so many years has had a profoundly depressing effect on the morale of the Hungarian camp inmates.

There remain at present approximately 1,000 Hungarian refugees in Italy. It is perhaps unfortunate that many of these have turned down possibilities of migrating to Canada and Australia because they hope to obtain visas to the United States, where they have relatives. The stubbornness of the refugees on this point is perhaps understandable since all of them seem to believe that they were given the firm assurance on leaving Austria for Italy that this move would in no way prejudice their chances of entering the United States. Up until now, however, only a handful of parolees have been able to enter the United States from Italy, and the outlook for the coming period is hardly encouraging.

Among the Hungarian refugees in Italy there are 90 students; almost 80 of these have passed their entrance examinations to Italian universities. A large percentage of them are students of the arts whose studies could perhaps most profitably be continued in Italy. Among these students, for example, is 27 year old Mihaly Korcsmaros, a gifted young painter who had been compelled to work as a factory hand while in Hungary, but who is now a pupil at Rome's famous Scola di Pittura. Korcsmaros' paintings of refugees attracted considerable attention at a recent exhibition in Rome.

The Hungarian Refugees in Other Countries

In other European countries visited by the Commission, the integration of the Hungarian refugees has, in general, proceeded in a satisfactory manner.

In Germany, which granted asylum to more than 14,500 * Hungarians, refugees were distributed to ^{the} various Länder according to a special plan. With very few exceptions all of them were able to find employment, the majority of them in the iron and steel and mining industries. Almost

* Latest official estimates, but subject to final confirmation.

1,200 students were taken into German universities and provided with assistance enabling them to continue with their studies. Those who did not manage to obtain scholarships received DM150 per month from the German government for their maintenance.

In France, which took in 8,500 * Hungarians, integration has been a more difficult process, primarily because of the acute housing shortage. Hungarian refugees who were recently brought from Yugoslavia to France had to be lodged temporarily in camps. This resulted in rather serious psychological depression. The refugees are, no doubt, exaggerating the importance of their temporary lodgment in the French camps. But this is understandable, since they all had believed that their transfer from Yugoslavia would make it possible for them to start living normal lives again.

Most students are continuing their studies with the benefit of French government scholarships. On the other hand, there are virtually no vocational training facilities for young refugees who wish to become skilled workers.

In Switzerland, which accepted 10,700 Hungarians, virtually all of the refugees have by this time found both employment and accommodation, and they may, for all practical purposes, be considered integrated. Most of the students received scholarships from Swiss student organizations. As is the case in France, however, the facilities for the vocational training of the young workers are extremely limited. In quite a number of cases apprenticeships could be arranged if it were not for the fact that, in the absence of hostels or homes, the young apprentices are not able to afford food and lodging.

In all three countries the major remaining problem is that of finding adequate employment for Hungarian professionals.

* Latest official estimates, but subject to final confirmation.

Summary

(1) The Hungarian Revolution places a special obligation on the Western world to make certain that neither the Hungarian refugees nor the refugees from the other communist-dominated countries should continue to live the life of outcasts from human society.

(2) A concerted effort must be made to arrange placement for the several thousand unaccompanied Hungarian minors, preferably in private homes or homes for apprentices. Special recognition must be given to the fact that these young people, separated from their parents and their country at the same time, have been subject to severe emotional stress and may in many cases require therapeutic attention to prevent a lapse into delinquency.

(3) Additional scholarships will have to be provided for Hungarian university students. In Austria, for example, it is expected that 50 students will be graduating from Hungarian high schools this year and an additional 320 the following year.

(4) The problem of the refugee professionals could be solved in many cases by a two or three year scholarship at an Austrian university or some other European university, which would enable the refugees to obtain recognition of their Hungarian diplomas. This would create the possibility of finding employment in Europe in their own field. A project providing for the establishment of such scholarships is pending with the High Commissioner.

(5) Finally, simple humanitarianism demands that the receiving countries modify their immigration regulations to permit the reunification of families.

HUNGARIAN REFUGEES ACCEPTED, ACCORDING TO POPULATION RATIO

Country	Total * Hungarian Refugees	Refugees per 100,000 Population
Australia	12,137	129.1
Belgium	5,528	62.1
Canada	34,438	216.6
Denmark	1,156	26.3
France	10,043	23.2
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	15,050	30.1
Israel	2,078	109.4
Netherlands	3,525	32.6
Norway	1,462	41.8
Sweden	6,531	89.5
Switzerland	11,427	228.5
United Kingdom	15,662	30.6
United States	36,623	21.8

* ICEM figures as of November 12, 1957.


HUNGARIAN REFUGEES ONE YEAR LATER



Left: Camp Bela Orkva, Yugoslavia
Above: Camp Kaiser-Ebersdorf, Austria



HUNGARIAN REFUGEES ONE YEAR LATER



Unaccompanied Hungarian
minors at ICS home, Adel-
boden



3. THE "HARD CORE" REFUGEES

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

IV. THE "HARD CORE" REFUGEES

The statistics of the United Nations High Commissioner show that there are in excess of 31,000 "hard core" refugees in Western Europe. (This figure includes family members). In the course of their travels through Italy, Austria, Germany and France, the members of the Commission met with many of these so-called hard core refugees. In their presence it was impossible not to feel a sense of guilt. What emerged from all their stories is that they have in most cases become what they are today as a result of the indifference and neglect of the Western world.

Represented in the hard core category is the entire roster of peoples enslaved by Communism - Poles, Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Balts, Bulgarians, Roumanians, Albanians and a score of nationalities of the USSR. The category includes many former slave laborers and inmates of Hitler's concentration camps. It also includes a substantial number of refugees who escaped from behind the Iron Curtain after World War II but who, for one reason or another, have not been able to migrate overseas or to integrate locally.

The term hard core refugees was first used by the I.R.O. in 1950 in referring to the residual group. Perhaps it would have been better if some other descriptive phrase -- a little less definitive, a little more understanding, and not so completely devoid of hope -- had been found. The hard core refugees are well aware of their classification; and it is difficult to conceive of anything more calculated to destroy the last vestige of one's self respect or will to regenerate. It is, as one observer put it, "like hearing one's self pronounced dead or incurably ill, thus adding a fully conscious finality or irreversibility to one's own inarticulate, half-repressed self-diagnosis." The present High Commissioner has endeavored to substitute for "hard core" the much less caustic description "difficult cases." But, in consequence of so many

years of usage, hard core has become difficult to eradicate from the international vocabulary concerned with refugees.

The majority of the refugees who are now considered hard core cases possessed robust bodies and healthy minds and hands that were eager to work when they first reached the West. But years in the camps, without purposeful labor, without privacy, with inadequate diet, without hope, weakened the body and destroyed the morale of the strongest men.

What kind of people are the hard core refugees, and how did they come to be left behind? In the first place it must be recorded that, with a few notable exceptions, selection for emigration has been carried out on narrow preferential grounds rather than humanitarian. The selection missions of the receiving countries, quite understandably, have accorded priority to the young and the able-bodied and the highly skilled. They left in the camps the disabled and the old who from the beginning had to be considered institutional or semi-institutional cases. But they also left in the camps a large number of families -- the so-called "uneconomic families" -- with many children, thus condemning these children to TB or to the even more terrible moral consequences of continuing life in the camps. They left the men of 45 and 50 and 55, who were able-bodied, but who, in the eyes of the selection missions, had passed the age of prime desirability. They left able-bodied people, both young and middle-aged, who were suffering from curable tuberculosis, and many thousands more who had recovered from tuberculosis but still had scars on their lungs.

Perhaps cruelest of all was the fate of the many family units all of whose members but one were eligible for emigration. Rather than leave behind their loved ones who were suffering from some physical or mental disability or who were disqualified by a TB scar, they elected to remain in the camps together.

And then there were not a few who, only several years ago, were able-bodied and eager to work, in good health and theoretically not too old to be eligible for acceptance. But they were turned down by two or three selection missions in a row -- because of personality deficiencies which impressed the selection missions but which in no way affected their ability to become self-supporting citizens; or because they were unskilled and came close to the upper age limits set by the visiting mission; or because they were slow in making application; or simply because luck was against them. Once a refugee's record shows that he has been passed over by several missions, his chances of selection become dim indeed.

One has only to visit a European camp and to talk to some of the refugees who have been there for years to understand why prolonged existence under these conditions erodes the spirit of man. After years of inactivity, the refugees become accustomed to a way of life requiring neither effort nor initiative. They accept the compressed living quarters, the total lack of privacy, the lack of sanitary facilities as normal. Worse still, they even lose their capacity for indignation at a fate that is little better than a living death. They may marry and have children in the camps, because it is natural for human beings to do so. But they helplessly accept the malformation of their children's character which goes on before their eyes. There is nothing more appalling than the spectacle of refugees so attached to their dreary corner of a barrack building that they refuse to leave it - like the Yugoslav inmate of Camp Landshut who, after spending five years there with his wife and children, said to one of the Commission staff: "Don't bother to get us out. We are all right here. Just let us live and send us parcels."

Those refugees who have recently arrived in the camps and for whom the chances of migration are good, are generally cheerful in their demeanor despite the difficulties of camp life. But the hard core refugees who

have been in the camps for many years have, with rare exceptions, lost the ability to be happy. Cut off from their traditions and cut off from a future, rejected by the world to which they felt they belonged, it is small wonder that many of them have tried to find a semblance of joy by means of alcohol.

In this environment an entire generation of refugee children have spent their formative years. In Camp Capua, Italy, the Commission met a Yugoslav refugee couple who had been in various camps since the end of World War II. They had five children; age one to ten, all of whom had been born in the camps and had known no other life. (Apart from everything else, this provides a rather interesting example of the folly of keeping the hard core refugees in the camps year after year. The cost of maintaining a refugee in a European camp is in excess of \$300 per year. Between them the members of this family had spent a total of approximately 50 years in the camps. The cost of maintaining this family in degradation and idleness had therefore, already exceeded \$15,000. Had a small portion of this amount been invested in this family as a rehabilitation grant 10 or 11 years ago, the chances are that they would now be satisfactorily integrated in some Western country, making a modest productive contribution to the society in which they lived rather than having to exist on charity).

The damage being suffered by the generation of camp children was eloquently described by Dr. Hans Harmsen, of the Academy of Public Health, Hamburg, who made a study of the psychological effects of camp life on the refugees. The study appeared last year in the magazine INTEGRATION, organ of the European Association for the Study of Refugee Problems.

"A rapid end to camp existence is necessary in order to preserve the physical and moral well-being of the rising generation. Many of the children are extremely precocious, and the mentality of a six year old camp dweller often corresponds, as a result of "one-room existence", to that of a ten to fourteen year old living out of camp. Living on top of one another, very often with communal amenities, the children's sensitivity to their surroundings causes them to absorb everything that passes between the grown-ups. The worst swear words are adopted and this, together with the example of those who lead them on, causes them to commit small thefts, from matches to chickens. Indeed, in rural

communities, this often leads to the local councils refusing "camp children" admission to school. The moral corruption amongst children and youths may also be ascribed to the camp atmosphere, to the all too early examples around them, and the impressions they have received with their own eyes and ears...

"A special problem is that posed by the fourteen to seventeen year olds who wander aimlessly about. Their lack of guidance is as great as the danger of their corruption. The most important task in this case is vocational training and placement in employment."

The human spirit, however, is capable of incredible recuperative powers.

There is still a tendency to regard the hard core problem as one for which there is no satisfactory solution. But there have been a number of positive experiences, which clearly demonstrate that, with the exception of the institutional cases, the great majority of the refugees can become economically self-supporting members of society.

The paragraphs that follow describe several of the more notable successes in the resettlement of hard core refugees.

NORWAY:

While some countries have rigidly excluded or have excluded large categories of refugees who were ill or disabled, the Scandinavian countries, the Low Countries and Switzerland have over the past several years opened their doors to a substantial number of the most difficult hard core cases, including active TB cases and cases requiring institutionalization. The work that has been done by these smaller European countries in rehabilitating refugees suffering from grave physical handicaps sets an example to the rest of the world.

According to information received from the Norwegian Refugee Council, Norway has since 1954 received a total of 170 elderly refugees, 235 TB refugees with their family members, and 41 blind refugees with family members.

The majority of the elderly refugees are living in homes for the aged. After five years' residence in Norway old age pensions are available to them.

The experience with the tubercular refugees has been outstandingly favorable. Indeed, because of the encouraging results with the first group of tubercular refugees, the Norwegian Government in July 1955 contracted for a second group. Apparently their recovery from TB results in an almost miraculous psychological regeneration. A letter from the Norwegian Refugee Council dated October 30, 1957 states that "All TB refugees not in hospitals have received jobs - we have no unemployment among them at the present time."

The majority of the 40 blind refugees (and their 30 family members) who were transferred to Norway in 1954 were, only one year later, all housed and working at trades which enabled them to support themselves. A small number of them however are being taken care of in public institutions or private homes. The Norwegian law of 1954 providing special social security for the blind is also applicable to the hard core refugees.

SWEDEN:

Since 1950 Sweden has accepted 660 refugees suffering from active TB. With their dependents, the total number of persons admitted was 1,202. The chief credit for the initiation of this program is due to Mrs. Agda Roessel of the Royal Labor Board of Sweden.

The Royal Labor Board, in information made available to the Commission on October 25, 1957, reported that the majority of the refugees could be discharged as cured shortly after their arrival. Those refugees with skills were able to find jobs almost immediately on their discharge. Those who did not possess skills were provided with industrial or professional training. In Sweden, as in Norway, the tubercular refugees, once cured, have turned into highly satisfactory immigrants. Sweden has, in addition, accepted 50 to 60 European refugees from Shanghai. Although the majority of these were considered difficult to place, the report indicates that with the exception of 11 persons, all of the Shanghai refugees are now gainfully employed.

Approximately 300 foreign refugees who could not find ordinary employment because of age or disability, have been taken on as "archive" workers" by the Swedish State Archives.

BELGIUM:

In the field of assistance to hard core refugees, special honors are due to Belgium - a small and over-populated country but one which, not very surprisingly, was the birthplace of the Crusade for "Une Europe du Coeur".

All told, some 800 hard core cases, either institutional or semi-institutional have been accepted by Belgium. Primary credit is due to the initiative of the Belgian voluntary agencies. Their various projects, however, would obviously not have been possible without the unstinting cooperation of the Belgian government and certain financial support which was forthcoming from UNHCR, USEP; and the Trieste Fund, (see page 12, this section.)

Caritas Catholica has brought in three groups of hard core refugees. The first group, which arrived in 1948, and consisted of elderly refugees coming from Austria, were placed in homes belonging to the "Little Sisters of the Poor". A second group consisted of 40 crippled, blind, and mentally deficient children, who were placed in special institutions affiliated with Caritas Catholica. The third group, which included 66 elderly refugees, is housed in a home set up in the Brussels vicinity.

Aid to Displaced Persons, headed by the Reverend Father Pire, has set up four homes for elderly refugees, notably in Huy, Esneux, Aartselar, and Brain-le-Comte. All told these homes accommodate 135 people.

The World Council of Churches operates five homes, in which some 90 elderly refugees are at present lodged. The cost of the lodging is kept to a minimum by filling vacant places with old people of Belgian nationality, whose board is paid for at a fixed rate by the Commission of Public Assistance.

These homes are situated at Elouges, Uccle (Brussels), Blangies, Amay, and Clabecq.

Entre'Aide Socialiste, the relief arm of the large trade union organizations, operates two homes in Fellen which accommodate 83 elderly refugees. The refugee couples in these homes have small separate flats, which include a bedroom, a small living room, and a kitchen. Their rent of 2,000 Belgian francs per month is paid for by the Commission of Public Assistance. Plans are now underway for two new homes. The first of these, at La Hulpe on the outskirts of Brussels, will provide shelter for approximately 200 aging refugees due shortly from Hong Kong and other places. The second home, at Coq-sur-Mer, will also provide separate flats for refugee couples; advance reports indicate that it will be one of the most modern establishments of its kind for hard core refugees.

Only a handful of the inmates of these Belgian homes for aging refugees have the physical strength to take full-time jobs. But the others do light work around the homes or cultivate small patches of land. As a special incentive, they are allowed to sell the produce they derive from their labors. Relations between the elderly refugees who have been placed in the various homes in the Belgian countryside and the local populace are reported to be uniformly good.

The establishment of the hard core refugees in Belgium was facilitated through initial grants averaging \$1,000 per case, which was made available by the International Refugee Organization (the functions of the IRO were taken over by the UNHCR in 1954) and by the "Trieste Fund" which was set up under ICEM and by USEP. The Belgian government assisted by providing an amount of 25 francs per day per person to all aging refugees accommodated in the various homes.

THE U.S.A.

Under the various immigration measures that have been enacted since the end of the war, a substantial number of hard core cases (the elderly and disabled, but not those suffering from TB or other infectious diseases) have entered the United States. They have, however, required very strong sponsorship from relatives or voluntary agencies, who guaranteed that they would not become public charges. This guarantee frequently involved the posting of a \$1,000 bond.

The great religious agencies -- NCWC, CWS, United HIAS Services, and the Lutheran Refugee Service -- were particularly outstanding in the matter of sponsoring difficult cases.

There have, however, been no government sponsored or backed projects resembling those initiated by the governments of the Scandinavian Countries and the Low Countries -- projects which brought in entire groups of the aged, the disabled, the tubercular and the blind, rehabilitated those who could be rehabilitated and provided institutional care for those who could not become self-supporting.

FATHER PIRE'S EUROPEAN VILLAGES

Within the past year, the Belgian Dominican, Father Pire, who had already done very much to assist the refugees, came up with a novel -- and inspirational -- approach to the hard core problem. He proposed the establishment of a series of European villages, whose populations would be recruited exclusively from the ranks of the hard core cases, with primary emphasis on large families because it is essential to extricate the children from the environment of the camps and hutments.

So far Father Pire has built three "European villages" -- at Huy in Belgium, at Aix-la-Chapelle in Germany, and at Bregenz in Austria. He plans to build several more in the near future. The villages are kept to a maximum of 120 persons (approximately 30 families) so that counsellors

in residence are able to maintain contact with the refugees and to give them the day-to-day guidance and encouragement which is of particular importance during the first period of rehabilitation.

The villages consist of homes and buildings that are attractive and of superior construction. They are sited so that there will be opportunities for work either in the village itself or in the vicinity for all those refugees who are capable of working. Each village of course must have its shoemaker, tailor, and other small craftsmen. Loans are also made to encourage the establishment of small enterprises within the village. Light labor has been found for some of the refugees in nearby towns.

The children attend schools in the adjacent towns. The positioning of the "villages" on the outskirts of European towns on the one hand gives the refugee a sense of community, on the other hand facilitates their integration and especially that of their children into their new national environment.

SARDINIA REFUGEE PROJECT

This project is sponsored by HELP (Homeless European Land Program) an organization recently established under the chairmanship of the well-known Hollywood actor, Don Murray, and his wife, Hope Lange. The purpose of HELP is to buy land in the countries with the greatest refugee concentrations and to "build new communities where they will be able to work, construct homes and earn their right to citizenship and freedom".

On the island of Sardinia, Italy, the first of these new communities is now coming into being. A group of six refugees has been established on the land and, with the aid of a volunteer American farmer, they have planted their first crop. This pilot project is supported by UNHCR, the Italian government, the U. S. Escapee Program and a number of voluntary organizations and individuals.

The United Nations and governmental agencies are giving almost half the money. Brethren Service Commission, Congregational Christian Service Committee, CARE, Heifer Project and other voluntary agencies are providing personnel, supplies and all administrative work, free of charge.

It is the hope of the sponsors that as this community grows and becomes self-supporting, it will stimulate the founding of new communities and the refugees themselves will return a portion of their earnings to bring in other refugees.

It is planned to have certain diversification of employment. The majority will work as farmers but there will also be a small concrete block factory and a small wood industry.

THE GALVANIA PROJECT

In the suburbs of Salzburg, Austria, members of the Commission visited the Galvania Project - a cooperative enterprise initiated by a group of hard core refugees under the sponsorship of the World Council of Churches, and with financial support from USEP and UNREF. It is a modest enterprise employing in all some 30 refugees - but it serves as an inspiring example of what can be done with imagination and some limited funds; and it stands, too, as a tribute to the indomitable spirit of man.

The initiators of Galvania were two Latvian refugees named Razinski and Knuski.* Mr. Razinski and his wife had fled from Latvia in 1944. As a result of suffering and nervous strain, his wife had become a chronic invalid, incapable of moving without assistance. In the immediate post-war period it might have been possible for Mr. Razinski personally to emigrate, but he preferred to remain in Austria and attend to his invalid wife.

*For the details of personal background, this study is indebted to the UNHCR publication "To Have a Key".

Despite considerable business experience, Razinski, who is now 58 years old, was for a long time unable to find employment.

Mr. Knuski is a 48 year old engineer who had been unable to emigrate because he suffered from arrested tuberculosis. In Latvia Mr. Knuski had learned a method for "cold" galvanization of metals which has many advantages over the hot galvanization generally practiced in Austria.

The idea of establishing Galvania was born when Knuski and Razinski were brought together. The two of them soon found seven other hard core refugees of superior intelligence who were willing to work with them. All of them had been unable to migrate because of the ineligibility of members of their families. One had a child who was subnormal; another had a wife who was in a mental institution in Austria; a third had decided to stay so that he could be near his tubercular mother; and so on.

Through USEP and UNREF, the World Council of Churches was able to obtain an initial loan of \$7,000 with which to launch the enterprise. Now the factory gives employment to some 30 refugees. When the Commission was there, the enterprise was experiencing difficulty, primarily because of the lack of working capital to invest in badly needed equipment.

This is a project of great vision and hopefulness, which deserves every possible support. If the funds could be made available, there are certainly other hard core refugees who have the acumen and skills to create more "Galvanias".

THE TRIESTE OPERATION

During the last months of 1952 and the first months of 1953, the deterioration of Italian-Yugoslav relations over the question of Trieste remained headline news.

In the Trieste area, there had accumulated since the end of the war some 4,500 refugees. Almost 3,000 of these were considered "hard core"

cases. With the political future of the territory completely up in the air, it is understandable that the refugees should have been panic-stricken and that those responsible for their welfare should have been gravely concerned.

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration continued negotiations with the U. S. government, which had previously been initiated by the International Refugee Organization, with a view to obtaining special funds to resolve the problem of the hard core refugees in Trieste. These negotiations resulted in the release by the U. S. of nearly \$1,000,000 - a carry-over from wartime reparations funds - for the projected Trieste operations.

The situation seemed dishearteningly difficult. The great majority of the Trieste refugees were either sick, aged or disabled, or else were considered unresettleable without special assistance. The immigration countries were refusing visas. Local integration in the Trieste area, or in Italy, was impossible. But everyone was agreed on the need for a concerted effort to move the refugees out of Trieste as rapidly as possible - and ICEM, UNHCR and the voluntary agencies, with the approval of the Western governments, drew up a plan for united action on a crash basis.

Fortunately, too, the United States Escapee Program was able during the following year to give very substantial support to the operations in the form of grants to USEP eligible cases.

The first step was to prepare a complete registration of all refugees, so that they could be broken down into professional, religious, and resettlement categories. The following schedule of grants was agreed upon, to be paid on a case basis to the international voluntary agencies and other recognized organizations assuming responsibility for the settlement of the refugees:

Category "A" included the aged, the chronic sick, the tubercular, the permanently disabled, and also mothers without spouses. For this group scheduled grants ranged from \$500 for a non-institutional placement up to \$1,500 for cure treatment in an institution and eventual firm resettlement. For dependents of the Category "A" group the agencies received a flat grant of \$150.

Category "B" -- a very minor category -- consisted of refugees who were temporarily considered ineligible for fund assistance, for a variety of reasons.

Category "C" included the healthy refugees. To expedite their resettlement, however, a flat grant was made of \$50.

Category "D" included the healthy refugees who were nevertheless difficult to place because of age, profession, family composition, or other handicaps. To permit their resettlement, a flat grant of \$150 was decided on.

When the operations began in March 1953, there were approximately 4,300 refugees in Trieste. New arrivals over the next two years increased the total number of refugees requiring handling to 7,200. By the end of 1956, more than 6,100 of the Trieste refugees had been resettled. The ICEM report on the operation pointed out that approximately 2,600 of these were accepted under mass schemes.

"This shows", said the report, "that refugees can be accepted under mass schemes when the problem is brought forward to the governments in the right way and the refugees are well documented, professionally tested, and given some language training."

The following table, which covers the Trieste operation for the period March 1, 1953 to December 31, 1956, illustrates better than anything else, that the hard core problem is far from insoluble. Given a determined attack by the international agencies, the voluntary agencies and the Western governments, there is no reason why the Trieste experience cannot be repeated on a larger scale with the residual hard core refugee population in Europe.

	: Category A :	:	:	:	:
	: and Category B :	Category C :	Category D :	TOTAL	:
	: Dependents :	:	:	:	:
	: (sick, (in (healthy, (diffi-	:	:	:	:
	: aged, : suspense): no : cult to :	:	:	:	:
	: disabled) :	: major re- : resettle) :	:	:	:
	:	: settlement :	:	:	:
	:	: obstacles) :	:	:	:
	:	:	:	:	:
Total caseload	1,877	: 67	: 4,347	: 928	: 7,219
Resettled	1,551	: -	: 3,780	: 798	: 6,129
Percentage resettled	83%	: -	: 87%	: 86%	: 85%

*This figure includes new arrivals after March 1953. Since there were relatively few hard core cases among the new arrivals, the hard core statistics relate primarily to the 4,300 refugees on hand as of March 1953.

SUMMARY

The liquidation of the "hard core" backlog is a sine qua non for the closing of the camps.

The great majority of the "hard core" cases can be resettled with special effort. This is borne out by the experiences of Norway and other small countries, by the Trieste program, by Father Pire's European Villages, the Galvania project, and other undertakings.

Even from an economic standpoint, one must seriously question the wisdom of keeping the so-called hard core cases in the camps indefinitely. The cost of maintaining them year after year in the misery and hopelessness of camp life has in most cases already exceeded the cost of the personal rehabilitation and resettlement program which might have been undertaken many years ago.

The hard core program, as much as any other aspect of the refugee problem, must be considered a joint responsibility of the Western world. It is unfair to leave the bulk of this burden to the several nations --

Germany, Austria, Italy primarily -- who have thus far provided asylum for the "hard core" refugees.

If smaller countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Switzerland could, between them, take several thousand "hard core" cases, then other Western countries, including the United States, could take proportionately more.

For the aging and the invalids, the most suitable solution in most cases might be institutionalization in Europe -- in the countries of their present asylum or elsewhere, but with the costs defrayed by an international fund under the High Commissioner.

To be effective, a large scale action on behalf of the "hard core" cases, however, should be coordinated by an international conference involving the interested Western powers, with the participation of UNHCR, ICEM, and the international voluntary agencies. Such a conference could dispose of the problem by agreeing on the allocation of quotas of "hard core" cases.

STATISTICAL TABLE (1)
NON-SETTLED HARD-CORE REFUGEES
 (Number of Persons)

	Refugee Households Whose Head Comes Within the Category of Institutional Cases		Other Refugee House- holds Whose Head Comes Within the Category of Difficult Cases		Households Whose Head Comes Within The Category of Physically Handicapped Refugees		Households Difficult To Resettle Because of Social or Economic Handicaps		TOTAL
	In Camps	Out of Camps	In Camps	Out of Camps	In Camps	Out of Camps	In Camps	Out of Camps	
AUSTRIA	397	1800 (2)	1350	-	692	-	1107	-	5,346
FRANCE	-	1061	-	6514	-	3475	-	3560	14,610
GERMANY	286	1800 (2)	2071	-	1196	-	4423	-	9,726
GREECE	23	-	71	-	3	-	324	-	421
ITALY	103	400 (2)	26	-	104	-	764	-	1,397
TURKEY	-	9	-	37	-	66	-	38	150
TOTALS	759	5070	3518	6551	1995	3541	6618	3598	31,650 (3)

Based on preliminary statistical report of UNHCR.

Estimated Number of Hard Core Cases Outside Camps.

Note that this tentative total includes only partial estimates for Germany, Italy, and Austria. The overall total, therefore, would almost certainly be in excess of this figure.

HARD CORE



"HARD CORE" REFUGEES

In the family group on the right the husband and wife have been in the camps for 12 years. Their 5 children, ranging in age from 2 to 10 were all born in the camps and have known no other life. Between them, therefore, this family has spent a total of approximately 50 years in camps.



THE REFUGEE REFUSED ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD BEEN IN THE CAMPS FOR 12 YEARS. HE HAD ONE SON AND ONE DAUGHTER IN CONSEQUENCE OF AN INFECTION. "THERE ARE ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR ME," HE TOLD HIGH COMMISSIONER AUGUSTE LINDT WHEN HE VISITED THE CAMP. "EITHER I SHALL EMIGRATE, AND I BELIEVE I CAN -- OR I SHALL DIE HERE".

4. THE NEW INFLUX OF YUGOSLAV REFUGEES

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

Beth Italian and Austrian officials with whom the matter was discussed agreed that the rate of escape was closely related to Yugoslavia's political orientation. They felt that in part the present influx is due to a general loss of hope -- to a feeling that the liberalization which several years ago seemed to be in process had now yielded to an irreversible reaction. In addition, they said that every time there was a new development which appeared to tie Yugoslavia more closely to the Soviet sphere, there was a new surge of refugees. One of the most knowledgeable Italians concerned with the problem carried the thesis a bit further. He asserted that the composition of the refugee influx varied in terms of local origin according to the relative impact of political developments on one part of Yugoslavia as against another. At one point earlier this year, for example, a rumor started that the Russians had shipped some troops to Albania. The rumor had particular impact in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, the territories closest to Albania. Hundreds of Serbs from these territories at this juncture travelled up to Fiume by train, horse and on foot, and then made their way over the frontier to Trieste. The official in question said that he anticipated a new influx of refugees in consequence of the recognition of the East German Government by Tito.

The refugees interviewed in Italy, Germany and Austria all complained bitterly about economic conditions; they complained with no less fervor of the suppression of freedom and persecution of religion. All of the refugees had heard of Djilas and they appeared to be overwhelmingly sympathetic to him, not because of any specific knowledge of his views, but apparently because he symbolized opposition to the regime. Many of them expressed a desire to obtain copies of his book.

Finally it is impossible not to see the political parallel between this non-violent but nonetheless dramatic revolt of Yugoslav youth and the revolt of the youth in East Germany, Hungary, Poland and even the

Soviet Union.

There was no uniformly accepted theory as to why so many Yugoslavs were able to escape. One of the obvious reasons, however, is that Tito could not possibly erect an Iron Curtain with electrified barbed wire and watch towers along his frontiers without forfeiting all possibility of economic aid from the West. In the absence of an Iron Curtain, escape automatically becomes easier. In addition, the theory was advanced that the lower cadres of the Yugoslav police force were even more demoralized than the general population, and that they were inclined to either turn their backs on escapees or else let them pass in return for fairly nominal bribes.

Italy

In the light of their own difficult economic situation, the Italian authorities are making a truly heroic effort to accommodate the Yugoslav refugees who have been pouring over their frontiers and to deal fairly with them. If camp conditions are sometimes inadequate, one must always remember that Italy is a very poor and overpopulated country and that it is having the greatest difficulty in coping with its own unemployment problem.

On crossing the frontier at Trieste, Yugoslav refugees are accommodated temporarily in the camp of San Sabba. The normal capacity of San Sabba is approximately 1,000 persons. At the time the Commission visited Trieste, the camp population was up to 1,500 refugees, of whom 1,100 were Yugoslavs and 400 were "old refugees".

San Sabba, during the war, was used as a concentration camp by the Nazis. Conditions in the camp are extremely primitive. One of the greatest of all hardships is that the refugees receive no pocket money from any source. A certain percentage of refugees are processed for

eligibility at San Sabba but an effort is now being made to pass them on to the camp at Cremona which, it is expected, will serve as the processing center for Northern Italy.

The Commission which passes on the eligibility of refugees consists of representatives of the Italian Government and the High Commissioner's Office. Through this Commission the UNHCR is able to make representation on behalf of individual refugees about whose refugee status the Italian Government may have doubts.

Approximately 35% - 40% of the Yugoslavs entering Italy are not granted eligibility. The figures are less precise for those who are actually returned, but the offhand estimate was that approximately half of those not accorded eligibility (that is 20% of the total) were sent back.

The business of returning refugees appears to be governed only in part by set rules. Criminals and Communist agents are, for understandable reasons, automatically repatriated but these account for only a small percentage of the total. With rare exceptions Yugoslav escapees under the age of 18 are also turned back. Having deducted these categories, however, there still remains a substantial percentage of "non-eligibles" whose fate apparently is not decided by clearly defined criteria. The prefect of Cremona, the Commission was told, refuses as a matter of principle to repatriate refugees. Once they leave his custody, however, they may be repatriated by police officials further along the line.

After leaving Cremona the refugees are sent to Capua, to Altamura (outside Bari) and to other centers. The right to work is not granted to refugees until they have been in Italy for three years or unless they have Italian spouses. Once they have the right to work, they enjoy all social benefits. In Italy, as a whole, there were, on the date of interview, approximately 3,300 Yugoslavs who had been ruled eligible for refugee status and another 3,000 whose cases were still pending.

From the 1st January until the 30th September, ICEM has moved out of Italy 2,000 new refugees from Yugoslavia of whom the great majority went to Australia and Canada.

Austria

Hard on the heels of the mass influx of 170,000 Hungarian refugees over the four months period commencing November last year, the Austrian Government is now being called upon to cope with another mass influx of refugees -- this time from Yugoslavia. In the light of their own limited resources and the relative dearth of cash assistance available for Yugoslav refugees from international sources, the Austrians must also be commended for their willingness to assume the new burden and for the strenuous efforts they have made to deal with it on a humanitarian basis.

The prevailing theory in Austria (although the opinion in government circles is far from unanimous) is that most of the Yugoslavs are economic rather than political refugees. According to informed estimates, approximately 35% of Yugoslav refugees who have entered Austria this year have not been granted status by the Austrian authorities. Of the 65% who are recognized, only a few hundred have been granted "A" certificates, which specifically acknowledge their refugee status and accord them the right to work. Most of the others have received "B" certificates which avoid specific mention of refugee status and state merely that the holder has been granted asylum by the Austrian government. The holder of the "B" certificate may not take work. He may, however, apply for travel documents under the Geneva Convention - after obtaining which, he may take work and enjoy much the same status as the "A" certificate holders. The complications and delay are rather disconcerting to the refugees. The "C" certificates, which are tantamount to non-recognition, do not grant asylum but

* The complete tally of Hungarian refugees arriving in Austria now stands at 178,900.

simply give the bearer the right to remain in Austria for a period of six months pending emigration. At the end of that time, the certificate is generally renewable. However, if a "C" certificate holder wishes to obtain Geneva Convention travel documents, he must apply for reclassification.

There are indications that the Austrian government plans to relax procedures so that the majority of the Yugoslav refugees arriving in their country will receive "A" certificates.

The classification of the Austrian government does not materially affect the refugees' chances of selection by a migration mission. But it does make a substantial difference in the kind of life he must live in Austria pending migration.

Refugee accommodation in Austrian camps varies in quality from very good to very bad. There are many shortcomings, however, even in the best of the camps, Glasenbach, near Salzburg, which has recently been renovated with USEP funds, consists of wooden barracks inhabited by some 700 Yugoslavs and 500 refugees from other eastern European countries. Only 10% of the inmates have found work outside the camp. The remaining ones, almost all of them young and healthy people, spend their days in demoralizing idleness. Although the buildings are of superior construction, as refugee barracks go, one room will house either 6 - 8 single persons or two or three families.

Germany

Since the beginning of 1957, Germany has received approximately Yugoslav refugees.

Like all other foreign refugees entering Germany, they must pass through the Central Processing Center at Camp Valka. (For a description of Camp Valka, see section entitled "Reception".) Approximately 60% of Valka's present population of 700 inhabitants are Yugoslavs. This percentage

applies roughly to the current rate of intake, which has hovered around 250 per month. Those refugees who are granted eligibility are moved to Camp Zirndorf, near Valka, where, with USEP assistance, they enjoy vastly improved living conditions. But much more important, from Zirndorf they stand a very good chance of being processed for migration to Canada or Australia or some other receiving country.

Those who are not granted refugee status remain eligible for migration to other countries but until such migration is arranged they remain third class residents of the Bonn Republic. Theoretically, they do not have the right to work. The voluntary agencies, however, are frequently able to arrange work for them, with the consent of the German authorities.

The Commission was assured that no Yugoslavs are returned from Germany.

Yugoslavs who come into Germany via Austria are eligible for refugee status if their transit time through Austria was less than three weeks. If they have been in Austria longer than this time, however, status is not granted.

The Return of Unaccompanied Minors

While unaccompanied minors who escaped from Hungary after the Revolution have been granted de facto status as political refugees, the same privilege has not been accorded to some thousands of minors who have escaped from Yugoslavia. The Commission was most disturbed by the fact that, with few exceptions, the refugees under the age of 18 are being returned. Indeed, in Italy, where approximately 35% of the escapees are refused eligibility, the largest single group of the refugees involved are adolescents of 15, 16, and 17.

The Commission was informed that all teen-age refugees are given individual consideration and that in a few cases where the escapees had

come out bearing written authorization from their parents, they had not been returned. This criterion struck the Commission as altogether excessive: it would be an extremely rare teen-ager who would have the foresight to arm himself with a document of parental permission. The intensity of the emotion which has impelled the young refugees to seek freedom in the West is apparent from some of their stories. One of the NCWC workers in Trieste, for example, told the Commission of a Yugoslav girl of 17 who had escaped twice, had been returned twice, and had escaped for the third time to Trieste in early October.

The Italian and UNHCR officials with whom the matter was discussed expressed the opinion that they had no alternative in the case of the refugees who were less than 18 years of age. Under international law they are minors, and, as minors, it is difficult to arrange for their migration without the written permission of their parents or guardians. From the standpoint of the Italian Government it is certainly understandable that they should not relish the prospect of accepting a large body of refugees for whom emigration is, at the best, very difficult.

In Austria, apparently for the same reasons that prevail in Italy, refugees below the age of 18 are not granted status. It remained unclear, however, whether they were returned automatically or whether some were returned and some permitted to stay, according to individual circumstances.

In Germany, the Commission was informed that it would in practice be impossible for the Bonn Government to repatriate Yugoslav minors since diplomatic relations no longer existed between the two countries.

The question of what to do with teen-age escapees is admittedly a complicated one. Some of the Commission members felt that it was inhuman to return any of the Yugoslav minors. Others felt that conceivably in the case of those refugees who were under 16, repatriation to the custody of their family might be the best solution. But the Commission as a whole is

agreed that the 16 and 17 year olds who have been escaping from Yugoslavia cannot simply be regarded as juvenile delinquents or as young people who are momentarily disaffected with their families. We are convinced that many of them, perhaps the majority of them, have escaped for the same complex of economic, personal, and political reasons that motivated the 18, 19 and 20 year olds, and we believe they should be accorded the same treatment.

Yugoslav Refugees and USEP

Theoretically, the Yugoslavs are eligible for USEP assistance. In practice, they are receiving only a portion of the aid made available to other escapees. There is at present no supplementary living allowance for Yugoslavs in Germany or Italy; and in Austria only the several hundred Yugoslavs at Camp Glasenbach are receiving such support. Requests for transportation money for Yugoslavs were not accepted by USEP from September 1 to November 25. They are now being accepted, however, "until further notice."

USEP says that, in principle, it is in favor of giving the Yugoslav refugees the same assistance it accords to other recent escapees, but that it simply does not have the funds. The situation is further complicated by USEP's requirement that refugees be registered within six months of the date of their escape. The flow of Yugoslavs into Austria and Italy had been so great that the voluntary agencies have been unable to keep up with individual USEP registrations. For this reason a large number of the Yugoslavs escaping into Austria and Italy have not been registered with USEP in time to claim even those USEP supports which have been authorized.

Summary

1. The Commission is convinced that the Yugoslav refugees, like other refugees, have escaped because of a complex of political, economic, and personal motivations. It feels that the term "economic refugees",

11. Yugoslav Refugees

apart from being inaccurate, is calculated to place the Yugoslav refugees on an inferior plane from the standpoint of status and treatment. It discriminates between the refugees from Yugoslavia and the refugees from the other Communist-dominated countries in a manner that is unfair and politically damaging.

2. Yugoslav minors who escape should not be returned automatically, because their motivations are frequently the same as those of the escapees who have passed the age of 18.

3. The Commission would seriously recommend that the administration examine the possibility of making certain discretionary funds available to USEP so that, in advance of the next congressional appropriation, it can provide assistance to the Yugoslav escapees on the same basis as the assistance given to escapees from other Communist dominated countries.

4. The Yugoslav refugee situation once again underscores the lack of flexibility in the American immigration set-up. This lack has cost us dearly in terms of human skills as well as international prestige. As potential immigrants, the youthful escapees from Yugoslavia are one of the most desirable groups that has emerged since the end of the war. Canada and Australia have eagerly been accepting thousands of them. But since the expiration of the Refugee Relief Act only a handful of the new Yugoslav escapees were able to enter our country and the likelihood is that under the present law admissions of Yugoslav escapees will not exceed 2,000 cases.



RECENT YUGOSLAV ESCAPEES

Camp Capua, Italy and Camp Glaserbach, Austria



III. THE NEW INFLUX OF YUGOSLAV REFUGEES

In Italy, Austria and Germany the Members of the Commission met with scores of Yugoslav refugees and discussed the problem at length with Government authorities, representatives of the High Commissioner's Office and the U. S. Escapee Program, State Department representatives in the field, local police officials and representatives of the American voluntary agencies. In Italy they visited the camps at Trieste and Capua which house Yugoslav escapees. In Austria they met with Yugoslavs in Camps Hellbrunn and Glashenbach; and in Germany they spoke to Yugoslavs in Camp Valka and Camp Zirndorf.

* * * * *

Since the beginning of the year some 20 - 25,000 Yugoslavs have escaped into Austria, Italy and Germany. There are two points of view as to the nature of this influx.

According to the first point of view, the majority of the Yugoslav escapees are not genuine political refugees but economic migrants who are leaving their country because they cannot find employment there and because normal channels of migration are not open to them.

The second point of view, which is shared by most of the American, Italian and Austrian officials, as well as representatives of the American voluntary agencies who have personal contact with the problem is that, despite minor differences in motivation, the great majority of the Yugoslav escapees do qualify as "political refugees". They feel that no serious qualitative distinction can be made between the refugees now emerging from Yugoslavia and those who fled to the West at various times since the Communist conquest of Eastern Europe.

As a result of discussions with refugees and with government and agency representatives, the Commission believes that the "economic migrants"

1. Yugoslav Refugees

definition is meaningless - for the simple reason that almost all refugees from Communist countries escape because of a combination of political, economic and personal motivations. In consequence of this definition, these refugees are receiving somewhat less help and consideration than escapees from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other Communist countries.

There are certain facts about the present exodus from Yugoslavia which are difficult to reconcile with the "economic migrants" thesis. Such migrations traditionally have involved adults of mature age and family groups primarily. The migrants have left their countries in the expectation that, when they arrive in the country to which they were moving, there was prospect of immediate employment. And they have taken with them in small trunks and suitcases their few worldly possessions - and worldly possessions can be far more precious to the poor than to the rich.

None of these criteria is met by the Yugoslav refugees of today. In the first place they are all extremely young; 80% of them are under 25, and perhaps the largest single group are the 18-21 year olds. They are not delinquents, but for the most part workers and students. Indeed, their general intelligence and the wholesomeness of their appearance stamp them as belonging to the elite of the Yugoslav youth.

They have fled despite the knowledge that no jobs were waiting for them in Austria and Italy; that they stood at least a small chance of imprisonment if caught by the frontier police; and they would have to wait for six months at the least and more probably a year or more before moving on to another country. They have left with only the shirts on their backs, because an escapee, unlike a migrant, cannot take a suitcase with him. In many cases they have risked their lives to escape by ~~stealing~~ small boats to cross the Adriatic or by swimming across the bay at Trieste. At the best, the act of escape was a physical ordeal. The Yugoslav refugees who have

entered Austria have had to make their way through a difficult mountain frontier. In some areas the frontier can be crossed with two days of hard trekking. But there are other parts of the frontier where the escapees have had to spend ten to twelve days moving over mountains that range up to 10,000 feet. That they were able to make this journey, in many cases bringing small children with them, is a tribute to their physical vigor and strength of character - but more than this, it supports the belief that they were impelled by motivations somewhat stronger than simple economic discontent.

The "economic migrant" thesis is also difficult to reconcile with the tremendous increase in the rate of escape which has been apparent over the past several years. There is no difference worth talking about between the economic circumstances in Yugoslavia of today and those that existed in 1955 and 1956; but the contrast in the rate of escape is startling. Here are some comparative figures for Austria for the years 1955, 1956, and 1957:

Yugoslav Escapees to Austria

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u> *
January		125	263
February		55	577
March		183	955
April		260	757
May		282	1,218
June		407	1,565
July		547	1,924
August		863	2,230
September		1,009	1,685
October		939	1,320
November		508	424
December		159	
 TOTAL	 1,492	 5,337	 12,918

* To November 10, 1957.

* Escapes into Austria tend to fall off sharply during the winter months because the mountains in many parts become impassable.

5. BERLIN

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

V. B E R L I N

EAST ZONE REFUGEES IN BERLIN

(As of September 1 1957)

In camp 15,300

Out of camp 154,853

Total 170,153

In Berlin the Commission members met with Mayor Willy Brandt of Berlin, with Frau Reuter, the widow of former Mayor Reuter, with officials concerned with the refugee problem and with representatives of USEP and the American Consulate. They visited the Marienfelde Reception Center for newly arrived escapees from East Germany and the model nursery which has been established in the center by the Reuter Foundation - IRC.

As an island in the Soviet zone of Germany, Berlin has a refugee problem of a unique nature.

There are very few foreign refugees in Berlin, although recently some hundreds of Poles and Czechs and Hungarians have been coming into the Western sector after entering East Germany with Communist approved passports. Since 1952, however, free Berlin has been the chief gateway for the tremendous influx of refugees from the Soviet zone of Germany.

It would be extremely difficult physically and it would be disastrous politically for the Communist regime in East Germany to erect a physical barrier across Berlin that effectively cut off their sector from the West. Because of the absence of any such barrier, it has been relatively simple for citizens of the Soviet zone who are disaffected with their regime to make their way to East Berlin, then walk or ride the subway into West Berlin and ask for asylum. Over the past 5 years,

1,085,000 refugees from East Germany have entered West Berlin in this way. At its peak in 1952 the rate of flow reached 40,000 per week. This year the rate of flow has been 12-14,000 per month.

At the Marienfelde Reception Center, the Commission saw the daily intake of refugees waiting to be processed -- teen-age boys and girls, family groups with infants-in-arms, and even quite elderly couples, most of them arriving without any possessions, some of them bringing with them a suitcase.

Almost 90% of those who arrive from the East zone are recognized as political refugees. The 10% who are rejected are not repatriated but obtain asylum with certain limited rights. Over the past year there has been a noticeable increase in the percentage of young men and women among the refugees. Those 18-25 now represent more than 40% of all arrivals. This is another dramatic evidence of the ferment that continues to go on among the youth of Communist-dominated Europe. There has also been a change in the social composition of the refugee flow. Several years ago, the peasants accounted for as much as 25% of the monthly intake. Of the refugees coming over at the present time, however, about 60% are workers, 10-12% peasants, the rest intellectuals and professionals.

The main reason that the adult refugees give for escaping is that they do not wish to have their children brought up as communists. A sizeable percentage (5-6%) of the refugees are teachers who have come out because their conscience/against the increasingly rigid control of the teaching profession and the emphasis on communist indoctrination.

The city of West Berlin, with a total of 2.2 million inhabitants, has 900,000 people who live, wholly or in part, on pensions, welfare, or relief. Of this number, 360,000 are past the age of 65. Despite the tremendous burden on its economy, West Berlin has neverthe-

less absorbed almost 200,000 of the refugees who have entered the city since 1952. The others have been flown out to distributing centers in Western Germany.

There are 10 city reception camps and 4 camps for young people which, between them, have a capacity of almost 10,000. In addition, there are 25 so-called "living camps" which accomodate primarily "nicht anerkannte" (not recognized) refugees. The other refugees in the city live privately, with friends or relatives or in furnished rooms. The majority of those who have remained have been able to find work, especially in the technical professions. The situation is more difficult for office workers, clerks, etc. There is a special department in the labor office for retraining those whose profession offers little chance for employment.

To help house the refugees remaining in Berlin, 1,341 apartments have been constructed thus far this year, with total accomodation for approximately 5,200 persons. During previous years some 30,000 refugees had been accomodated in almost 7,000 apartments especially built for them.

The Senate Department responsible for refugees has set up a cultural program for refugees in camps and for those living on the outside. The chief purpose of the program is to provide refugees with information about the various parts of Germany to which they will be distributed. Most of the camps in general are well equipped and have libraries and cinemas. One of the large camps for young men has a carpenters and mechanics workshop.



MARTENFELDE RECEPTION CENTER, BERLIN

East German refugees waiting to be
registered.



6. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE SOVIET

REDEFECTION CAMPAIGN

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

VI. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE COMMUNIST REDEFLECTION CAMPAIGN

In early 1955 the Soviet Union and its satellite nations simultaneously embarked on a redeflection campaign of international scope. Amnesty decrees were passed, assuring all the refugees who had fled their countries that they would suffer no penalty on their return.

In virtually every city of Western Europe and the Western hemisphere where Iron Curtain refugees had settled in substantial number, the redeflection campaign, lavishly financed and supported by a network of agents and informers, became an instrument of fear in refugee circles. Russians, Poles, Hungarians and others who had left their countries many years previously and had begun to feel confident that the Communists knew nothing of their whereabouts and circumstances, suddenly began to receive letters, newspapers and circulars, sent to them at their current address. The literature and letters were supplemented by radio broadcasts in every refugee language, appealing to the refugees on patriotic grounds to return home. Finally, there were the personal visits from Soviet agents, who employed techniques ranging all the way from saccharine suasion to outright kidnapping.

At first, the campaign had some sensational successes. It was particularly easy to appeal to the refugees who were broken and embittered after vegetating in the camps of Western Europe for many years. It was also relatively easy to appeal to the refugees in certain of the Latin American countries where integration had proceeded poorly and the refugees were isolated and economically discontented. At the height of the campaign, several very large groups of Iron Curtain refugees returned from Latin America to their Communist-dominated homelands. Of course, there was a tremendous fanfare on the subject by Communist propaganda.

The reason for the redeflection campaign was obvious. Every refugee who was successfully settled abroad was a living argument against

Communism; every refugee who redefected to his homeland after experience with the West became a living argument in the service of the Communist lie.

The redefection propaganda campaign, although it still persists, has been tapering off. The reason for this tapering off, it can be safely assumed, has been the diminishing rate of return. Those who were weak or broken and psychologically prepared to succumb, succumbed during the early months of the campaign. The overwhelming majority, however, were not prepared to surrender their freedom despite the economic difficulties under which many of them were living.

At the present time, the redefection campaign publishes three newspapers in Russian and several in the satellite languages. These are regularly dispatched to a great number of refugees in Western Europe. Apparently, however, the refugees -- with the exception of the Hungarians -- are receiving far fewer letters from near relatives urging them to return.

Other techniques still employed include personal visits to refugees at their homes, or meetings with them while they are attending conferences, congresses, etc. in the West. In France, the consulates regularly attempt to entice the refugees with cultural programs in their own language. These are often well attended, because in many cases they are the only events of their kind to which the refugee has access.

However, the rosy descriptions of life behind the Iron Curtain, which are fed to the refugees in the course of these cultural programs, are counteracted in part by private letters which they receive from their homeland. "I am working like a slave," a Czechoslovak refugee who returned in 1956 wrote to a friend in Paris. "I found no room and prices are so high that I must work 12 hours a day and even Sundays to earn the bare minimum. I could kick myself when I think of my life in Paris. Now I am living here like a dog without hope or future."

The redefection campaign is most active among the Russian refugees. The activities of the Soviet agents encharged with winning the refugees back are centralized through the "Committee for Return to the Homeland," which has its headquarters at Schadowstrasse 18 in the Eastern sector of Berlin. The committee has a radio station and it broadcasts in Russian, Ukrainian, Ruthenian and the other regional languages of the USSR. It has special reception centers in East Berlin, where redefectors are lodged prior to their return to Russia. The Committee for the Return to the Homeland has its agents at every point where there is a concentration of Russian refugees. These agents distribute literature and pamphlets, spread news and rumors and pay personal visits to those refugees who show signs of being psychologically prepared. In some cases, also, the Soviet embassies play a direct role in enticing redefectors and assisting redefection agents.

Most of the Russian redefectors came from Argentina and other Latin American countries. In France, a certain number of old White Russian immigrants decided to return. From Western Germany, where the activities of the Berlin committee are most energetic, the number of redefectors returning to Russia amounted to only six in the month of June, five in July and five in August.

Among the redefectors, it goes without saying, there is always a certain number of Communist agents, who are recalled home after having completed longer or shorter assignments in the West. The Communist propaganda machine makes great use of such cases to demonstrate that "the refugees are returning home" — and the Communist agents, posing as once-genuine refugees who had been disillusioned by their experience with the West, deliver eloquent tirades over the Communist radio.

The redefection campaign has also been active among the new

Hungarian refugees. Official figures list more than 5400 repatriations from Austria, 2700 from Yugoslavia, and 2200 from other countries. The actual numbers are undoubtedly higher. The Hungarian Communist regime has been making particularly strenuous efforts to promote the repatriation of the young people who escaped without their parents. (For an account of this campaign, see section "The Hungarian Refugees One Year Later.")

SUMMARY: There is only one effective answer to the redefection campaign. That is, as this report proposes, a concerted effort to close down the camps, to resettle the refugees who have been waiting so many years, to humanize the reception of the refugees, to expedite their processing and to liberalize immigration procedures -- to the end that those who come over to our side will have the feeling that they are wanted and the assurance that they will be able to rebuild their lives without having to suffer through years of idleness and uncertainty and frustration.

7. THE RECEPTION AND TREATMENT OF THE REFUGEES --

A CHALLENGE TO THE WEST

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

VI. THE RECEPTION AND TREATMENT OF THE REFUGEE

The refugee who makes up his mind to escape must leave behind all that he possesses, must be prepared to risk his life, must forfeit the protection of his government and therewith his legal status, must be prepared to endure months and even years of privation in the camps before he is given the possibility of remaking his life. If he succeeds in escaping, he arrives in the country of his asylum physically and emotionally exhausted, completely penniless, defenseless and unoriented -- "...the bewildered guest of embarrassed hosts who have no obligations towards him other than those dictated by common humanity". (Quotation from Century of the Homeless Man by Elfan Rees.

But, withal, the refugee is full of hope on his arrival in the West. The great majority of refugees have listened to the broadcasts of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, the BBC and other Western transmitters. No one can say that they are deliberately invited to escape. On the whole, the Western broadcasts make a simple and truthful presentation of the facts about Communism and about democracy. But in the mere act of doing so, they inevitably stimulate in their listeners a discontent with their lot and a desire to enjoy the blessings of freedom. Many of those who have succeeded in escaping have declared that the Western broadcasts to which they listened were a major factor in their desire to sacrifice status and possessions for the hope of freedom.

The picture they have of democracy is admittedly an over-idealized one. At the very least, however, they expect a friendly reception, humane treatment during the inevitable period of waiting, and ultimately the opportunity to resettle somewhere in the free world. They come over to our side not merely because they want these things for themselves, but also because they feel that in this way it will be possible for them to join the worldwide struggle for freedom.

Reception

But when the escapee arrives in the West, he is often treated with suspicion and hostility. The reception center to which he is moved bears a disturbing similarity, both in physical appearance and general living conditions, to centers that went by the name of concentration camps not so many years ago. In the center he finds himself immediately subjected to a series of interrogations by intelligence officers and eligibility commissions. All of this is unavoidable: The intelligence officers must check on the refugees to make certain that they are not Communist agents, and the eligibility commissions must screen them to assure that they otherwise qualify as refugees. The interrogators, in the main, are humane and sympathetic, but it is their function to ask probing questions -- and in many cases these probing questions are enough to make the refugee feel that he is suspect, perhaps unwanted. Finally, the escapee soon discovers that although resettlement is available, in most cases the price he must pay for this opportunity is a stay of a year or two years or perhaps longer in camps which segregate him from the society of free men.

Reception

The escapee's first real experience of the free world is apt to be a camp like Valka, the reception center for all non-German refugees arriving in Germany. Valka is a dismal segregation compound, surrounded by concrete walls and barbed wire. During the war it served as a POW camp for Allied officers; after the war it was used as an internment camp for third degree Nazis. In 1949 it was converted into a camp for homeless foreign refugees.

In Valka the refugee shares a room with 6 to 12 other refugees, sleeping on triple-decker bunks with blankets and straw mattresses that have served many bodies before his, over a period of more than a decade. The crude frame buildings are so badly dilapidated that they are, by official

admission, beyond the possibility of repair. There is no common dining room, so the refugees must obtain their food from a kitchen and carry it, sometimes through rain or cold, several hundred yards to their quarters. The accumulation of bits of food and refuse in the quarters has produced a sizeable population of rats, who make their homes underneath the floorboards of the flimsy structures.

In this environment, the escapees who loved freedom enough to sacrifice possessions and risk their lives must pass an average of eight to nine months while they are being screened to determine their eligibility as refugees.

Members of the Commission were several times moved to tears during the course of their visit to Valka. Time and time again, refugees, with bitterness in their voices, would ask, "Is this how people are treated in the free world?" or "How much longer must we stay here?"

Valka is a reproach to the conscience of the Western world, a blot on the generally good reputation in the treatment of refugees that Germany has won for herself since the end of the war.

The facts about Valka are well known. It has been the subject of many indignant statements by Germans as well as non-Germans - and it has also been the subject of many propaganda broadcasts by the Communist radio. This last November 12, for example, Radio Pilsen told the story of a refugee woman by the name of Jahkova.

"Perhaps she had in her mind," said the broadcast, "the illusion that she would be welcomed with open arms in the West and would go ahead to who knows what success. Instead she was admitted to the Valka camp near Nurnberg, where she lived for eight years. Having returned home with her two children, she could not be recognized, as her looks were quite changed ... She looks like an old woman, although she is only 35 years of age."

This kind of broadcast has been going on for years. Valka, indeed, has been one of the most effective propaganda clubs of the Communist

radio. For example, two years ago there was a broadcast over Radio Pilsen by a 19-year old Czech named Frantik Suchy, who had recently redefected from Germany.

"We lived in Camp Valka a few months," said Suchy. "We used to sit in front of the barracks and dream. We deliberately shut our eyes to reality. We deliberately overlooked the holes in the roof through which rain poured into the rooms. Nobody ever mentioned the bugs which kept us from sleeping. We avoided groups of women and children who wept because they were hungry ... finally I escaped from the camp to join my sister in Vienna. I was desperate. I had to leave that awful camp at any price, for the conditions there kill within a man all his good qualities; you face hopelessness, misery, and despair with every step you take."

Unfortunately, there is little that can be said in reply to such propaganda, because, even though it contains exaggerations, too much of it is true.

Nobody defends Valka, nobody wants it, everyone agrees that it is an abomination. The town of Nurnberg, the Land Government of Bavaria, the Bonn Government -- all are embarrassed by Valka, and they have been in agreement for years that Valka should be closed as soon as possible. Apparently Valka has been scheduled for liquidation ever since its inception. The camp commander, in fact, said that when he assumed the post in 1951 he was told it would be for one year only. But Valka still stands.

The difficulty seems to be that Valka cannot be liquidated until some other camp is established to take its place, and that all the German communities thus far approached have expressed opposition to the establishment of a refugee reception center in their environs. Unfortunately the words "refugee reception center" have become identified with "Valka"; and no community can be blamed for not wanting a Camp Valka in its suburbs. Against the background of Valka, it is apparently difficult to persuade communities that camps can be acceptable dwelling places and that they are, in addition, not unpleasant in external appearance (e.g. Zirndorf and Glasenbach).

This difficulty has been further aggravated by the greatly exaggerated publicity in the local press on the subject of crime in Valka. Crime statistics for Valka are about the same as those for slum areas anywhere in Germany. But, according to the camp commander, every incident of crime involving a Valka refugee is sensationalized and inflated out of all proportion to reality by the local press.

A small model camp has been established at Zirndorf, less than 15 miles from Valka, with USEP support. Camp Zirndorf, with a planned accommodation of 200 (actual occupancy 340) is at present being used as a migration processing center for foreign refugees who have graduated from Valka -- that is, have been granted refugee status by the German authorities. USEP had originally hoped that it would be possible to expand Zirndorf to the point where it could provide accommodations for the 600 to 700 refugees currently in Valka. This hope, unfortunately, has foundered on the resistance of the community of Zirndorf, which objected to the enlargement of the camp already in its suburbs. The protests from Zirndorf were apparently backed by the Bavarian Government, which would like to see the reception center moved out of its own territory. The Bonn Government, on the other hand, feels that it is both cheaper and politically logical to keep the reception center fairly close to the Czech and Austrian borders. The result of all this has been an unbroken round of conferences -- with no decision. The plans for another center, the Commission was informed, are ready; the money is available -- but the problem of positioning it still remains to be solved.

The German officials at all levels with whom the Commission discussed the matter of Valka were completely frank. They attempted to cover up nothing. They agreed that Valka was a horror that should not have been permitted to exist all these years, and they spoke of their repeated attempts to find a solution. Despite the admitted difficulties, the Commission members

CAMP VALKA AND CAMP ZIRNDORF

A study in contrasts: The misery of Camp Valka is apparent in the faces of these inmates (top). The Polish mother and child and the Polish children in the model Camp Zirndorf (bottom) are, in contrast, relatively happy.



could not help feeling that, had a truly determined effort been made years ago by the German authorities in Bonn and Bavaria, Valka could have been closed and replaced by a reception center somewhat more in harmony with Western humanism.

In Bonn, a high ranking official concerned with refugees assured members of the Commission that the government was determined to see Valka closed by the end of 1958. His categorical affirmation is something that will be welcomed by all those, both refugees and agency representatives, who have experienced the horror of Valka at first hand. The Commission wonders, however, whether some way could not be found of accelerating the schedule of closure in the case of Valka. Every day that it continues to exist is an affront to the conscience of the German people and, indeed, of the free world.

ELIGIBILITY SCREENING

Refugees arriving in Germany, Austria or Italy must pass before screening commissions, which decide whether or not to recognize them as political refugees. The composition and the criteria of the screening commissions will vary from one country to another. In Italy the eligibility commissions are composed of representatives of the Italian government and of the UN High Commissioner. In Austria and Germany, the commissions are government appointed. The lack of the uniformity of criteria results in some startling discrepancies. It is, for example, difficult to understand why 70% of the Yugoslavs currently escaping into Italy should be considered political refugees while only a small minority of the Yugoslavs escaping into Austria are granted "A" certificates, which clearly recognize them as political refugees. (See section "The New Influx of Yugoslav Refugees" for description of differences between "A", "B", and "C" certificates in Austria.)

In Italy, members of the Commission were able to meet both the

Italian and UNHCR representatives on the eligibility commission. They were men of altogether superior intelligence and understanding and the files which the Italian authorities maintain to help check on the veracity of the refugees' stories were most comprehensive and meticulously kept. But the Commission could not help wondering whether the procedures employed gave the refugee the benefit of the doubt, and the protection to which he is entitled.

When the refugee arrives in the West he is frequently unnerved by the ordeal through which he has passed, groping for an orientation, insecure. Without the benefit of legal counsel in most cases and very frequently without the benefit of advice from agency counsellors, he must pass before a committee which asks him many probing questions. (Theoretically the refugee can consult with legal counsellors during the course of his interrogation. In Austria, this right is somewhat more than theoretical, thanks to a special project set up by UNHCR. In Germany and Italy, however, these counsellors are in such short supply -- there is only one legal counsel, appointed by The National Catholic Welfare Conference, for the whole of Camp Valka -- that the refugee in the great majority of cases does not enjoy access to legal advice. The UNHCR representatives who sit in on the eligibility commissions as full members in the case of Italy, and as observers in the case of Germany and Austria, perform a certain protective function, but they do not specifically serve as personal counsellors to the refugees.)

Gertrude Samuels described such an interrogation session eloquently in her article "People in Search of Identity" (New York Times Magazine, September 23, 1956):

"Inside a small, cheerless room of a wooden barracks, a young Czech 'escapee' faces his interrogators. Seated at the foot of the T-shaped tables, flanked by an interpreter and a United Nations observer, he looks nervously into the alert faces of the three German 'judges' of the Screening Center. It is a bad moment for him.

"He feels the helplessness of most stateless people who lack proof of identity -- the pieces of paper, invented by the modern state, with the blue-inked stamps and red seals which give a man some status and say, in effect, 'This man wanted to live in freedom and so he fled.' Now they must rely on his words, the words of an alien stranger seeking asylum in a country whose soldiers not long ago occupied his town; he must prove that he had been persecuted by the new regime or lived in fear of persecution. He knows that in this camp there are people who have been screened and re-screened and rejected -- the 'non-recognized' whose reasons for flight have not been accepted. He is desperate as he pours out his story."

It is understandable that many refugees, in their disturbed state, and lacking any assurance of the friendly intentions of their interrogators, should become involved in petty lies -- indeed, it is all the more understandable in view of the fact that they come from countries where one frequently is compelled to lie in order to make his way. And so the refugee will sometimes tell a completely pointless lie in reply to a question. The Commission may pardon one or two lies - but many refugees, once they have told an untruth to their interrogators, become further and further enmeshed, until finally they are hopelessly lost.

Sometimes they may prejudice their chances by an outburst of temper. In Valka the Commission spoke to a Hungarian refugee who had just come from a very disturbing session with the screening board. A member of the board had asked him why he had escaped. At this question the refugee blew his top. "Anyone who asks that question," he said, "just isn't capable of understanding why a person becomes a refugee!" The screening board was, of course, entitled to ask the question -- indeed it must do so as a matter of routine. It is also understandable that the refugee in question should have reacted as violently as he did.

On the basis of information which came to it the Commission could not help wondering whether the refugee who is being screened for eligibility is, in effect, not placed in the position of having to "prove his innocence", and whether he is not too frequently denied eligibility on the

basis of unconfirmed suspicion. Refugees with political proclivities are unfortunately prone -- especially after several years in a camp -- to engage in denunciation of fellow refugees whose political views differ from theirs. A single denunciation can sometimes be instrumental in denying status as a political refugee to a recently arrived escapee. But even where there is no denunciation, the routine check which is made with older refugees who have personal knowledge of the newcomer frequently produces information of questionable reliability. Dr. Raphael Aghababian, an authority on the legal protection of the refugee, had this to say on the subject in INTEGRATION (No. 1, 1957):

"This testimony does not inspire a normal confidence..... Terrorized and still suffering from the mental deformation produced by the regime of persecution and espionage, these refugee witnesses are afraid to testify in favor of another refugee, if they do not know him sufficiently well, for fear of themselves becoming suspect..... of being accomplices.."

Because of such testimony, however, the screening for eligibility frequently drags on for many months. In Germany, the average time required is approximately 8 months. In Austria and Italy, it is somewhat less than this. While some of the receiving nations will accept refugees as immigrants prior to the determination of their status, or even if they are denied status, in general the process of immigration would be expedited if some improvement could be made in the tempo of eligibility screening.

In addition to his personal anxiety and the questionable nature of the evidence which frequently comes before the eligibility commissions, the refugee is up against another and perhaps even more serious handicap. The Geneva Convention of 1951 was intended to establish uniform eligibility criteria. The interpretation of these criteria, however, will vary from one country to another and, for that matter, will vary considerably in their application to individual cases.

The denial of status as a political refugee is a serious matter

for the refugee. The concrete effects of denial, however, will vary from one country to another.

In Germany, because of the shortage of labor in many areas, it has generally been possible for refugees, even when they have been denied status, to find employment. Lack of status, however, results in certain complications. Among other things, the refugee requires special permission to accept employment or to take up residence in a German Kreis (county). If, as sometimes happens, the refugee is denied the right of residence by a Kreis, this decision then becomes valid for the whole of Germany. If the refugee in question should subsequently obtain an offer of employment in another Kreis, he would first have to appeal to the first Kreis to revise their finding on his acceptability for residence. In consequence of these complications, it frequently happens that refugees who have been denied status are compelled to accept employment at a lower level than would be available to them if they had been recognized.

In Austria, the escapee's chances of finding employment are much more limited. There is, however, enough elasticity in the Austrian economy to make it possible for substantial numbers of refugees to integrate themselves -- e.g. it is estimated that approximately 7,000 Hungarians who escaped into Austria have been able to resettle satisfactorily in that country or are on their way to satisfactory integration.

In Italy escapees in general are not permitted to work but those who are granted status are accommodated in official Italian camps so that they do not have to worry about food and shelter. Those who are denied status may be repatriated, as happens with many Yugoslav refugees; or, if they are not returned, they may be thrown out on the over-burdened Italian economy, in which case they are doomed to a sub-marginal existence.

Far more important than any economic suffering to which he may be

subjected by denial of refugee status, is the psychological impact of such denial on the refugee. The significance of this denial to him is that he is unwanted. Having lived under a political regime where the scrap of paper which identifies a person controls his entire destiny, and having abandoned national and legal status in the act of escaping, the refugee tends to look upon his certificate of eligibility almost as a proof of his personal existence. The refugee's attitude may be exaggerated - but there can be no doubt that the denial of status is for him a cruel and sometimes shattering experience.

Prince Nicolas Engalicev, Director for Italy of the World Council of Churches, eloquently described the refugees' desperate quest after identity in a speech delivered at Bossey, on May 9, 1956: "It is no wonder then that the insistent cry of the refugee is 'Nobody here knows who I am.' He himself has begun to doubt his existence. Everybody knows the feverish attempt that a refugee makes to obtain at least a birth certificate from the country that denationalized him or forced him to flee." ... If a birth certificate from the country he has rejected means so much to the refugee one can imagine how much more intensely he feels about the piece of paper that certifies his eligibility for refugee status in the country of first asylum.

Legal Protection

The need for legal protection is a continuing one for the refugees.

Those who have been refused status generally appeal against the decision. The majority of these appeals are unsuccessful - e.g. in Germany two out of every three appeals are turned down. It stands to reason that the ratio might be improved somewhat if more personalized legal counselling were generally available to the refugees.

Moreover, the frustration, emptiness and poverty of camp life create an atmosphere in which even those who have all their lives been

even-tempered and law-abiding may find themselves engaged in a brawl with their neighbors or else, yielding to temptation, may engage in some petty pilfering. When a refugee is apprehended because of such a misdemeanor, his treatment by the local courts frequently lacks equity. On the basis of his considerable personal experience in Italy Prince Engalicev made this statement:

"The refugees involved (i.e. those brought to trial) usually cannot speak Italian and therefore they are unable to explain themselves to the court. Under these circumstances, the judges, no matter how humane they may be, are not in a position to examine the case in its real light and are led to impose the more onerous sentences permitted by law. In consequence, the sentence is quite often disproportionate to the offense - and a man who might have gotten off with a reprimand if he had had legal help is instead punished to the full extent of the law. All sentences are registered on the penal record and, as we know, if this penal record is not spotless, the refugee is not accepted by any immigration country." (Speech at Bossey)

The Geneva Convention (Annex No. viii) represented a tremendous step in advance, as an international agreement designed to safeguard the rights of refugees. There is, however, one flaw in the Convention, as Professor Aghababian (INTEGRATION, 1957, No. 1) points out: the Convention assigns to the various national governments who are party to it, the task of insuring respect for its provisions - yet the Convention sprang from the frank recognition of the need to defend refugees against the possibility of abuse or of the violation of their rights by the public authorities of the countries of their residence. Article 35 of the Convention assigned to the High Commissioner the function of supervising the implementation of the Convention by the signatory nations. It would be a tremendous step in advance if some way could be found of spelling out these supervisory powers in detail so that UNHCR could more effectively serve as the legal protector of the refugees in the countries of their asylum.

The need for legal assistance to refugees has been recognized by the International Bar Association, which at its last three conferences has formally adopted motions favoring the establishment of such a service.

Summary

The Commission endorses the recommendations relative to reception adopted by the Conference on the Refugee Problem convened in Geneva May 27-28, 1957 by the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations interested in migration and the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees, in association with UNHCR and ICEM. (See Annex No. 1.) In addition, the Commission offers the following recommendations:

1. Reception Centers should be modeled after Zirndorf or Marienfelde.

It will be impossible to give the refugees the feeling that we welcome them as friends unless, on their arrival, we accommodate them in civilized quarters -- with rooms that are clean and not overcrowded, and with adequate sanitary and recreational facilities.

Camp Valka must be closed with the greatest possible expedition.

2. Orientation could be expedited by providing the refugee on arrival with a 4-8 page brochure in his own language, informing him of the procedures through which he must pass to obtain status, to find employment, to arrange for emigration; advising him of the assistance he may expect from the national government in his country of asylum, from UNHCR, USEP, ICEM and the various voluntary agencies which are there to help him; and also informing him briefly of the emigration possibilities that are open to him. Such a brochure (which would obviously have to vary from one country to another) would do much to remove the sense of insecurity which springs from ignorance of his status and of his possibilities.
3. Eligibility criteria, ideally, should be uniform for the countries of reception. This is a matter, conceivably, in which UNHCR might be able to take the initiative. Alternatively, it might be one of the items on the agenda of a Western Nations Conference on the

Refugee Problem, convened with the participation of UNHCR.

4. Screening Procedures should be subjected to careful reevaluation, with a view to providing the refugee with at least that degree of protection which is accorded to an accused person by civilized jurisprudence. UNHCR is represented on the Eligibility Screening Commissions in Italy and Belgium. It would be most helpful if Austria and Germany and France could revise their procedures to allow for formal representatives rather than observers.
5. Legal counsellors should be available to all escapees during the period of their eligibility screening and afterwards. The number of counsellors required for Germany, Austria and Italy is not so great that they could not be provided through the combined efforts of UNHCR, USEP and the voluntary agencies.
6. UNHCR's protection service should be strengthened, and UNHCR's supervisory function, if possible, more clearly delineated.
7. Voluntary Agency Counsellors, many of whose salaries have been reimbursed by USEP and UNHCR, have done much to help orient the refugees, to process them, and to give them a sense of security and friendship. Unfortunately the number of counsellors available is frequently inadequate to cope with the case load. If USEP could be provided with additional funds, it would among other things enable the voluntary agencies to increase their corps of counsellors. This would help tremendously in giving the refugees the assurance that the West is genuinely interested in their fate.
8. The Process of Resettlement must be expedited so that refugees will be able to embark on the making of their new lives 6-12 months after arrival, rather than having to wait two, three or more years.

8. U. S. IMMIGRATION POLICY

REPORT OF THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION

VIII. U. S. IMMIGRATION POLICY

For elementary reasons of geography, the refugees fleeing from Iron Curtain countries in Europe -- and this report deals exclusively with the European situation -- have no choice in selecting their countries of asylum. Barring occasional spectacular escapes by plane, the frontiers they must cross are predetermined for them. For this reason, Germany, Austria and Italy are for most refugees the countries of first asylum. Greece and Turkey receive occasional escapees from the Balkan satellites. Sweden and Denmark are the destinations of the small numbers of refugees who escape from Poland, and, very occasionally, from the Baltic countries, by crossing the Baltic Sea.

The work of receiving and resettling the refugees, as we have pointed out, must be a collective Western responsibility. It is neither fair nor in line with the hopes and expectations of the refugees who have gained a first asylum in Germany, Austria or Italy, to expect these countries to absorb all the refugees, the old and the new ones, into their economies. One of the criticisms of the United States that is heard most frequently from our European friends is that, while we are generous with funds, we apparently expect the countries of first asylum in Europe to accept all and sundry refugees who cross their borders, while we ourselves place narrow limits on the numbers we will admit. In addition -- although this criticism is directed against Canada, Australia, and other countries as well as against the U. S. -- they consider it unfair that we should insist on selecting the best elements while leaving the more difficult ones to Europe.

The solution of the European refugee problem, if it is to be achieved, will require a change in the immigration policies of some of the major receiving countries. Above all, what is required is a liberalization of American policy that would place our country in the position of providing

1. Immigration Policy

the leadership which the Western world expects of her.-- and of living up to her own historic role as a haven for the oppressed. Public Law 85-316 which was signed by the President on September 11, 1957 is, as the President himself points out, an inadequate instrument for the discharge of the task in hand. It limits the number of refugees from Iron Curtain countries and refugees from the Middle East who may be admitted to 14,556. *

It is the hope of the Commission that Congress in 1958 will enact a new refugee law which will extend the scope of the United States immigration program to admit a minimum of 75,000 refugees over a one-year period. This law ideally should make provision for the admission of a fair share of hard core cases, on the pattern established by the Scandinavian countries and the Low Countries. A program of this scope would almost certainly encourage the other Western nations to join in a crash program designed to liquidate the residual refugee problem in Europe, as well as the unfinished business of the Hungarian emergency.

Specifically on the subject of the Hungarian refugee program, it is the opinion of the Commission that the present criteria established by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the admission of additional refugees on parole basis are deficient, especially with regard to those Hungarian refugees who have relatives in the United States. As things stand at the moment, the applications of Hungarian refugees who are first degree relatives (parents, children, brothers, sisters) of residents of the United States are in many cases considered only if the applicants and their resident sponsors lived in the same household prior to the Hungarian uprising. This eligibility criterion discriminates against citizens of the United States and against the lawfully admitted alien residents who came

* The Middle East refugees will be a minor category. In addition, 2,500 German expellees and 1,600 refugees and persons of Dutch ethnic origin may come to the United States under the terms of this Law.

here before October, 1957, since they did not, as a rule, share the household of their relatives in Hungary in October, 1956. The Commission has learned of a number of refugees who escaped from Hungary in the winter of 1956/57 but have not been permitted to join their citizen parents in the United States.

The interests of the United States are identical with the interests of its citizens and future citizens. A situation which arbitrarily creates hardship for a significant number of citizens and residents cannot serve the cause of our country.

The Commission strongly recommends that the parole program be extended to make possible the admission of Hungarian refugees for whom affidavits of relationship are filed by relatives in the United States, no matter whether the affiant relatives are citizens, legal residents, or parolees. It is arbitrary to limit the principle of family reunion to people who lived together until a year ago (approximately). A refugee who has elderly parents in the United States whom he may not have seen for twenty years certainly deserves consideration on humanitarian grounds -- even though his case, under existing criteria, might not be considered to have "unusual and appealing equities". The degree of relationship entitling a refugee to consideration for admission to the United States should be extended to cover second degree relatives, i.e., cousins, nephews, nieces, uncles and aunts, including the members of their immediate families.

Another area of the parole program which, in the opinion of the Commission, requires liberalization, concerns unattached Hungarian minors, who can now enter the United States only if they will be residing in the household of their sponsoring relative. Instead of basing the children's program on the availability of a relative who is able to provide a home for a child, the future of the child itself should be our guiding criterion.

It is therefore recommended that this portion of the parole program be enlarged to permit the admission of all minors up to the age of 18 for whom assurances guaranteeing proper care and schooling are submitted by residents of the United States or by established voluntary agencies.

With regard to the roughly 30,000 Hungarian parolees who have been admitted to the United States, the Commission hopes that Congress will enact legislation making possible the speedy adjustment of their status. On signing Public Law 85-316, the President declared, "I think that it is particularly regrettable that the Congress did not provide a method whereby the thousands of brave and worthy Hungarian refugees who have suffered so much at the hands of Communism, might in the future acquire permanent residence, looking forward to citizenship."

Looking to the future, the Commission is of the opinion that the only adequate way of coping with future refugee emergencies is the enactment of the most important recommendations contained in the Message of the President to the Congress on January 31, 1957. With regard to the quota system, the President stated the following:

"First, the quota should be based on the 1950 census of population in place of the 1920 census. An annual minimum of 154,857 quota immigrants is now provided, using the 1920 census. I believe that the economic growth over the past thirty years and present economic conditions justify an increase of approximately 65,000 in quota numbers.

"Second, an equitable distribution of the additional quota numbers should be made. Under the present system a number of countries have large unused quota numbers while other countries have quotas regularly oversubscribed. I recommend that the additional quota numbers be distributed among the various countries in

proportion to the actual immigration into the United States since the establishment of the quota system in 1924 and up to July 1, 1955.

"Third, quota numbers unused in one year should be available for use in the following year. Under existing law if a quota number is not used during the year, it becomes void. In my view Congress should pool the unused quota numbers for Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific Oceanic area. Those numbers should be distributed during a twelve-month period on a first-come, first-served basis without regard to country of birth within the area. However, I recommend that these unused quota numbers be available only to aliens who qualify for preference status under existing law -- persons having needed skills or close relatives in the United States."

The Commission strongly subscribes to the President's recommendation for the pooling of unused quotas. It feels, however, that in addition to persons qualifying for preference status under existing law, all bona fide refugees from Communist countries should benefit from the pool. Such a pooling of quotas would endow our immigration set-up with a flexibility it does not now possess -- a flexibility that would enable it to cope with new refugee situations as they emerge in Europe. For example, through such a

pooling of unused quotas, America would be able to absorb its share of the Yugoslav refugees, and in the process obtain some of the best immigrant manpower that has been available since the end of the war.

The importance of extending the use of pooled quotas in the manner suggested becomes manifest from a listing of the present status of the quotas of the Communist-dominated countries. The quotas of those countries which had been "mortgaged" under previous legislation were relieved by Public Law 85-316, which terminated the system of quota deductions. * However, as of October 15, 1957, when the "mortgages" were removed, the

* Refugees admitted under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, were charged against their future national quotas. The "mortgages" were to be paid off by deducting up to 50% of the national quota each year, until admissions under the Displaced Persons Act and quota deductions were "in balance". Since the national quotas of some of the Iron Curtain countries are very small, quotas were "mortgaged" for decades and centuries into the future - for more than 300 years in the case of Latvia. The quotas of European countries under Communist control, as of the effective date of Public Law 85-316, had deductions charged against them through the following years:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Last fiscal year through which deductions made:</u>
Czechoslovakia	1959
Estonia	2146
Hungary	1990
Latvia	2275
Lithuania	2090
Poland	2000
Rumania	2021
U.S.S.R.	1981
Yugoslavia	2015

registration dates ** controlling the issuance of visas to non-preference applicants still show a waiting period of many years for natives of all of the Iron Curtain countries:

- Albanians may apply for admission to the United States now if they registered in 1948,
- Bulgarians, if they registered in 1951
- Czechs and Slovaks, if they registered in 1954,
- Estonians, if they registered in 1946,
- Hungarians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, if they registered in 1949,
- Poles, if they registered in 1951,
- Rumanians, if they registered in 1946,
- Soviet Russians, if they registered in 1952,
- Yugoslavs, if they registered in 1947.

For all practical purposes, therefore, our present immigration quota system provides no serious possibility of haven in America for the refugees who are currently escaping from behind the Iron Curtain or even for those who have escaped over the past five or more years.

Common sense and humanity both require that the existing law be modified so that we are no longer in the position of recognizing the right of asylum, while making the admission of refugees to this country possible as quota immigrants only after they have suffered in the camps of Central Europe for a period of from three to eleven years.

** A prospective immigrant chargeable to an oversubscribed quota establishes his intention of coming to the United States by registering on the quota waiting list. He is invited to file a formal visa application when his turn on the waiting list is reached. The registration dates given indicate the year in which an applicant must have registered in order to be able to file application as of October 15, 1957.

RECEPTION

IN THE light of the experiences and observations of many voluntary agencies, the Working Group wishes to submit the following report and recommendations regarding the reception of refugees in emergency situations. The Working Group realises that the following recommendations cannot all apply to every situation and they are submitted in the expectation that they will be seriously studied and implemented where applicable. The Working Group furthermore realises that many of its concerns are covered by the Convention on the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951. "Reception" as used in this document includes not only the arrival of refugees at border reception stations but relates to registration centres, assembly centres and processing centres in Europe.

Recommendations Regarding Functions and Responsibilities with Regard to the Reception of Refugees in Emergency Situations.

I. Functions and Responsibilities of the National Government of the Country of First Asylum.

1. The national government of a sovereign state has a clear and prime responsibility for all matters related to the reception, accommodation, care, maintenance and registration of refugees coming into its territory.
2. It is desirable that governments likely to be faced with refugee emergencies should elaborate a plan of action to be ready for implementation when required.

This plan should be conceived in a way that foresees possible eventualities and recognizes that in an emergency the prime need concerning refugees is to get them first in places where they can be accommodated and properly informed and then to provide the machinery and facilities for registration for eventual emigration processing, and for meeting religious, cultural and mental health needs.

In preparing this plan the government should consult with the office of the UNHCR, the ICEM and with the voluntary agencies.

3. The government should designate a national authority with full powers to implement the plan already prepared for the reception, accommodation, care, maintenance and registration of refugees. It is desirable that voluntary agencies be invited to assist the national authority in a consultative capacity.
4. When a government finds that a refugee situation is beyond its capacity to handle alone and appeals for assistance to governments of other countries, such appeals should be made in a co-ordinated manner, and through the office of the UNHCR.
5. The government should welcome the support of the services of national and international voluntary agencies. It is desirable that the government should create the necessary liaison and co-ordination machinery to permit the voluntary agencies accredited by that government to mobilize their resources to the maximum and to co-ordinate the efforts of all governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in helping the refugee situation.

II. Functions of Intergovernmental Bodies and of other Governments.

1. Although the government of a country of first asylum has a responsibility to care for refugees in its territory, it is clear that the international community has an unavoidable responsibility in the face of refugee emergencies.

It is felt that the international responsibility acknowledged by the United Nations Organization in the case of the Hungarian refugees should be regarded as a precedent; in any other similar situations other governments should give financial support to and accept adequate numbers of refugees from countries of first asylum.

2. It is recommended that the UNHCR should be the over-all co-ordinating body for the channeling of all appeals to and offers of assistance from other governments.

3. It is desirable that the office of the UNHCR should be so equipped as to be able to provide experts experienced in the handling of refugee emergencies who would advise the national government, and where appropriate, act as a link between voluntary agencies and the government.
4. The ICEM should be responsible for the co-ordination of all refugee movements out of the country.

III. Functions of Voluntary Agencies.

1. The function of voluntary agencies is auxiliary and complementary to that of the government, which has the prime responsibility for reception.
2. It is desirable that all voluntary agencies not indigenous to the country of first asylum keep the office of the UNHCR fully informed as to their programmes and plans for reception and in this respect recognize its co-ordinating role. It is assumed that the work of indigenous voluntary agencies will be co-ordinated by the national authority.
3. Whilst it is recognized that each voluntary agency will maintain day-by-day relationships with government officials at all levels, it is desirable that on major policy questions affecting all voluntary agencies, the latter should devise a means whereby joint representation may be made to the government.
4. Representatives of the voluntary agencies should offer the government their advice in the formulation of plans for the reception of refugees, and in the operation of the refugee authority.

ANNEX: Proposed Plan of Action for Reception of Refugees

A plan as outlined below should be formulated by governments likely to be faced with refugee situations and measures be taken immediately so that in case of emergency the plan would become instantly effective.

The plan should include:

1. Designation of a national authority with full powers to implement the plan.
2.
 - a) Establishment and operation of Border Reception Stations.
 - b) Establishment and operation of Registration Centres.
 - c) Establishment and operation of Assembly Centres.
 - Designation of adequate numbers of centres as points for emigration selection missions to work.
 - Designation of certain centres for use as processing centres.
 - Designation of certain centres for unaccompanied youth.
 - Designation of certain centres for integration purposes.
3. Provision of accommodation, —of care and maintenance, —of welfare services, —of facilities for meeting special religious needs, —of facilities for counselling services, —of facilities for registration, —of facilities for accurate information to be given to refugees.

Establishment and Operation of Border Reception Stations

Suitable locations.

Provision of adequate border police for reasons of security. It may be necessary to establish police or military control in border areas to prevent entry of unauthorized persons.

Provision of emergency feeding, clothing, first aid. These services should be limited to bare essentials. Distribution of gift parcels not to take place at this point.

Provision of information and interpretation services.

Facilities to transport refugees to registration centres. Unauthorized transports of refugees must be forbidden.

Provision of liaison with Registration Centres for forwarding refugees. Under all circumstances all refugees must pass through Registration Centres and be registered before proceeding to any other point. Foreign selection missions must also submit to this procedure.

Establishment and Operation of Registration Centres

It is understood that all refugees passing through a Registration Centre would remain there for a period not exceeding 48 hours.

Survey of all facilities (military camps, schools, etc.) suitable to serve as Registration Centres and working out a plan for their availability in event of emergency.

Planning for additional emergency facilities, e.g. army tents, field kitchens, etc., if available facilities are not adequate.

Provision of sleeping quarters (separate quarters for youth of different sexes under competent supervision): feeding; emergency clothing; postal facilities.

Provision for adequate sanitary conditions, including plans for rapid construction of field latrines, and facilities for delousing.

Provision for medical services, e.g. dispensary.

Provision for information in the refugee language.

Facilities for initial registration. This registration should be simple and uniform, primarily for statistical purposes, for use by authorities, tracing services, etc. and should by no means be registration internationally used for resettlement. It is desirable that an uniform registration form should be drafted and sponsored by the UNHCR in consultation with governments and voluntary agencies concerned.

Facilities for assigning refugees to Assembly Centres.

Provision of limited welfare services such as leisure time activities.

Provision for meeting religious needs.

Establishment and Operation of Assembly Centres

Assembly Centres are to be regarded as a more permanent place of accommodation where refugees wait until they have been processed for emigration or are absorbed into local integration schemes.

Survey of suitable facilities and working out of plan for their availability in the event of emergency.

Provision of sleeping quarters, feeding, clothing. Special accommodation to be provided for families, single men, single women, unaccompanied youth.

Prevention of disease, control of epidemics and provision of medical services.

Provision for welfare services, including recreational and educational activities; leisure time activities suitable for all age groups; initiating rehabilitation and vocational training; initiating temporary employment; postal facilities.

Provision for meeting religious needs.

Provision for refugees to take an active part in camp services and duties.

Provision of space and facilities for: counselling services, including legal assistance, —uniform registration for resettlement or integration, —selection missions, and voluntary agencies working for migration, if the camp is designated for such purposes, —orientation services and language training both for migration and integration.

EMIGRATION

THE response of the world to the Hungarian refugee emergency has shown that much which has been developed in the field of migration assistance over the years has been invaluable, and that, on the other hand, new approaches, methods, and techniques have been employed which have helped immeasurably to carry the work very close to almost solution. At the same time, much still needs to be done to liquidate the problem entirely, and to set the highest possible standards for the future.

With these facts in mind, the Working Group has set out to review what it considers to be activities and actions necessary to be carried out by governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies concerned with assisting refugees through emigration, as follows :

Recommendations Regarding General Role and Specific Functions for Assistance to Emigration of Refugees in Emergency Situations

I. General Role of Governments

1. The action of governments in emigration of refugees is of first importance for there can be no resettlement of refugees without visa opportunities provided by countries interested and able to receive newcomers. The governments and peoples of the world, considering themselves responsible for a fair share of the financial burden arising from the need for migration and evacuation of refugees, should comply by admitting refugees within their borders and providing economic support in cash or in kind in proportion to their possibilities and their means.

Specific Functions of Governments

2. Formalities for immigration should be more simplified and the criteria for immigration greatly liberalized. Governments should be willing to accept not only the able-bodied, productive refugees who may contribute to the economic growth of the country, but also a fair share of family groups and some of the difficult uneconomic cases which may require special assistance or institutional care.
3. Processing of refugees for visas should be effected through enlarged consulates or special migration missions to be established by the immigration countries in the country of first asylum. Selection and recruiting methods should be adjusted to the urgency of the situation and in accordance with the expert and constant advice of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration in the area of its mandate and any other competent authorities.
4. For the sake of efficiency and to expedite the processing and evacuation of refugees, the government of the country of first asylum should control the movements of refugees within the country and pay all inland transportation of refugees within its borders. Those countries which have a system of exit visa, should issue this kind of visa freely to refugees.
5. Governments should arrange for the medical examinations, inoculations or minor treatment necessary for the obtention of visas. Where it is considered necessary to facilitate processing of visas, assembly centers should be established for this purpose.
6. In the movement or evacuation of refugees from crowded areas, in the accordance of visas and entry permits and the resettlement of the refugees, the integrity of the family group shall at all times be respected.

7. Governments should contribute financially to the costs of the migration movements to countries of resettlement in addition to according entry permits to the extent of their ability.
8. In issuing entry permits, the resettlement country should undertake to provide suitable employment and working permits free of charge, and in the event that the persons admitted have lost or should lose their ability to work, to provide support whenever necessary.
9. Equal treatment in emigration processing should be accorded to new refugees in countries of asylum and to those who for various reasons still remain unsettled in countries where they are stranded.

II. General Role of Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations

10. Certain international governmental and intergovernmental organizations were established to assist the migration of refugees wherever that was found to be the suitable solution to the problems arising from an emergency situation.

Specific Functions of Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations

11. ICEM assists in obtaining from the governments of resettlement countries the entry permits necessary. It should arrange for the transportation of the refugees and should be responsible for the co-ordination of all the means of transportation provided. It should assist governments to carry through the emigration formalities with the utmost speed and smoothness in consideration of the refugees, and should offer assistance to governments to find suitable placement opportunities after their arrival.
12. When the services of Voluntary Agencies are needed ICEM should refer refugees to one of the national or international voluntary agencies, respecting the religious and national preferences of the refugee in selecting an appropriate organization.
13. ICEM should maintain and increase its efforts to include assistance in the reception and integration of refugees in those immigration countries which request its services.
14. In a far sighted approach to assist governments of resettlement or potential resettlement countries, the ICEM should stimulate capital development and land settlement projects in all under-populated countries interested in the resettlement of refugees.
15. International financing of transportation through ICEM should be maintained and strengthened by the establishment of a contingency reserve or stand-by financial commitment of governments to meet emergency requirements involving refugees.
16. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should co-operate in facilitating the emigration of refugees by promoting resettlement opportunities and placement of difficult cases and by all other means within its mandate. The legal and protective services of the UNHCR make possible the emigration of refugees and unaccompanied youth through the provision of travel documents and by other means, and it is vital that these services are maintained.
17. While the United States Government contributes substantially to the budgets of inter-governmental organisations such as ICEM and UNHCR, it also participates directly through the United States Escapee Program (USEP) in the field of emigration by subsidizing the movement costs of refugees who are recognized as escapees by USEP. It also participates in the counselling and preparation of the refugees for emigration and in integration costs incurred by the voluntary agencies in the resettlement of these cases. In view of the fact that refugees from totalitarian countries make up a very significant part of the total refugee population, the contribution by USEP is most significant in alleviating the refugee problem, and should be maintained and increased. It is highly desirable that the criteria for USEP eligibility be liberalized.

III. General Role of the Voluntary Agencies

18. The national and international non-governmental organizations through their constituent agencies should strive to interpret the needs of refugees to governments and to international organizations. The national and international voluntary agencies deal with refugees practically from the moment of their displacement, on an individual case to case basis. They serve to help refugees to make the initial adjustment to displacement and enable them to organize themselves toward their reestablishment. Consequently, voluntary agencies are well equipped to assist refugees in their relation to governmental and intergovernmental bodies in the assessment of their needs and wishes with regard to their reestablishment by emigration. Voluntary agencies, themselves or through their counterparts in countries of resettlement, are also able to effect contact between refugees and relatives or sponsors whose interest in the individual is a substantial aid in developing resettlement opportunities.

Voluntary agencies through their counterparts in other countries develop resettlement projects for groups of refugee families. During this temporary displacement and while in processing for emigration, voluntary agencies provide material services to refugees which while supplementary to basic care and maintenance and movements—which are and must be the responsibility of the governments—are nevertheless essential, in the material, as well as in the spiritual and psychological sense.

Specific Functions of the Voluntary Agencies.

19. The voluntary agencies should carry out the registration of refugees for emigration, working in co-operation with ICEM for this purpose. They will be charged with the counselling and documentation services for refugees requiring special assistance. The activities of the voluntary agencies are supported by private contributors. When these funds prove to be inadequate, the voluntary agencies should receive assistance from governments and inter-governmental agencies to provide the personnel and working facilities necessary for the provision of these services to refugees. When voluntary agencies are expected to find placement for refugees in a certain land, the voluntary agencies should have a say in the selection of the families.
20. When an emergency arises, the voluntary agencies will agree in common upon the division of work, and will meet regularly to discuss and solve problems jointly. Co-ordination will be effected under the auspices of the Councils of Voluntary Agencies and in co-operation with the UNHCR, ICEM and USEP.
21. The voluntary agencies will assist in the reception and integration of refugees in the countries of resettlement, since the position of these agencies with respect to the refugees enables them to play a most significant role in juridical, social, cultural and economic adjustment.

INTEGRATION

T*erms of Reference of Working Group*: To provide appropriate information and to prepare recommendations concerning the integration of refugees in emergency situations.

By integration we mean the two-way process by which a refugee becomes economically stabilized as well as psychologically and socially adapted to a new geographical setting with a culture different from his own and is accepted by the community of the new geographical setting.

In relation to the refugee, the new geographical setting may be: (a) the country of his first asylum where he may decide to remain of his own free will or where he may remain only because of inability to be resettled elsewhere, or (b) another country to which he goes of his own free choice, by the exigencies of the emergency or because it is the only possibility offered to him as a country of final settlement.

Recommendations Regarding Responsibilities and Functions in Connection with Integration of Refugees in Emergency Situations

I. Responsibilities of Governments

We presume that all governments will accord to refugees the benefits and conditions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951, or, where not applicable, the terms and conditions of the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We urge the ratification both of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951, and the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of September 28, 1954, by all governments who have not ratified it.

Should the country of first asylum not be in a position to integrate the total influx of refugees, other governments have the responsibility of accepting them and providing the opportunity for their integration. The effectiveness of governments' participation in such plans should be facilitated by working through intergovernmental agencies.

As far as possible, the choice should remain with the refugee whether he wants to integrate in the country of first asylum or to emigrate elsewhere.

II. Functions of Governments and Intergovernmental Agencies

Recognizing that the success of integration depends upon the mutual good will and reciprocal desire of the refugee to integrate and the receiving government's offer of integration possibilities, all efforts should be made to avoid forcing decisions upon refugees and upon receiving governments by providing:

1. that, as far as conditions allow, no movements of refugees and particularly no separation of families, will take place until the refugee has had the opportunity to consult an Information and Counselling Service preferably conducted by a team of voluntary agency personnel under the leadership of the best qualified person on the team and with the co-operation of the appropriate intergovernmental agency such as the UNHCR, ICEM, etc. In the event the emergency requires immediate movement of refugees, all refugees moved under such emergency conditions, without regard to the principles described above, should have the same opportunities to evaluate their situations as those who remain in the country of first asylum;

2. a clearing house through which information can be exchanged concerning the age, skills and other characteristics of the refugee group and the employment, housing and other integration possibilities of receiving countries;
3. methods of sharing knowledge on the best ways of promoting smooth integration; continuing research on problems of integration.

The contribution to the integration of refugees made by the UNHCR through UNREF projects, by the USEP and by the special services of ICEM are an essential part of the integration of refugees. These integration programmes should be expanded.

III. Basic Requirements for Integration

Successful integration depends on both the refugee himself and the country of adoption. It can best be achieved when the refugee is encouraged to give something of his own cultural heritage to the country of adoption and to adapt himself to the culture of his new country. This desirable result is not apt to be achieved accidentally, but must be consciously planned for in order to assure the possibility of greater happiness for the refugee and his family.

The refugee should be able to expect certain rights to :

1. Specific legal provisions guaranteeing that within a defined period of time he will have full and equal opportunities of acquiring citizenship if he wishes and satisfies the legal requirements.
2. Freedom of movement within as well as outside of the country and the right to free association.
3. Religious freedom.
4. Suitable accommodation on reception and subsequently permanent housing.
5. Suitable employment and vocational guidance where necessary.
6. Education for children and adults.
7. Language training, orientation to the new community mores and orientation of the community to the refugee.
8. Social security benefits, public assistance and medical care as enjoyed by citizens of the receiving country.
9. Qualified counselling services.
10. Recognition of the needs of special groups such as children, youths, students, intellectuals, professionals, handicapped and older people.

The focusing of attention upon these rights is not intended to diminish any of the rights and privileges accorded under the Conventions mentioned in Article 1.

The effectiveness of governments' efforts to help refugees integrate will be facilitated by taking advantage of the existing body of knowledge made available by and the opportunity to consult with the United Nations and its specialized agencies ; the UNHCR, ICEM, voluntary agencies, foundations, etc.

IV. Voluntary Agencies

Voluntary Agencies can serve as a bridge between governments as well as between interested communities in different countries. Their potentiality for flexibility and their non-official character enable them to reach the refugee more easily as well as to gather information on the needs and problems of refugees. Voluntary agencies may make recommendations to governments and intergovernmental agencies where needs are not being met. Co-operation among voluntary agencies, national and intergovernmental agencies is essential in providing the range of services necessary to a smooth integration process. Governments are urged to take advantage of the services rendered by voluntary agencies. Some of these are :

1. Counselling: family, employment, physical and mental health, child welfare, socio-legal problems, etc.

2. Language training.
3. Legal assistance both local and international.
4. Ministering to religious and spiritual needs.
5. Development of pilot projects in housing, employment and agriculture.
6. Vocational training for youths and adults.
7. Supplementary relief, medical services and other services for special groups—children, aged, physically and mentally handicapped, etc.
8. Leisure time activities.
9. Preparation of local communities for acceptance of refugees and orientation of the refugees to the new community.
10. Serving as a connecting link for solving problems related to the refugee's past life and family members in other countries.

ANNEX I

RECOMMENDATIONS

of the

CONFERENCE

on the

REFUGEE PROBLEM

Convened by

The Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations Interested in Migration

and the

Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees

In Association With

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

and the

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

ANNEX II

ON THE NEED FOR AN INITIAL GRANT FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

Editorial note:

The following paragraphs are extracted from a letter written by Countess Louise Esterhazy, Hungarian Delegate to the Sub-Committee for Refugees of the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), and one of the directors of the Hungarian Refugee Committee in France. The letter, dated February 16, 1957, was addressed to Dr. Vilas Masens, President of the Assembly of Captive European Nations in New York.

The conditions which the letter describes hold true for most European countries. In countries like the United States and Canada where wage levels are higher and where refugees, if they have skills may expect equal opportunities with other workers, an initial resettlement grant, such as the letter proposes, may not be essential. In European countries, however, salaries are much lower. In addition, the refugees frequently find themselves given last preference so that their jobs are at or near the bottom of the economic ladder. It is unquestionably true, as Louise Esterhazy points out, that these refugees who are attempting to become part of Western European society are terribly handicapped from the beginning if, in addition to paying their way, they must re-equip themselves with all the most elementary necessities of personal life.

Since integration in Western Europe will remain the most intelligent solution for a substantial percentage of the refugees who come out, Countess Esterhazy's proposal is one which merits the most serious consideration. The excerpts from the letter are reproduced as written - although the Commission wonders whether the most effective arrangement might not be a combination of a limited grant for rehabilitation purposes plus a loan from a revolving fund, the payments on which would not place an undue strain on the refugees' future income.

France has made the most generous possible effort to give the same opportunities and protection to the refugee workers as are enjoyed by French nationals. The other reception countries in Europe have made similar efforts.

Nevertheless, despite these efforts, despite the wages, social benefits, scholarships, etc. made available to the refugees, their economic conditions in Western Europe have for many years now been precarious, and in many cases even desperate.

Why? Because even a normal salary is not enough when one has to start from scratch - possessing nothing, not even the most essential personal possessions or household utensils, not even a change of clothing or linen, not even bed or blankets. Lacking a single saucepan, there is no question of having a single penny in reserve.

When, therefore, everything has been lost, it is necessary, upon beginning to work, to spend a crippling proportion of one's salary on the simplest

and most essential of personal possessions. This results in the budgets of too many refugees being hopelessly unbalanced and grossly overloaded for years.

In order to meet these commitments, each refugee needs, upon arrival in the West, an adequate initial aid - a "re-launching" aid, similar to that given by governments to the victims of air raids.

The Efforts to Save the "Total Victim"

The victims of towns destroyed by war have been the object of special care on the part of each government. Governments have made immense efforts to supply these victims with clothes, household utensils and the necessities of existence. In many countries provisional quarters were thrown up in all haste in order to give craftsmen and shopkeepers the opportunity of re-opening their shops, workshops, cafes, etc. More than that, governments have made great efforts to grant loans to these victims on favourable conditions in order to enable them to establish a stock of merchandise or equip themselves with tools.

All these aids and loans enabled the victims of air-raids to begin life anew without having to subject their incomes to the strain of re-equipping themselves from scratch. This was done by means of special initial grants, with which the victims of the air raids were able to begin work again in the knowledge that they would be able, by their own efforts and the practice of rigid economy, to climb the ladder towards a life of reasonable financial stability.

It is aid of this type and to this extent that is the hope of all the refugees when, after an escape frequently attended by the risk of death, and manifesting unlimited trust, they cast themselves into the arms of the free Western world.

When the new Hungarian refugees begin work, the SSAE (Service Social d'Aide aux Emigres) makes them an initial grant of 5000 French Francs in order to enable them to exist (i.e. pay their rent and food) while awaiting their first pay, which, in general, they are given ten days after the commencement of their employment.

In other words, while waiting for his first pay, a refugee worker can reckon on 500 French Francs (about \$1.50) per day for board and lodging. This is not enough unless he can eat in a works canteen and his rent is sufficiently low. But when the refugee is compelled to pay a high rent, this "initial grant" is tragically inadequate. The refugee continues to apply to various charitable organizations for extra help.

Thus he becomes a beggar, a beggar who often cries with shame and humiliation at having to ask for help. If the extra help which has been asked for is not forthcoming, or if it is late in being granted, then he is compelled to sell those garments which have been given him by the various charitable organizations. He is often in tears when he sells these garments in order to be able to pay his rent and avoid being cast out into the street. It is almost always thus that the tragic process of a refugee's demoralization begins, even that of the best and strongest-willed. Every social worker, on seeing this, feels his heart wrung by sadness because, for want of means, it is often not possible for him to give more substantial help to refugees waiting for their first salaries.

When the refugee has already settled down to his work, and enjoys the same wage as French workers, his situation is frequently the following:

If he has found a room at a moderate rental, it is usually unfurnished. From the very first day he is therefore compelled to buy household utensils, curtains, bed linen and often even a bed, a table, and a suitcase in which to keep his clothes - because there is often no wardrobe in an unfurnished room. His wages are obviously not sufficient for these purchases and he is therefore compelled to borrow the money. From the very beginning, therefore, his budget is in a precarious state. The smallest interruption in work caused by illness, the least unforeseen expense makes him incapable of repaying his debt.

Once more he applies to the charitable organizations for help to pay his rent. In such case, he is frequently given this reply: "You have the same salary as the other workers of the country; solve your difficulties as they solve theirs; do as they do."

Unfortunately the salary of the refugee is not the same as other workers receive, because he has lost everything. Watching the rent eat up his salary, he is a prey to discouragement and he tells himself that he will never be able to arrange his affairs on a sound basis. In order to do so, he would need an initial aid comparable to that given the victims of air raids.

I know the needs from my own personal experience of such initial aid. At the beginning of my life as a refugee I was also compelled to sell the clothes which my friends had given to me, and after five years' working for a modest salary I have still not been able to re-equip myself. I have myself, therefore, felt the need of an initial grant - and I have never ceased to feel this need.

I am convinced that a joint effort by all the countries of the Free World could succeed in enabling the countries of reception to so increase their aid as to do the following:

- (a) re-equip the refugees on their arrival with clothes, the most indispensable household utensils, and, in certain cases, with tools;
- (b) to supplement their wages during the first few months to an extent great enough to enable refugees to pay the very high rents which must now be paid for modest quarters in France and other countries.

I am convinced that, given such an initial aid, the refugee would be launched on the road to economic consolidation. Possessing his basic equipment, he could, from the beginning, save in order to create a reserve. Feeling his feet planted on firm economic ground, his morale would rapidly rise and he would soon become a constructive member of society of the country of reception instead of having to beg for charity for many years which is often the case in the absence of adequate initial aid.

ANNEX III

Refugee Intake Compared to Total Population
of Receiving Countries

<u>Receiving Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Refugee Intake (incl. Hungarians)</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Israel	1,813,000	148,333	8.18
Germany	50,595,000	3,102,257	6.13
(West Berlin)	2,204,000	170,153	7.72
Australia	9,428,000	218,301	2.31
Austria	6,974,000	136,469	1.95
Canada	15,899,000	185,561	1.16
Italy	48,178,000	418,844	0.86
France	43,600,000	370,583	0.84
Sweden	7,316,000	46,000	0.62
United Kingdom	51,218,000	281,493	0.54
Switzerland	5,023,000	22,632	0.45
Belgium	8,868,000	35,580	0.40
Venezuela	5,949,000	18,948	0.31
U.S.	168,091,000	487,243	0.29
New Zealand	2,174,000	6,000	0.27
Netherlands	10,880,000	17,583	0.16
Argentina	19,470,000	34,790	0.10
Brazil	59,846,000	38,552	0.06

(1) Figures for overseas countries are based on IRO and ICEM statistics.

Figures for Europe are based on official estimates.

(2) Incl. Soviet-zone refugees, not incl. German ethnic expellees.

ANNEX IV.

S T A T U T E

of the

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

ANNEX IV

**STATUTE OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES**

General Assembly Resolution No. 428 (V)
14 December 1950

CHAPTER I. - GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities.

In the exercise of his functions, more particularly when difficulties arise, and for instance with regard to any controversy concerning the international status of these persons, the High Commissioner shall request the opinion of the advisory committee on refugees if it is created.

2. The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees.
3. The High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given him by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council.
4. The Economic and Social Council may decide, after hearing the views of the High Commissioner on the subject, to establish an advisory committee on refugees*, which shall consist of representatives of States Members and States non-members of the United Nations, to be selected by the Council on the basis of their demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem.
5. The General Assembly shall review, not later than at its eighth regular session, the arrangements for the Office of the High Commissioner with a view to determining whether the Office should be continued beyond 31 December 1953.

*** CHAPTER II. - FUNCTIONS OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER**

6. The competence of the High Commissioner shall extend to:
 - A. (i) Any person who has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;

- (ii) Any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.

Decisions as to eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of the present paragraph;

The competence of the High Commissioner shall cease to apply to any person defined in section (A) above if :

- (a) He has voluntarily reavailed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or
- (b) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it; or
- (c) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or
- (d) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
- (e) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, claim grounds other than those of personal convenience for continuing to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. Reasons of a purely economic character may not be invoked; or
- (f) Being a person who has no nationality, he can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist and he is able to return to the country of his former habitual residence, claim grounds other than those of personal convenience for continuing to refuse to return to that country;

B. Any other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, if he has no nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

7. Provided that the competence of the High Commissioner as defined in paragraph 6 above shall not extend to a person :

- (a) Who is a national of more than one country unless he satisfies the provisions of the preceding paragraph in relation to each of the countries of which he is a national; or
- (b) Who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country; or
- (c) Who continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance; or

ANNEX IV

- (d) In respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition or a crime mentioned in article VI of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal or by the provisions of article 14, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights *.
8. The High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his Office by :
- (a) Promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments thereto;
 - (b) Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution of any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection;
 - (c) Assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation or assimilation within new national communities ;
 - (d) Promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most destitute categories, to the territories of States ;
 - (e) Endeavouring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and especially those necessary for their resettlement ;
 - (f) Obtaining from Governments information concerning the number and conditions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning them ;
 - (g) Keeping in close touch with the Governments and inter-governmental organizations concerned ;
 - (h) Establishing contact in such manner as he may think best with private organizations dealing with refugee questions ;
 - (i) Facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees.
9. The High Commissioner shall engage in such additional activities, including repatriation and resettlement, as the General Assembly may determine, within the limits of the resources placed at his disposal.
10. The High Commissioner shall administer any funds, public or private, which he receives for assistance to refugees, and shall distribute them among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he deems best qualified to administer such assistance.
- The High Commissioner may reject any offers which he does not consider appropriate or which cannot be utilized.
- The High Commissioner shall not appeal to Governments for funds or make a general appeal, without the prior approval of the General Assembly **.
- The High Commissioner shall include in his annual report a statement of his activities in this field.
11. The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views before the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies.
- The High Commissioner shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council; his report shall be considered as a separate item on the agenda of the General Assembly.
12. The High Commissioner may invite the co-operation of the various specialized agencies.

ANNEX IV

CHAPTER III. - ORGANIZATION AND FINANCES

13. The High Commissioner shall be elected by the General Assembly on the nomination of the Secretary-General. The terms of appointment of the High Commissioner shall be proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly. The High Commissioner shall be elected for a term of three years, from 1 January 1951.
14. The High Commissioner shall appoint, for the same term, a Deputy High Commissioner of a nationality other than his own.
15. (a) Within the limits of the budgetary appropriations provided, the staff of the Office of the High Commissioner shall be appointed by the High Commissioner and shall be responsible to him in the exercise of their functions.
(b) Such staff shall be chosen from persons devoted to the purposes of the Office of the High Commissioner.
(c) Their conditions of employment shall be those provided under the staff regulations adopted by the General Assembly and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Secretary-General.
(d) Provision may also be made to permit the employment of personnel without compensation.
16. The High Commissioner shall consult the Governments of the countries of residence of refugees as to the need for appointing representatives therein. In any country recognizing such need, there may be appointed a representative approved by the Government of that country. Subject to the foregoing, the same representative may serve in more than one country.
17. The High Commissioner and the Secretary-General shall make appropriate arrangements for liaison and consultation on matters of mutual interest.
18. The Secretary-General shall provide the High Commissioner with all necessary facilities within budgetary limitations.
19. The Office of the High Commissioner shall be located in Geneva, Switzerland.
20. The Office of the High Commissioner shall be financed under the budget of the United Nations. Unless the General Assembly subsequently decides otherwise, no expenditure other than administrative expenditures relating to the functioning of the Office of the High Commissioner shall be borne on the budget of the United Nations and all other expenditures relating to the activities of the High Commissioner shall be financed by voluntary contributions.
21. The administration of the Office of the High Commissioner shall be subject to the Financial Regulations of the United Nations and to the financial rules promulgated thereunder by the Secretary-General.
22. Transactions relating to the High Commissioner's funds shall be subject to audit by the United Nations Board of Auditors, provided that the Board may accept audited accounts from the agencies to which funds have been allocated. Administrative arrangements for the custody of such funds and their allocation shall be agreed between the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the United Nations and rules promulgated thereunder by the Secretary-General.

ANNEX IV

ANNEX V

THE USEP EMPLOYMENT PROJECT

of Camps Ingolstadt, Landshut and Valka
in Bavaria for rapid integration of foreign
refugees

from a report of Mr. H. Heyn, IRC representative
Reutlingen, to the 7th Annual Meeting of the
Association for the Study of the World Refugee
Problem at Arnhem, Sept. 9-12, 1957.

At least 80% of the refugees are fit for work and they are often
skilled workers.

To condemn these persons to idleness with all its temptations
is irresponsible and needless.

In October 1954 the American Friends Service Committee began to
register foreign refugees in the Bavarian camp of Ingolstadt for work.
This project was supported by UNHCR funds and gave surprising results.
It appeared that not every person selected from the camps was thoroughly
lazy. But what can one expect of a person who, for almost a decade,
has been carted from one camp to the other, put into a room with
three, four, five others and to whom all possibility seems remote of
work. This man cannot immediately undertake heavy physical work
because he has been too long without any form of occupation whatsoever.

In 1955, after the first results of placement in the Ruhr dis-
trict and Stuttgart were known, the Bavarian Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs asked AFSC to assume in the first line responsibility
for single men. These were just as difficult a problem as the families,
but were nevertheless easier to place in employment. For this reason,

this organization, together with the International Rescue Committee and with the financial support of the United States Escapee Programme, began to find work for single men in the camps of Ingolstadt, Landshut and later also of Nurnberg. With the approval of the responsible authorities, more than 100 men had been placed in employment by Christmas 1955.

Offices were opened in Stuttgart and Cologne in order to coordinate the work of placing refugees with the provincial labour offices and local authorities.

It can be said, with certain reservations, that today it is possible to give each newly arrived refugee an alien's identity card and get him leave from the camp, provided that he is willing to work and that no political objections are raised against him. This means that taking into account the vacancies existing in industry in the various Federal provinces and taking into account the availability of furnished rooms, workers from the Bavarian camps, especially from the reception center of Valka, can be placed in employment. As placement is a privilege of the various Labour Exchanges, the AFSC/IRC offices confine themselves to providing information and suggesting possibilities from amongst those in the camps. In Baden-Wurtemberg, for example, a hectographed list of foreign refugees looking for work is sent each month to about 50 labour exchanges.

Within the framework of the Employment Project, USEP funds are available for alleviation of difficulties at the beginning. These funds enable us to make an advance to each person just beginning work, in order to enable him to pay the first month's rent and buy work

clothes. This support is in no way a loan and is given without formality. All that is required is the will to work and be integrated.

130 foreign refugees were placed in employment in Baden-Wurtemberg between April and December 1956. Of these 26% were Poles, 20% Czechs, 16% Jugoslavs, 15% Russians and 9% Hungarian. The rest came from Albania, Latvia, Lithuania and Rumania. Of all these 57.1% were placed in the building trade, 26.1% in factories, 4.4% in agriculture and 12.4% in clerical work. A further 100 foreign refugees were placed in work between January and June 1957. Of these 26% were Jugoslavs, 23% Czechs, 17% Hungarians, 15% Russians, 14% Polish. The rest were from Estonia, Lithuania and Rumania. 18% were placed in the building trade, 57% in factories and 16% in clerical work.

The distribution of ages shows that the most active age groups were 26-35 years with a percentage of 48 (40.8 in 1956) and 36-45 years with a percentage of 20 (27.7 in 1956).

The refugees show a satisfying will to work, but it must be admitted that the desire to stay in any one place of employment is less, in proportion to the length of time the refugee has been compelled to remain idle in camp. A preliminary investigation of this question gave the following results: only 29% of the "old" refugees (DP's and those staying for years in camps) remained more than 90 days in the same employment. This compares with the figure of 42% for the "new" refugees. The percentage giving positive reasons for leaving their work (successful search for better positions by those

- 4 -

with superior language qualifications) were as follows: "old" refugees 5.26%, "new" refugees 12.5%. Negative reasons being: unaccustomed to work owing to prolonged stay in camps, "camp neurosis" with its attendant alcoholism and chronic laziness; in the case of the "new" refugees, the change to the German rate of working, were given in the following percentages: "old" refugees 59.21%, "new" refugees 39.58%. There were other reasons too, for example dismissal due to sickness or lack of work available.

ANNEX VI

Resolution on the closure of camps adopted by the 6th Conference of NGO's interested in Migration, Geneva, Aug. 9, 1957.

The Conference

Desiring to support the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' reaffirmation before the Economic and Social Council on 24 July 1957 that the prime objective of his Office is to close refugee camps, aware of the separate and serious problems facing out-of-camp refugees, whether under the UNGCR's mandate or not;

Having regard to the tragic fate of these refugees, adults and children in camp, who, through no fault of their own, have spent many years in actively seeking and waiting in vain for re-settlement or emigration opportunities;

Takes the view that the way to achieve the desired objective is to start, if need be, on a small scale, by abolishing one camp;

Calls upon the members of the Conference to cooperate with the UNHCR and the governments concerned in a programme of action based on the results of a survey being prepared by the UNHCR;

- (a) By offering to place, whether in the country of asylum or in some other country, all refugees who have been in a given camp over one year and to place them forthwith as normal resettlers or as emigrants or as institutionalized cases as circumstances may require;

- 2 -

- (b) By asking the country of first asylum to agree to relocate all the newer arrivals preferably outside of camps;
- (c) By calling on all governments, especially those directly concerned, governmental and inter-governmental organizations, USRP and ICEM to join the UNHCR in treating this matter as of the highest priority; and
- (d) By referring this resolution to the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees for appropriate action.

ANNEX VII.

Resolution on Sardinia project adopted
by the Conference on the Refugee Problem,
Geneva, May 28, 1957

The Conference resolves:

1. To appoint a Sub-Committee to pursue the study of large-scale resettlement possibilities in undeveloped areas of Europe and notably Sardinia;
2. To request the Chairman of the Sub-Committee to make such inquiries in the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and from governments as may help to determine the willingness of these bodies to cooperate financially and otherwise in the promotion of such resettlement;
3. To request the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees to sponsor the proposal.

The WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES seconded that proposal and the Resolution was adopted.

The Chairman referred the Resolution to the Bureau of the two convening organizations for further study and action.

With a view to reawaken and to increase efforts on behalf of these refugees, the Conference approved the inclusion in this report.

ANNEX VIII.

THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON REFUGEES

CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

PREAMBLE

The High Contracting Parties

Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination,

Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms,

Considering that it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement,

Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation,

Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States,

Noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner,

Have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REFUGEE"

A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:

(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;

Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;

(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it;

In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall

mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention the words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" in Article 1, Section A, shall be understood to mean either

(a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951;" or

(b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951;" and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.

(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:

(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or

(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or

(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or

(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or

(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality;

(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence;

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.

When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall *ipso facto* be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.

E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;

(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 2

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.

Article 3

NON-DISCRIMINATION

The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.

Article 4

RELIGION

The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children.

Article 5

RIGHTS GRANTED APART FROM THIS CONVENTION

Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.

Article 6

THE TERM "IN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES"

For the purpose of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 7

EXEMPTION FROM RECIPROCITY

1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.

2. After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States.

3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to refugees the rights and benefits to which they were already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State.

4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of according to refugees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to extending exemption from reciprocity to refugees who do not fulfil the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights and benefits for which this Convention does not provide.

Article 8

EXEMPTION FROM EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES

With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken against the person, property or interests of nationals of a foreign State, the Contracting States, shall not apply such measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the said State solely on account of such nationality. Contracting States which, under their legislation, are prevented from applying the general principle expressed in this article, shall, in appropriate cases, grant exemptions in favour of such refugees.

Article 9

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security.

Article 10

CONTINUITY OF RESIDENCE

1. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War and removed to the territory of a Contracting State, and is resident there, the period of such enforced sojourn shall be considered to have been lawful residence within that territory.

2. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War from the territory of a Contracting State and has, prior to the date of entry into force of this Convention, returned there for the purpose of taking up residence, the period of residence before and after such enforced displacement shall be regarded as one uninterrupted period for any purposes for which uninterrupted residence is required.

Article 11

REFUGEE SEAMEN

In the case of refugees regularly serving as crew members on board a ship flying the flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic consideration to their establishment on its territory and the issue of travel documents to them or their temporary admission to its territory particularly with a view to facilitating their establishment in another country.

CHAPTER II

JURIDICAL STATUS

Article 12

PERSONAL STATUS

1. The personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his residence.

2. Rights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal status, more particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a Contracting State, subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the formalities required by the law of that State, provided that the right in question is one which would have been recognized by the law of that State had he not become a refugee.

Article 13

MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property.

Article 14

ARTISTIC RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, designs or models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, artistic and scientific works, a refugee shall be accorded in the country in which he has his habitual residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country. In the territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual residence.

Article 15

RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

As regards non-political and non-profit-making associations and trade unions the Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances.

Article 16

ACCESS TO COURTS

1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States.
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the Courts, including legal assistance and exemption from *cautio judicatum solvi*.
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence.

CHAPTER III

GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT

Article 17

WAGE-EARNING EMPLOYMENT

1. The Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.
2. In any case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be applied to a refugee who was already exempt from them at the date of entry into force of this Convention for the Contracting State concerned, or who fulfils one of the following conditions:
 - (a) He has completed three years' residence in the country;
 - (b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence. A refugee may not invoke the benefits of this provision if he has abandoned his spouse;

(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country of residence.

3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals, and in particular of those refugees who have entered their territory pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration schemes.

Article 18

SELF-EMPLOYMENT

The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.

Article 19

LIBERAL PROFESSIONS

1. Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
2. The Contracting States shall use their best endeavours consistently with their laws and constitutions to secure the settlement of such refugees in the territories other than the metropolitan territory for whose international relations they are responsible.

CHAPTER IV

WELFARE

Article 20

RATIONING

Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals.

Article 21

HOUSING

As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

Article 22

PUBLIC EDUCATION

1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education.
2. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other

than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.

Article 23

PUBLIC RELIEF

The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.

Article 24

LABOUR LEGISLATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY

1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the following matters:

(a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are subject to the control of administrative authorities: remuneration, including family allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home work, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and training, women's work and the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining;

(b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency which, according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject to the following limitations:

(i) There may be appropriate arrangements for the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in course of acquisition;

(ii) National laws or regulations of the country of residence may prescribe special arrangements concerning benefits or portions of benefits which are payable wholly out of public funds, and concerning allowances paid to persons who do not fulfil the contribution conditions prescribed for the award of a normal pension.

2. The right to compensation for the death of a refugee resulting from employment injury or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact that the residence of the beneficiary is outside the territory of the Contracting State.

3. The Contracting States shall extend to refugees the benefits of agreements concluded between them, or which may be concluded between them in the future, concerning the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process of acquisition in regard to social security, subject only to the conditions which apply to nationals of the States signatory to the agreements in question.

4. The Contracting States will give sympathetic consideration to extending to refugees so far as possible the benefits of similar agreements which may at any time be in force between such Contracting States and non-contracting States.

CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

Article 25

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE

1. When the exercise of a right by a refugee would normally require the assistance of authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse, the Contracting States in whose territory he is residing shall arrange that such assistance be afforded to him by their own authorities or by an international authority.

2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 shall deliver or cause to be delivered under their supervision to refugees such documents or certifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities.

3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the official instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities, and shall be given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary.

4. Subject to such exceptional treatment as may be granted to indigent persons, fees may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such fees shall be moderate and commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services.

5. The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to articles 27 and 28.

Article 26

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

Article 27

IDENTITY PAPERS

The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.

Article 28

TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

1. The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside the territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful residence.

2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by the Contracting States in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to this article.

Article 29

FISCAL CHARGES

1. The Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied on their nationals in similar situations.

2. Nothing in the above paragraph shall prevent the application to refugees of the laws and regulations concerning charges in respect of the issue to aliens of administrative documents including identity papers.

Article 30

TRANSFER OF ASSETS

1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit refugees to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to another country where they have been admitted for the purposes of resettlement.

2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application of refugees for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which are necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been admitted.

Article 31

REFUGEES UNLAWFULLY IN THE COUNTRY
OF REFUGE

1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.

Article 32

EXPULSION

1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.

2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.

3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.

Article 33

PROHIBITION OF EXPULSION OR RETURN
("REFAULEMENT")

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refauler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

Article 34

NATURALIZATION

The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.

CHAPTER VI

EXECUTORY AND TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Article 35

CO-OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WITH
THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.

2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning:

- (a) the condition of refugees.
- (b) the implementation of this Convention, and
- (c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter, be in force relating to refugees.

Article 36

INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

The Contracting States shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of this Convention.

Article 37

RELATION TO PREVIOUS CONVENTIONS

Without prejudice to article 28, paragraph 2, of this Convention, this Convention replaces, as between parties to it, the Arrangements of 5 July 1922, 31 May 1924, 12 May 1926, 30 June 1928 and 30 July 1935, the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 and the Agreement of 15 October 1946.

CHAPTER VII

FINAL CLAUSES

Article 38

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute between parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other means shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute.

Article 39

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION

1. This Convention shall be opened for signature at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and shall thereafter be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It shall be open for signature at the European Office of the United Nations from 28 July to 31 August 1951 and shall be reopened for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations from 17 September 1951 to 31 December 1952.

2. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all States Members of the United Nations, and also on behalf of any other State invited to attend the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons or to which an invitation to sign will have been addressed by the General Assembly. It shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall be open from 28 July 1951 for accession by the States referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 40

TERRITORIAL APPLICATION CLAUSE

1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into force for the State concerned.

2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this notification, or as from the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned, whichever is the later.

3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the time of signature, ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the possibility of taking the necessary steps in order to extend the application of this Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary for constitutional reasons, to the consent of the governments of such territories.

Article 41

FEDERAL CLAUSE

In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the Federal Government shall to this extent be the same as those of Parties which are not Federal States;

(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are not, under the constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment.

(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other Contracting State transmitted

through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its constituent units in regard to any particular provision of the Convention showing the extent to which effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other action.

Article 42

RESERVATIONS

1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36-46 inclusive.

2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 43

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the day of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 44

DENUNCIATION

1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article 40 may, at any time thereafter, by a notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, declare that the Convention shall cease to extend to such territory one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.

Article 45

REVISION

1. Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 46

NOTIFICATIONS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in article 39:

(a) of declarations and notifications in accordance with Section B of Article 1;

(b) of signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with article 39;

(c) of declarations and notifications in accordance with article 40;

(d) of reservations and withdrawals in accordance with article 42;

(e) of the date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance with article 43;

(f) of denunciations and notifications in accordance with article 44;

(g) of requests for revision in accordance with article 45.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention on behalf of their respective Governments,

Done at Geneva, this twenty-eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, in a single copy, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic and which shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States referred to in article 39.

SCHEDULE

Paragraph 1

1. The travel document referred to in article 28 of this Convention shall be similar to the specimen annexed hereto.

2. The document shall be made out in at least two languages, one of which shall be English or French.

Paragraph 2

Subject to the regulations obtaining in the country of issue, children may be included in the travel document of a parent or, in exceptional circumstances, of another adult refugee.

Paragraph 3

The fees charged for issue of the document shall not exceed the lowest scale of charges for national passports.

Paragraph 4

Save in special or exceptional cases, the document shall be made valid for the largest possible number of countries.

Paragraph 5

The document shall have a validity of either one or two years, at the discretion of the issuing authority.

Paragraph 6

1. The renewal or extension of the validity of the document is a matter for the authority which issued it, so long as the holder has not established lawful residence in another territory and resides lawfully in the territory of the said authority. The issue of a new document is, under the same conditions, a matter for the authority which issued the former document.

2. Diplomatic or consular authorities, specially authorized for the purpose, shall be empowered to extend,

for a period not exceeding six months, the validity of travel documents issued by their Governments.

3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to renewing or extending the validity of travel documents or issuing new documents to refugees no longer lawfully resident in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful residence.

Paragraph 7

The Contracting States shall recognize the validity of the documents issued in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of this Convention.

Paragraph 8

The competent authorities of the country to which the refugee desires to proceed shall, if they are prepared to admit him and if a visa is required, affix a visa on the document of which he is the holder.

Paragraph 9

1. The Contracting States undertake to issue transit visas to refugees who have obtained visas for a territory of final destination.

2. The issue of such visas may be refused on grounds which would justify refusal of a visa to any alien.

Paragraph 10

The fees for the issue of exist, entry or transit visas shall not exceed the lowest scale of charges for visas on foreign passports.

Paragraph 11

When a refugee has lawfully taken up residence in the territory of another Contracting State, the responsibility for the issue of a new document, under the terms and conditions of article 28, shall be that of the competent authority of that territory, to which the refugee shall be entitled to apply.

Paragraph 12

The authority issuing a new document shall withdraw the old document and shall return it to the country of issue, if it is stated in the document that it should be so returned; otherwise it shall withdraw and cancel the document.

Paragraph 13

1. Each Contracting State undertakes that the holder of a travel document issued by it in accordance with article 28 of this Convention shall be readmitted to its territory at any time during the period of its validity.

2. Subject to the provisions of the preceding subparagraph, a Contracting State may require the holder of the document to comply with such formalities as may be prescribed in regard to exit from or return to its territory.

3. The Contracting States reserve the right, in exceptional cases, or in cases where the refugee's stay is authorized for a specific period, when issuing the document, to limit the period during which the refugee may return to a period of not less than three months.

Paragraph 14

Subject only to the terms of paragraph 13, the provisions of this Schedule in no way affect the laws and regulations governing the conditions of admission to, transit through, residence and establishment in, and departure from, the territories of the Contracting States.

Paragraph 15

Neither the issue of the document nor the entries made thereon determine or affect the status of the holder, particularly as regards nationality.

Paragraph 16

The issue of the document does not in any way entitle the holder to the protection of the diplomatic or consular authorities of the country of issue, and does not confer on these authorities a right of protection.

ANNEX IX.

EXCERPTS -- UNHCR STATISTICAL REPORT

(Based on Preliminary Surveys)

Table I
First sheet of twoNON-SETTLED REFUGEES BY CATEGORY, COUNTRY AND TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION
(Number of persons)

A. All refugees

Category of household	AUSTRIA			FRANCE			GERMANY			GREECE			ITALY			TURKEY			TOTAL		
	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acc-ommod-ations	All acc-ommod-ations	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acc-ommod-ations	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acc-ommod-ations	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acc-ommod-ations	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acc-ommod-ations	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acc-ommod-ations
1. Refugee households expected to emigrate under normal schemes	13,638	3,014	1,426	2,266	3,692	...	267	4,050	346	179	525	19,907
2. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of institutional difficult cases	397	1,061	236	23	103	-	9	9	759
3. Other refugee households whose head comes within the category of difficult cases	1,350	6,514	2,071	71	26	-	37	37	3,518
4. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of physically handicapped refugees	692	3,475	1,196	3	104	-	66	66	1,995
5. Refugee households difficult to resettle because of social or economic handicaps	1,107	3,560	4,423	324	764	-	38	38	6,618
6. Refugee households which could be settled by procuring employment for one or more members of the household	2,314	4,118	1,471	315	212	-	327	327	4,312
7. Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings	6,059	9,864	406	2	-	89	89	16,331
TOTAL	25,757 ^a	(21,742) ^b	20,687	44,600	65,287	...	1,409	5,241	346	745	1,091	53,440 ^b

a. Including a number of persons from Yugoslavia on whose refugee status a decision is pending.

b. Including one unofficial camp in Greece.

c. Excluding "Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings" and a number of refugees likely to emigrate after the end of 1958, some of whom may be non-settled.

Table I
Second sheet of twoNON-SETTLED REFUGEES BY CATEGORY, COUNTRY AND TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION
(Number of persons)

Category of household	AUSTRIA		FRANCE		GERMANY		GREECE		ITALY		TURKEY		TOTAL	
	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	All acco-ations	All acco-ations	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps	In off-icial camps	Outside off-icial camps
1. Refugee households expected to emigrate under normal schemes	13,019	...	1,365	178	527	705	239	...	3,995	...	322	45	367	17,753
2. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of institutional difficult cases	274	...	30	11	92	103	-	...	16	...	-	-	-	301
3. Other refugee households whose head comes within the category of difficult cases	590	...	124	127	688	815	6	...	2	...	-	5	5	725
4. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of physically handicapped refugees	336	...	97	147	251	398	-	...	39	...	-	5	5	522
5. Refugee households difficult to (re)settle because of social or economic handicaps	389	...	121	184	741	925	-	...	446	...	-	10	10	1,019
6. Refugee households which could be settled by procuring employment for one or more members of the household	2,004	...	717	402	1,339	1,741	14	...	210	...	-	14	14	2,650
7. Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings	786	178	151	329	-	...	2	...	-	-	-	966
TOTAL	17,398 ^a	...	(2,454) ^b	1,227	3,789	5,016	259	...	4,710	...	322	79	401	23,916 ^b

B. Refugees eligible for USRP assistance

C. Refugees not eligible for USRP assistance

1. Refugee households expected to emigrate under normal schemes	819	...	1,649	1,248	1,739	2,987	28	...	35	...	24	134	158	2,154	...
2. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of institutional difficult cases	123	...	1,031	225	23	...	87	...	-	9	9	458	...
3. Other refugee households whose head comes within the category of difficult cases	760	...	6,390	1,944	65	...	24	...	-	32	32	2,793	...
4. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of physically handicapped refugees	356	...	3,578	1,049	3	...	65	...	-	61	61	1,473	...
5. Refugee households difficult to (re)settle because of social or economic handicaps	718	...	3,439	4,239	324	...	318	...	-	28	28	5,599	...
6. Refugee households which could be settled by procuring employment for one or more members of the household	310	...	3,401	1,069	301	...	2	...	-	313	313	1,682	...
7. Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings	5,273	9,686	406	...	-	...	-	89	89	15,365	...
TOTAL	8,359 ^a	...	(19,288) ^b	19,460	40,811	60,271	1,150	...	531	...	24	666	690	29,524 ^b	...

See footnotes on first sheet.

Table II
First sheet of three

NON-SETTLED REFUGEES BY NATIONALITY OR ORIGIN, COUNTRY AND TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION

A. All refugees

Nationality or origin ^a	AUSTRIA			FRANCE			GERMANY			GREECE			ITALY			TURKEY			TOTAL		
	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accom- modations	All accom- modations	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accom- modations	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accom- modations	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accom- modations	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accom- modations	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accom- modations
Albanians	2	65	398	323	323
Armenians	12	1,156	5
Austrians ^b	144	3
Baltes	110	...	177	2
Bulgarians	32	...	119	34	199	93	93
Czechoslovaks	299	...	558	44	8	8
Egypt (refugees from)	-	...	1,000	-	-	-	-
Germania ^c	-	...	61	-	1	-	-
Hungarians ("old") ^e	691	...	282	-	69	53	53
Hungarians ("new")	14,424	...	1,531	-	217	345	372
Poles	338	...	3,336	-	53	1	98
Romanians	1,587	...	408	826	49	15	16
Spaniards ^d	-	...	7,474	-	4	-	-
Romanians ^e	335	...	718	-	9	-	-
Ukrainians ^f	28	...	3,642	-	161	-	41
USSR (pre-war)	333	...	121	287	4,136	-	2
USSR (others)	7,200 ^h	...	937	197	-	145
Yugoslavs	378	...	131	-	11	-	-
Others
Unspecified ^g
TOTAL	25,757 ^h	...	(21,742) ⁱ	...	20,687	44,600	65,287	1,409	5,241	346	745	1,091	53,440 ^g

^a Refugees are classified, as a rule, according to their nationality. Stateless refugees are classified according to their origin; those whose origin cannot be ascertained are included in "Unspecified".

^b Refugees of Austrian (German) origin who left their country under the national-socialist régime and have maintained their refugee status.

^c Refugees who left Hungary prior to 23 October 1956.

^d Spanish Republicans.

^e Refugees who expressly claim Ukrainian nationality or origin.

^f Refugees who left the USSR before the Second World War, including White Russians.

^g Including one unofficial camp in Greece.

^h Including a number of persons from Yugoslavia on whose refugee status a decision is pending.

ⁱ Excluding "Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings" and a number of refugees likely to emigrate after the end of 1958, some of whom may be non-settled.

Table II
Second sheet of three

NON-SETTLED REFUGEES BY NATIONALITY OR ORIGIN, COUNTRY AND TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION

B. Refugees eligible for USEP assistance

Nationality or origin ^a	AUSTRIA		FRANCE		GERMANY		GREECE		ITALY		TURKEY		TOTAL	
	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accommodations	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accommodations	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	All accommodations
Albanians	2	...	9	1	2	3	51	...	299	...	-	6	353	...
Armenians ^b	-	...	21	6	-	6	-	...	-	...	-	-	6	...
Austrians ^c	-	...	10	9	1	10	-	...	-	...	-	-	9	...
Balts	4	...	3	8	27	35	23	...	123	...	-	38	158	...
Bulgarians	27	...	257	113	512	625	-	...	18	...	-	1	158	...
Czechoslovaks	-	...	2	-	-	-	-	...	-	...	-	-	-	...
Egypt (refugees from)	-	...	-	-	-	-	-	...	-	...	-	-	-	...
German ^b	91	...	31	-	20	20	-	...	39	...	-	-	130	...
Hungarians	14,424	...	1,449	123	343	466	-	...	217	...	321	27	15,085	...
Poles	7	...	173	123	217	340	-	...	11	...	-	1	141	...
Romanians	9	...	13	5	15	20	-	...	34	...	-	-	49	...
Spaniards ^d	-	...	-	-	-	-	-	...	-	...	-	-	-	...
Ukrainians ^e	28	236	415	651	-	...	7	...	-	-	-	...
USSR (pre-war) ^f	48	...	46	586	2,126	2,712	-	...	116	...	-	1	1,452	...
USSR (others)	459	...	50	-	-	-	-	...	-	...	-	-	-	...
Yugoslavs	-	-
Others	-	-
Unspecified ^g	2,327 ^h	...	362	15	111	126	185	...	3,846	...	-	5	6,373	...
TOTAL	17,398 ⁱ	...	(2,454) ^j	1,227	3,789	5,016	259	...	4,710	...	322	79	23,916 ^k	...

^a Refugees are classified, as a rule, according to their nationality. Stateless refugees are classified according to their origin; those whose origin cannot be ascertained are included in "Unspecified".

^b Refugees of Austrian (German) origin who left their country under the national-socialist régime and have maintained their refugee status.

^c Refugees who left Hungary prior to 23 October 1956.

^d Spanish Republicans.

^e Refugees who expressly claim Ukrainian nationality or origin.

^f Refugees who left the USSR before the Second World War, including White Russians.

^g Including one unofficial camp in Greece.

^h Included under "USSR".

ⁱ Including a number of persons on whose refugee status a decision is pending.

^j Excluding "Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings" and a number of refugees likely to emigrate after the end of 1958, some of whom may be non-settled.

Table II
Third sheet of three

NON-SETTLED REFUGEES BY NATIONALITY OR ORIGIN, COUNTRY AND TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION

C. Refugees not eligible for UNRPA assistance

Nationality or origin ^a	AUSTRIA		FRANCE		GERMANY		GREECE		ITALY		TURKEY		TOTAL	
	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accommodations	In official camps	Outside official camps	All accommodations	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	Outside official camps	In official camps	Outside official camps
Albanians	-	...	3	14	...	39	...	-	317
Armenians	1,135	-	...	5	...	-	-
Austrians ^b	44	-	...	3	...	-	-
Balks	167	-	...	2	...	-	-
Bulgarians	28	...	146	11	...	16	...	-	55
Czechoslovaks	272	...	301	-	...	26	...	-	7
Egypt (refugees from)	998	-	...	-	...	-	-
German ^c	-	...	61	-	...	1	...	-	-
Hungarians	600	...	251	-	...	30	...	-	53
Polos	331	...	82	-	...	-	...	24	24
Romanians	1,578	...	3,163	826	...	15	...	-	37
Spaniards ^d	-	...	395	-	...	4	...	-	15
Ukrainians ^e	-	...	7,474	-	...	2	...	-	-
USSR (pre-war ^f)	189	...	690	-	...	45	...	-	40
Others	4,875 ^h	...	582	287	...	301	...	-	2
Unspecified ^a	378	...	124	-	...	-	...	-	140
TOTAL	8,350 ^h	...	19,288 ⁱ	19,460	40,811	60,271	1,150	...	531	...	24	666	29,524 ^k	...

^a Refugees are classified, as a rule, according to their nationality. Stateless refugees are classified according to their origin; those whose origin cannot be ascertained are included in "Unspecified".

^b Refugees of Austrian (German) origin who left their country under the national-socialist regime and have maintained their refugee status.

^c Refugees who left Hungary prior to 23 October 1956.

^d Spanish Republicans.

^e Refugees who expressly claim Ukrainian nationality or origin.

^f Refugees who left the USSR before the Second World War, including White Russians.

^g Including one unofficial camp in Greece.

^h Including a number of persons from Yugoslavia on whose refugee status a decision is pending.

ⁱ Excluding "Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings" and a number of refugees likely to emigrate after the end of 1958, some of whom may be non-settled.

Table III
First sheet of two

NON-SETTLED REFUGEES LIVING IN OFFICIAL CAMPS,^a
BY CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD, COUNTRY AND ETHNIC GROUP
 (Number of persons)

A. All refugees

Category of household	AUSTRIA			GERMANY	GREECE			ITALY	TURKEY	TOTAL
	Ethnic German refugees	Alien ^b refugees	Both groups		Ethnic Greek refugees ^a	Alien refugees	Both groups			
1. Refugee households expected to emigrate under normal schemes	431	13,407	13,838	1,426	12	255	267	4,030	346	19,907
2. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of institutional difficult cases	112	285	397	236	23	-	23	103	-	759
3. Other refugee households whose head comes within the category of difficult cases	572	778	1,350	2,071	62	9	71	26	-	3,518
4. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of physically handicapped refugees	155	537	692	1,196	3	-	3	104	-	1,995
5. Refugee households difficult to (re)settle because of social or economic handicaps	585	522	1,107	4,423	324	-	324	764	-	6,618
6. Refugee households which could be settled by procuring employment for one or more members of the household	131	2,183	2,314	1,471	283	32	315	212	-	4,312
7. Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings	3,715	2,344	6,059	9,864	406	-	406	2	-	16,331
TOTAL	5,701	20,056 ^b	25,757	20,687	1,113 ^a	296	1,409	5,241	346	53,440

^a Including refugees living in one unofficial camp in Greece.

^b Including a number of persons from Yugoslavia on whose refugee status a decision is pending.

Table III
Second sheet of two

NON-SETTLED REFUGEES LIVING IN OFFICIAL CAMPS -
BY CATEGORY OF HOUSEHOLD, COUNTRY AND ETHNIC GROUP
(Number of persons)

Category of household	AUSTRIA		GERMANY		GREECE			ITALY	TURKEY	TOTAL
	Ethnic German refugees	Alien, b refugees ^a	Both groups		Ethnic Greek refugees ^a	Alien refugees	Both groups			

B. Refugees eligible for UNRPA assistance

1. Refugee households expected to emigrate under normal schemes	.	13,019	13,019	178	.	239	239	3,995	322	17,753
2. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of institutional difficult cases	.	274	274	11	.	-	-	16	-	301
3. Other refugee households whose head comes within the category of difficult cases	.	590	590	127	.	6	6	2	-	725
4. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of physically handicapped refugees	.	336	336	147	.	-	-	39	-	522
5. Refugee households difficult to (re)settle because of social or economic handicaps	.	389	389	184	.	-	-	446	-	1,019
6. Refugee households which could be settled by procuring employment for one or more members of the household	.	2,004	2,004	402	.	14	14	210	-	2,630
7. Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings	.	786	786	178	.	-	-	2	-	966
TOTAL	.	17,398 ^b	17,398	1,227	.	259	259	4,710	322	23,916

C. Refugees not eligible for UNRPA assistance

1. Refugee households expected to emigrate under normal schemes	431	368	819	1,248	12	16	28	35	24	2,154
2. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of institutional difficult cases	112	11	123	225	23	-	23	87	-	458
3. Other refugee households whose head comes within the category of difficult cases	572	188	760	1,944	62	3	65	24	-	2,793
4. Refugee households whose head comes within the category of physically handicapped refugees	155	201	356	1,049	3	-	3	65	-	1,473
5. Refugee households difficult to (re)settle because of social or economic handicaps	585	133	718	4,239	324	-	324	318	-	5,599
6. Refugee households which could be settled by procuring employment for one or more members of the household	131	179	310	1,069	283	18	301	2	-	1,682
7. Other refugee households living in sub-standard dwellings	3,715	1,558	5,273	9,686	406	-	406	-	-	15,365
TOTAL	5,701	2,658 ^b	8,359	19,460	1,113 ^d	37	1,150	531	24	29,524

See footnotes on first sheet.

Table IV
First sheet of three

NON-SETTLED REFUGEES LIVING IN OFFICIAL CAMPS,
BY NATIONALITY OR ORIGIN, COUNTRY AND ETHNIC GROUP
A. All refugees

Nationality or origin ^a	AUSTRIA			GERMANY	GREECE			ITALY	TURKEY	TOTAL
	Ethnic German refugees	Alien refugees	Both groups		Ethnic Greek refugees ^g	Alien refugees	Both groups			
Albanians	-	2	2	...	-	65	65	338	-	...
Armenians ^b	-	-	5	-	...
Austrians ^c	...	110	110	-	-	3	-	...
Balta	...	32	32	34	34	2	-	...
Bulgarians	192	107	299	-	-	139	-	...
Czechoslovaks	-	-	-	-	-	44	-	...
Egypt (refugees from)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	...
Germans ^b	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	...
Hungarians { "old" ^e "new"	200	491	691	-	-	69	-	...
Poles	80	14,424	14,424	-	-	217	345	...
Romanians	1,522	258	338	-	-	53	-	...
Spaniards ^d	...	65	1,587	...	826	-	-	49	1	...
Ukrainians ^e	6	-	-	-	-	4	-	...
USSR { pre-war ^f others	29	329	335	-	-	9	-	...
Yugoslavs	3,635	28	28	-	-	161	-	...
Others	37	304	333	...	287	-	-	197	-	...
Unspecified ^g	3,635	3,565 ^h	7,200	...	-	197	-	4,136	-	...
TOTAL	5,701	20,056 ^h	25,757	20,687	1,113 ^g	296	1,409	5,241	346	53,440

^a Refugees are classified, as a rule, according to their nationality. Stateless refugees are classified according to their origin; those whose origin cannot be ascertained are included in "Unspecified".

^b Refugees of Austrian (German) origin who left their country under the national-socialist régime and have maintained their refugee status.

^c Refugees who left Hungary prior to 23 October 1956.

^d Spanish Republicans.

^e Refugees who expressly claim Ukrainian nationality or origin.

^f Refugees who left the USSR before the Second World War, including White Russians.

^g Including refugees living in one unofficial camp in Greece.

^h Including a number of persons from Yugoslavia on whose refugee status a decision is pending.

ANNEX X

R E S O L U T I O N

ADOPTED BY THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

(November 16, 1957)

- WHEREAS the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have since 1949 joined in common cause to protect their freedom and independence from the threat of Communist suppression and aggression; and
- WHEREAS Soviet enslavement and repression of the peoples of Eastern Europe has proven so abhorrent that thousands each month seek refuge in the lands of their Free neighbors; and
- WHEREAS the great majority of these refugees are motivated by their devotion to freedom and their repugnance for Soviet tyranny; and
- WHEREAS they have in large measure sought the sanctuary of their Free neighbors in response to the promises of freedom, humanity and justice which are repeatedly directed to the peoples enslaved by the Soviet Union; and
- WHEREAS the Free Nations geographically contiguous to those enslaved by the Soviet Union have already offered all facilities within their respective economic capacity to welcome and absorb these refugees; and
- WHEREAS the volume of escapees has in recent years multiplied beyond the absorptive abilities of those nations offering asylum; and
- WHEREAS approximately 200,000 refugees from Communist enslavement are still unsettled in West European countries, many in refugee camps, which are overtaxed and characterized by inadequate and temporary facilities, and which have resulted in a serious strain on the economies and resources of these asylum nations; and
- WHEREAS the welfare and eventual resettlement of these refugees from tyranny requires the assistance of the Free nations including those that comprise the Membership of NATO; and
- WHEREAS Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty prescribes for the organization economic and social functions broad enough to encompass the solution of this tragic problem; and
- WHEREAS the experience in resettling almost 200,000 Hungarian refugees during the past year demonstrates that the Members of NATO are capable of resolving this problem humanely

NOW, Therefore be it Resolved,

THAT the NATO PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE urge upon the Members of the NATO Council to examine the best means of putting the influence and resources of the members of NATO at the disposal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Special Representative of the Council of Europe, ICEM and other Agencies in the interests of Western Security and in order to demonstrate in a practical manner the Free World's capacity to deal with the victims of tyranny and the possibility of cooperation of the NATO countries therein.